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Abstract 
 
There is little in Quine’s philosophy that is more significant and more puzzling than his 
commitment to naturalism. On the one hand, naturalism seems to play an unparalleled role in 
explaining the development and unorthodox nature of Quine’s views. On the other hand, 
however, naturalism is deeply elusive. Not only is there disagreement amongst commentators 
about how to understand the nature and development of naturalism, but also Quine’s own 
characterisations of naturalism are often thinly sketched and leave us with few clues as to 
how we should understand naturalism and its origins. In light of these reasons, it is a 
significant challenge to arrive at an accurate picture of what naturalism amounts to and how it 
fits into Quine’s philosophical development. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of Quine’s commitment to naturalism, and 
to highlight the ways in which this analysis illuminates the surrounding landscape of his 
philosophical views. Here, I endeavour to show that careful analysis into what Quine’s 
commitment to naturalism amounts to establishes that this commitment is not as longstanding 
as is often thought. More specifically, I argue that Quine is not committed to naturalism until 
shortly after ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, and this reveals that Quine’s philosophical work 
cannot be felicitously understood as revolving around a stable commitment to naturalism. 
Having established this, I then explain the ways in which this analysis informs a thorough 
interpretation of several vital aspects of his thought, such as the development of his attitude 
towards analyticity, and his sustained commitment to empiricism. I believe that these 
findings motivate and lay the foundations of a cautious and appropriately nuanced 
understanding of Quine.   
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7 
Introduction 
 
Names of philosophical positions are a necessary evil. They are necessary because we 
need to refer to a stated position or doctrine from time to time, and it would be tiresome 
to keep restating it. They are evil in that they come to be conceived as designating 
schools of thought, objects of loyalty from within and objects of obloquy from without, 
and hence obstacles, within and without, to the pursuit of truth.1 
 
There is a key to unlocking a correct interpretation of Quine which many of his critics 
and commentators have overlooked. That key is Quine’s commitment to naturalism.2 
 
Amongst the many puzzles associated with the philosophy of W.V. Quine, one stands out due 
to its complexity, centrality, and importance: the problem of Quine’s naturalism. On the one 
hand, naturalism plays an unparalleled role in explaining the development and unorthodox 
nature of Quine’s views, but on the other, naturalism is deeply elusive. Commentators often 
diverge widely in their interpretations of what naturalism amounts to and how it develops in 
Quine’s philosophy, and some don’t even acknowledge its presence at all. Moreover, Quine 
himself, with his penchant for precise but poetic language over the prosaic, often 
characterises naturalism in ways that seem to differ subtly from each other and that leave us 
with few clues about how naturalism was brought into the world. It is therefore a major 
challenge to arrive at an accurate picture of what naturalism amounts to and how it fits into 
Quine’s philosophical development. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of Quine’s commitment to naturalism, and 
to highlight the ways in which this analysis illuminates the surrounding landscape of his 
philosophical views.3 Here, I argue that Quine’s naturalism amounts to a substantial view on 
the nature of philosophical inquiry that casts a light on a number of often dimly lit aspects of 
and developments in his thought. Namely, I argue that Quine’s naturalism is not as 
longstanding a commitment as is often thought, i.e. that Quine is not committed to naturalism 
 
1 Quine, W.V. ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.461. Henceforth, I suppress 
the name of the author when it’s Quine. 
2 Gibson, R. 1992. p.17 
3 For a similar approach, see Verhaegh, S. 2018 
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until shortly after his monumental paper ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951).4 This prompts 
a more careful understanding of both the nature of Quine’s overall view — since it cannot 
always be viewed as naturalistic — and the development of his naturalism. By providing a 
careful examination of Quine’s commitment to naturalism, which consequently informs a 
thorough interpretation of the development of Quine’s philosophical thought, I aim to lay the 
foundations for a more nuanced and cautious understanding of his work. 
 
In this introduction, I contextualise and motivate my project by identifying a number of 
important and directly related problems; problems which make addressing the puzzle of 
eliciting Quine’s naturalism difficult but vital for understanding his philosophy, as well as his 
place in the history of philosophy. There is no clear consensus over what naturalism is, but 
roughly, it encompasses a family of views that emphasise some form of continuity between 
philosophy and science. Precisely how we should understand Quine’s naturalism will be 
made clear in Chapter 1. 
 
Let me begin by surveying briefly the different uses of the term ‘naturalism’ in recent 
philosophy and some associated problems, as well as indicating ways in which Quine figures 
into this landscape. Getting a clear and accurate picture of naturalism is crucial not just in 
gaining a better understanding of the evolution of analytic philosophy and one of its key 
figures, but it is especially important today where naturalism seems to be the prominent 
metaphilosophy, or at least the prominent methodological approach to philosophy. As Hacker 
claims, naturalism is supposedly “the distinctive development in philosophy over the last 
thirty years.”5 This claim is from a little over ten years ago, but times have not changed. 
Glock describes Quine’s stress on the continuity between science and philosophy as the 
“orthodoxy”.6 And, as Foley stresses, naturalism is a movement that’s spreading fast into 
each recess of philosophy.7 Analytic philosophy itself is sometimes defined in terms of its 
respect for science, and so the naturalist, in pushing philosophy and science closer together, is 
in some sense the analytic philosopher par excellence.8 
 
 
4 Hereafter I refer to this as ‘Two Dogmas’. 
5 Hacker, P.M.S. 2006. p.231 
6 Glock, H. 2003. p.25. See De Caro, M. and Macarthur, D. 2004. pp.1-2 
7 Foley, R. 1994. p.243 
8 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.5 f11 
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Whatever naturalism amounts to, there seems to be universal acknowledgement from both 
naturalists and those reacting to naturalism that Quine is not only an important figure, but 
some sort of founder of the movement – at least for its contemporary incarnation. Hacker 
claims that “[c]ontemporary American naturalism originates in the writings of Quine”.9 Paul 
Churchland praises Quine for pushing the idea that philosophy and science are continuous 
and for helping to stop philosophers from relying on the method of armchair reflection.10 
Dreben stresses Quine’s influence even more strongly, without restricting it to naturalism, 
writing: “Quine has set the terms in which an enormous amount of contemporary philosophy 
is done….hardly anyone…does not do theoretical philosophy in the terms that Quine has 
set.”11 Naturalism, then, is an immensely popular movement in philosophy, and Quine is 
often acknowledged to be an important figure in this movement. 
 
However, while many philosophers stress that contemporary naturalists are following or are 
at least influenced by Quine, I want to stress that this is often very superficial, not least 
because it’s poorly understood what Quine’s naturalism is. Also, as has been well noted, it’s 
unclear whether there’s any way of giving a general characterisation of naturalism that does 
any sort of justice to most of the positions that are viewed as naturalistic. The idea that we 
can capture the essence of Quine’s philosophy and see how well it aligns with his supposed 
present-day allies is too optimistic, or, at least, it underestimates the complexity (and perhaps 
even the determinacy) of the proposed task. 
 
For a while, philosophers have become aware of just how problematic a label ‘naturalism’ is. 
Giedymin notes how different naturalism is from philosopher to philosopher: 
 
Naturalism in philosophy is by no means as simple a doctrine as it appears at first sight. 
Because of inherent ambiguities and because of the curious turns in its recent evolution, 
it is not really one coherent philosophical theory. When two naturalists say the same, 
they do not (necessarily) mean the same.12 
 
 
9 Hacker, P.M.S. 2006. p.231. See De Caro, M. and Macarthur, D. 2004, p.8 
10 Churchland, P. 1986. pp.2-3 
11 Dreben, B. 1990. p.88 
12 Giedymin, J. 1972. p.45 
 
 
10 
The term is ambiguous (perhaps inherently ambiguous) in that it refers to a number of distinct 
approaches to philosophy, and also distinct aspects of philosophy. For example, some view 
naturalism as a metaphilosophy while others instead view it as a methodological restriction.  
 
In addition to its ambiguity, some have complained that naturalism is vague by definition. 
Indeed, it has even been argued that this vagueness is a constitutive feature of naturalism: 
 
…the idea is to make sure that our philosophical theories are compatible with science. 
Put roughly, and it may be that it cannot be put any other way, this means that in our 
philosophical theories we are to make use only of those properties that are either 
reducible to or supervene upon properties that science countenances.13 
 
Moreover, as a further issue, naturalism is not new, nor is the appeal to natural investigation 
or objects. For this reason, viewing the naturalistic turn as a novel development, where Quine 
acts as a founder of the movement, also seems problematic. This is a point that has been 
raised strongly by Stroud: 
 
The idea of “nature,” or “natural” objects or relations, or modes of investigation that are 
“naturalistic,” has been applied more widely, at more different times and places, and for 
more different purposes, than probably any other notion in the whole history of human 
thought.14 
 
Given worries like these, then, finding some common or essential feature of naturalistic 
views seems implausible. That being said, a number of philosophers seem to have had some 
success. For example, Giedymin thinks that naturalistic theories share “the claim that the 
method of natural science is the only legitimate or appropriate method to be used in 
attempting to acquire knowledge of whatever kind.”15 Although this seems to capture 
something minimal but generally accepted by naturalists, it’s clear that naturalists differ 
widely over their specific views. Giedymin thinks that the reason for this disagreement is 
because this common principle, that the method of science is the only one we can use to get 
knowledge, is ambiguous in many ways. For example, naturalists disagree about what the 
 
13 Foley, R. 1994. p.243. My emphasis. 
14 Stroud, B. 1996. p.43 
15 Giedymin, J. 1972. p.45 
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scientific method is and whether mathematics is to be included in science. For these reasons, 
using a general principle to understand the nature of naturalism instead ends up being “a 
matrix which generates widely divergent methodological programmes.”16 Quine is certainly 
no exception here; he has specific answers to all of these questions which gives him a very 
distinctive version of naturalism that differs in important ways from other naturalists. 
 
We’ve seen that there are significant problems in finding a general characterisation of 
naturalism. But whatever naturalism signifies generally, one’s own brand of naturalism is 
often presented as a methodological approach to philosophy, and so a spirit that embodies a 
philosopher and guides their answers to all questions from epistemology to ethics. However, 
in practice, we tend to see philosophers applying naturalism to specific areas of philosophy. 
This is one way in which Quine stands out because he has a deeply systematic approach, as 
I’ll explain shortly. 
 
Perhaps the most prominent area where naturalism has taken root is in epistemology, and 
Quine’s influence here is often claimed to be foundational. Kim, for example, claims that 
Quine is the main influence cited by naturalists in epistemology, especially in stressing 
science’s relevance to epistemology and in rejecting traditional approaches. Naturalists reject 
traditional epistemology as being an a priori subject.17 It’s vital, then, that we are clear about 
the nature and plausibility of Quine’s naturalism to better understand not just the general 
position of naturalism, but also more particularly both Quine’s actual influence on 
contemporary epistemology, as well as Quine’s naturalised epistemology. 
 
Beyond focussing on naturalism specifically, there is a lot of evidence that Quine’s 
philosophy has been poorly understood. A common claim to find at the start of a serious and 
detailed interpretation of Quine is a statement that people are still not really clear on his 
views. For example, Kemp claims: “much of what is most powerful and deeply interesting in 
Quine is not widely understood…”18 Similarly, philosophers often emphasise that the lack of 
an understanding about Quine’s overall philosophy is an important reason for writing about 
 
16 Ibid. pp.45-6 
17 Kim, J. 1988. p.385, pp.394-99. Kim doesn’t think that epistemological naturalists tend to 
actually be Quinean, however, because Kim thinks that Quine eliminates normativity from 
epistemology whereas epistemological naturalists generally retain it. 
18 Kemp, G. 2006. ix 
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him. We see this in the introduction to Gibson’s monograph Enlightened Empiricism: “[a] 
premise of this book, and a justification for its existence, is that Quine’s philosophy is not 
well understood by most philosophers…”19 
 
Indeed Quine, who has supposedly influenced the dominant view in contemporary 
philosophy the most, is viewed as putting forward sceptical, implausible and dismissive 
views in most areas of philosophy. The reason that most philosophers writing about Quine 
misunderstand his views is usually that Quine’s deeply systematic approach to philosophy, 
his naturalism, is not appreciated.20 While philosophers working thoroughly on Quine 
disagree about the nature of his naturalism, there is general agreement that Quine is a deeply 
systematic philosopher, that naturalism is Quine’s systematic approach to philosophy,21 and 
that this complex systematicity is a large part of what makes Quine’s philosophy so difficult 
to understand.22  
 
Indeed, part of the reason that Quine’s philosophy is so poorly understood is because the 
nature of naturalism is so connected to Quine’s views; views which are, often by themselves, 
difficult to grasp. The systematic nature of Quine’s naturalism might be the key to 
understanding his philosophy, but this doesn’t make clarity easy to obtain. Difficult and often 
radical views on specific philosophical issues which need to be understood in the context of 
an overall difficult and radical approach to philosophy make Quine’s views especially 
challenging to decipher.23 
 
A further reason that’s often highlighted for explaining why Quine’s philosophy is so poorly 
understood is the difficulty of his prose. Part of what makes Quine so impenetrable is that his 
writing is often very brief. The reason for this is that Quine tends to take time explaining 
things in detail only when he himself finds the point not obvious, or when enough people 
have failed to appreciate the point that Quine feels he has to set the record straight.24 As 
 
19 Gibson, R. 1988. xv 
20 See also Becker, E. 2012. ix 
21 Creath is an exception, claiming that pragmatism is a more basic commitment. Creath, R. 
1990b. p.17 
22 See Gibson, R. 1988. xv-xvi. Glock, H. 2003. p.27. Kemp, G. 2012. p.15. Verhaegh, S. 
2018. pp.6-7. Hylton, P. 2007. p.2 
23 See Gregory, P. 2011. p.1 
24 See Ibid. Johnsen, B.C. 2005 
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Foley stresses: “[w]hen faced with the choice of expressing his views with great elegance or 
maximum clarity, he [Quine] rarely chooses the latter.”25 
 
A good place to see this problem is in the reviews of Word and Object, often taken to be 
Quine’s most important monograph, especially in relation to naturalism.26 Here we see the 
difficulty of Quine’s prose leading to complaints from his audience. Oesterle, for example, 
claims that “what [Quine] finally avows is not wholly clear.”27 Wells claims that Quine’s 
style is “very demanding”, that “if the ship of science…is not merely to stay afloat but to sail, 
it should not drag anchor.”28 Quine, Wells claims, gives up rigour in favour of “fluency of 
exposition.”29 And Presley claims that Quine’s prose “is sometimes condensed to the point of 
enigma.”30 
 
Quine was aware of this problem. He notes that while he tried to keep parts of Word and 
Object succinct, Dreben later told him that he went too far.31 That being said, Quine’s later 
work doesn’t become drastically less concise, so even if Quine was aware of this problem, he 
didn’t quite learn the lesson. It doesn’t help that Quine’s approach to writing often flouts the 
norms for what’s usually expected in philosophical papers. Quine, especially after 1950, 
rarely mentions his contemporaries unless to reorient his own position against them. He 
doesn’t, for example, present various views on a topic and then proceed to show why they are 
wrong before presenting his own solution to the problem. 
 
With all of this in mind, then, here’s the crux of the problem that this thesis will address. The 
lack of an understanding of naturalism (as evidenced by its ambiguity, vagueness, etc.) leads 
to significant issues when it comes to evaluating Quine’s philosophy. For example, Gregory 
notes that many common objections against Quine, like that his view is circular, or that his 
epistemology isn’t normative, “tend to be based on the very presuppositions concerning 
epistemology and human knowing that Quine is at pains to reject or alter” because of Quine’s 
 
25 Foley, R. 1994. p.245 
26 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.151-61 
27 Oesterle, J.A. 1961. p.119 
28 Wells, R. 1961. p.696 
29 Ibid. p.697 
30 Presley, C.F. 1961. p.175 
31 Time of My Life, p.34, p.44. ‘Philosophy’, p.42 
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naturalistic perspective.32 More generally, Gibson argues that a number of common problems 
for Quine’s philosophy only arise because people haven’t appreciated the role of 
naturalism.33 Because the nature of Quine’s naturalism is not understood, and thereby not 
taken into account when explaining and evaluating his view, this means that Quine’s position 
is viewed as being far less plausible than it would otherwise be and far more radical than is 
reasonable.34 Given how important Quine’s naturalism is to his later philosophical work, an 
authentic interpretation and evaluation of Quine’s philosophy requires a proper understanding 
of his naturalism. 
 
However, to be clear, it’s not merely that the nature of naturalism is misunderstood. What 
makes things worse is that that the development of Quine’s naturalism is poorly understood 
and appreciated, perhaps even more so than the nature of the view itself. It’s only recently 
that the development of Quine’s naturalism has started to be studied rigorously, especially in 
relation to Quine’s earlier work.35 Moreover, a related problem that Verhaegh stresses is that 
what’s also missing is studies of how Quine’s work was received by philosophers. This is 
part of a more general problem that analytic philosophy, as opposed to philosophy more 
generally, has tended to lack such studies. The fact that philosophers are beginning to pay 
attention to the history of Quine’s views seems to be part of a more general move to see the 
history of analytic philosophy as valuable for analytic philosophy itself.36 This is especially 
important for understanding Quine because his naturalism emerges out of his reaction to 
philosophers that he has some sort of kindred spirit with, especially Carnap.37 It will be 
crucial throughout to look at how Quine interpreted Carnap, as well as other important 
philosophers for his development like Russell and Hume. It’s this perspective, i.e. Quine’s 
interpretation of these figures, that will be crucial for my views, for it is Quine’s 
interpretation that is affecting his own philosophical position. Note that, in this pursuit, I’m 
not attempting to offer my own historical analysis or exposition of views like Carnap’s. 
 
 
32 Gregory, P. 2011. p.1 
33 Gibson, R. 1992. 
34 Quine appreciates this. He writes: “Gibson plausibly surmised that the major obstacle to 
understanding my position is a failure to take my commitment to naturalism seriously”. 
‘Reply to Gibson’, p.367 
35 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.79-80 
36 See Floyd, J. 2009. p.157 
37 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.4-5 
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So, there is a cluster of problems surrounding both the development and nature of Quine’s 
naturalism and, more generally, concerning how we can pinpoint his location within the 
naturalist tradition. These problems show how important it is to understand the nature, the 
development, and the extent of Quine’s naturalism. Here, by establishing that Quine’s 
naturalistic perspective is absent in his earlier work, I aim to both provide an interpretation of 
Quine’s pre-naturalistic views, as well identify ways in which these views relate to his later 
naturalistic position. Let me summarise how I will do so. 
 
In Chapter 1, I argue that Quine was not always a naturalist. I do this by first motivating the 
idea that there is a tendency to view Quine as having been, at least to some significant extent, 
a naturalist very early in his work. I then provide a detailed characterisation of Quine’s 
naturalism which shows naturalism to be a developed, nuanced and restrictive approach to 
philosophical inquiry. Naturalism is restrictive in that it requires the philosopher to always 
work within science and reject theorising that is first philosophical. I then argue that Quine’s 
early work cannot felicitously be viewed as naturalistic because Quine is open to a form of 
phenomenalist theorising that would be prohibited by a naturalistic outlook until at least 
1951. I conclude the chapter by examining Quine’s later argument against phenomenalism. 
Doing so, I contend, provides evidence for the idea that the emergence of Quine’s naturalism 
takes place soon after 1951. 
 
In Chapter 2, I turn my attention to ‘Two Dogmas’. This is often cited as the critical paper for 
Quine’s move towards naturalism. However, I provide reasons that undermine the idea that 
Quine undergoes an important change in his perspective in this paper. The apparent conflict 
between these claims, I take it, prompts a more thorough analysis of Quine’s position in ‘Two 
Dogmas’ and the evolution of his philosophical thought leading up to it. To better understand 
the nature and significance of Quine’s views on analyticity, including their relation to the 
development of naturalism, I undertake a careful investigation into the development of 
Quine’s evolving attitude towards analyticity. This analysis reveals that Quine’s views 
towards analyticity are multifaceted and that they develop in a subtle but natural way from 
fairly friendly optimism to bleak pessimism. That being said, I contend that Quine’s view on 
the cusp of ‘Two Dogmas’ is not quite as negative as it would be in the paper. This is because 
it appears that Quine only pushes a holistic picture of inquiry directly against the root of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, i.e. verificationism, from ‘Two Dogmas’ onwards. I end the 
chapter by providing some thoughts concerning the importance of ‘Two Dogmas’ for Quine’s 
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development towards naturalism. 
 
In Chapter 3, I endeavour to elucidate one of Quine’s most notable philosophical 
commitments, i.e. his commitment to empiricism, in light of the above analysis of Quine’s 
naturalism and the surrounding landscape of his pre-naturalistic views. To this end, I conduct 
a thorough investigation into the relationship between the forms of empiricism that are 
important to Quine. More precisely, in pursuit of explicating the distinctive nature of Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology, I offer an analysis of the forms of empiricism that Quine both 
considers and engages with at different points in his development. I demonstrate that these 
views share a number of minimal but vital features, such that it seems fair to view them as 
forms of the same view, i.e. empiricism, as well as forms of empiricism that are occupied 
with the same sort of epistemological project. However, I argue that close inspection of these 
similarities shows that there are also a number of important differences between these 
empiricist views. This establishes that although a commitment to empiricism may be 
sustained throughout Quine’s development, this can only true in a minimal way. I take these 
findings to prompt a more nuanced understanding of Quine’s empiricism. 
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Chapter 1 
The Limits of Quine’s Naturalism 
 
1.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, I argue that Quine was not always a naturalist. Naturalism, as I’ll explain, is a 
developed, nuanced, and deeply restrictive approach to philosophy in that it involves an in-
principle rejection of first philosophy, and a stress on the fact that we begin and remain 
theorising within science. I establish the fact that Quine, until approximately 1952, was open 
to ways of theorising that qualify as first philosophical, and so would be prohibited by 
naturalism. From 1952, Quine’s perspective changes in such a way that he comes to reject 
theorising that attempts to transcend science as illegitimate. This difference in outlook 
represents Quine’s development to a perspective that is naturalistic. Crucially, however, 
before this change takes place, Quine cannot be viewed as a naturalist.  
 
Recall from the Introduction that something distinctive about Quine’s philosophy is the 
deeply systematic approach he has, and that this system is often taken to be his naturalism. 
As many commentators have emphasised, getting a stable grasp of Quine’s naturalism is very 
difficult, and one of the most effective ways to do so is to see how Quine puts his 
methodology to use. For example, one might look at how Quine naturalistically approaches 
philosophical issues like meaning, or how he naturalizes an area like epistemology.38 
Naturalism, as the supposedly universal and systematic core of Quine’s philosophical output, 
performs a significant role in the literature in explaining Quine’s overall philosophy, and in 
supposedly influencing contemporary naturalists.39 Part of the reason that my interpretation is 
important is that if many of the moves we think of as being distinctly Quinean cannot be the 
result of Quine’s naturalism, since Quine makes those moves in work before he can be 
described felicitously as a naturalist, then this affects how we ought to explain the scope and 
nature of naturalism itself, and so how we ought to understand Quine’s overall philosophy. 
My interpretation requires that we read Quine in a different and more complex light. 
 
 
38 This is the motivation behind Hylton, P. 2007. See esp. pp.1-2. See also Kemp, G. 2010. 
p.292 
39 Gibson even claims: “…Quine’s philosophy is nothing if not naturalistic!” Gibson, R. 
1988. p.23 
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This is especially important not just for the light that it shines on the development of 
Quine’s naturalism and the nature of Quine’s view, but also because there is a trend to see 
Quine’s commitment to naturalism as extending back into his earlier work. Quine’s 
naturalism is often read as either one of his earliest philosophical commitments, or as 
something that takes root early and then emerges more visible and strongly as his 
philosophical output continues. The argument in this chapter directly challenges this 
common reading of Quine’s view and argues that this picture is too simplistic, given that 
Quine’s early work lacks a commitment to naturalism. Let me explain how I will do this. 
 
In §1.2, I motivate the idea that while Quine’s early work doesn’t contain the term 
‘naturalism’, it is still generally considered to be naturalistic. I do this by highlighting 
interpretations of Quine’s view that claim his very early work was, at least to some degree, 
naturalistic. I also provide evidence for the idea that understanding the nature of Quine’s 
early work, and the development of his naturalism, is a difficult task. Notably, this evidence 
includes the fact that Quine’s reflections on the development of naturalism are not 
particularly clear.  
 
§1.3 provides a thorough characterisation of Quine’s naturalism. This is required to 
appreciate that naturalism is not only a nuanced and developed approach, but that it’s also a 
deeply restrictive one. Appreciating this will allow us to see that there is a time in which 
Quine lacks such a view. I start by examining the ways in which Quine characterises 
naturalism, and then highlight two elusive strands that seem vital to his view: (i) the idea that 
we begin and remain working within our ongoing scientific theory when investigating the 
world, and (ii) a rejection of first philosophy. Following this, I clarify these two aspects of 
Quine’s naturalism. I then look at Quine’s conception of science in detail. Quine’s conception 
of science is distinctive, but I argue that properly understanding naturalism requires grasping 
the esoteric notion of science that is at the centre of it.  
 
Finally, having established that Quine’s early work is often considered to be naturalistic, and 
having characterised the vital aspects of Quine’s naturalism, §1.4 then argues that Quine was, 
in fact, not always a naturalist. I do so by, first, establishing that, in his early work, Quine 
was open to a form of theorising that would qualify as first philosophical, namely, a form of 
phenomenalist theorising. Given that first philosophical theorising is prohibited by 
naturalism, then, this openness shows that his early work cannot be felicitously considered to 
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be naturalistic. I then conclude this section, and Chapter 1, by examining the eventual change 
in attitude that Quine displays towards phenomenalist theorising in his later work (i.e. as an 
approximation, from 1952 onwards). This change in attitude, I take it, is indicative of Quine’s 
development into a view that is naturalistic.  
 
 
1.2 Implicit Naturalism 
 
Quine is best known for his work after 1948, with the publication of ‘On What There Is’, and 
especially from 1951 onwards, with the emergence of ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. In 
1960, we have another landmark, Word and Object, where we see Quine’s naturalism come 
into full bloom. It is around this point and beyond that the philosophical focus of Quine’s 
work is most often appreciated. Yet Quine’s daunting output of publications began far earlier 
than this. While Quine introduces the term ‘naturalism’ into his work in the late 1960s, it’s 
almost universally acknowledged, or tacitly presupposed, that the introduction of the term in 
Quine’s work doesn’t represent a substantial change in attitude; rather, it gives a name to 
something implicit in his earlier work. In this section, I motivate the idea that while Quine’s 
early work doesn’t contain the term ‘naturalism’, it is still generally considered to be 
naturalistic. I do this by highlighting a number of interpretations of Quine’s view that claim 
Quine’s early work was to some degree naturalistic. In placing Quine’s naturalistic 
conversion roughly in 1952, as I will argue in §1.4, I agree broadly with this idea. However, 
philosophers often stretch naturalism back much earlier than this. It is therefore important to 
demonstrate this general trend in interpreting Quine to appreciate the significance of the 
overall argument in this chapter. I also explain some reasons that make understanding the 
development of Quine’s naturalism difficult.  
 
Interpretations of Quine’s early work (i.e. before 1952) as naturalistic fit into a more general 
problem of reading Quine’s mature views into his early work. A number of philosophers have 
highlighted this phenomenon. For example, Creath argues that philosophers tend to read 
Quine’s stronger views on analyticity into ‘Truth by Convention’.40 Hylton highlights a 
problem with reading Quine as a holist in the Carnap lectures and ‘Truth by Convention’.41 
 
40 Creath, R. 1987. p.486 
41 Hylton, P. 2001. pp.269-70. 
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Doing so, Hylton claims, makes Quine appear to have a substantive epistemology to account 
for logic and mathematics which he doesn’t actually have. Similarly, Verhaegh argues that 
we tend to read Quine’s epistemology as more developed in ‘Two Dogmas’ than it really is.42  
 
Returning to the specific instance of reading naturalism into Quine’s early work, it is often 
unclear how far back in Quine’s work naturalism is meant to extend. Kemp suggests, in line 
with Hylton, that 1951’s ‘Two Dogmas’ plays a crucial role in Quine’s development towards 
naturalism: 
 
Naturalism did not make its explicit appearance in Quine’s philosophy until mid-way in 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’…. But this was only the culmination of tendencies present 
in his earlier work, including…‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’…It was not in any 
substantive sense a change in the direction of his thinking so much as an increased self-
consciousness and confidence in what was suggested by his criticism of Carnap – 
which actually dates from 1933…43 
 
On Kemp’s view, what’s crucial for Quine’s development towards naturalism is both his 
views in ‘Two Dogmas’ and how they trace back to worries he had much earlier. What ties 
these pieces together are worries about Carnap’s project, especially his use of analyticity. I’ll 
save an examination for the precise role of Quine’s worries about analyticity for Chapter 2. 
However, for now, it’s worth stressing that Kemp traces Quine’s naturalism, in some sense, 
as far back as 1933. Similarly, Creath traces Quine’s naturalism in “embryonic form” to the 
same year.44  
 
As a further example of this, Isaac seems to read Quine’s early work as naturalistic. Isaac 
claims that: “[t]he basic tenets of Quine’s mature thought set in early in his studies.”45 Isaac 
thinks that Quine’s early work views philosophy as part of science, and science as the main 
 
42 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.98 
43 Kemp, G. 2010. p.284. He links this to Hylton, P. 2007. p.1 
44 Creath, R. 1990b. pp.28-9 
45 Isaac, J. 2005. p.205. Emphasis removed. Dreben has a similar view, though he doesn’t 
mention naturalism explicitly. He claims that Quine’s dissertation displays “the deepest 
philosophical impulses that have characterized and governed Quine to this very day.” 
According to Dreben, Quine’s more famous views then evolve out of this attitude already 
present in Quine’s thesis. Dreben, B. 1990. p.81 
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way of gaining knowledge about the world. Here we have something like a trademark of 
naturalism. The way in which Quine’s early work is naturalistic is seen in Isaac’s reading of 
Quine’s empiricism. Isaac emphasises the role that naturalism plays in validating Quine’s 
empiricism—empiricism is a discovery made within science—and he thinks that this applies 
to Quine’s early view too.46 On this topic, Chapter 3 will look at the contrast between 
Quine’s pre-naturalistic and naturalistic views towards empiricism. For now, however, it’s 
important to stress that Isaac is committed to attaching this naturalistic attitude to early Quine 
when he argues that Quine’s naturalistic empiricism provided a basis for Quine to extrapolate 
the following: 
 
…his famous doctrines: meaning holism, radical translation, underdetermination of 
scientific theory, and ontological relativity. Each can be taken as an instance of the 
broader philosophical enterprise that Quine called “naturalized epistemology.” Such 
were the doctrines towards which Quine was moving as he made this way through 
college, graduate school, and the early stages of his academic career.47 
 
Like with Kemp and Creath’s readings, we have a picture where the early Quine is in some 
sense moving towards being fully naturalistic, but where the seeds of naturalism are already 
sown in some substantial sense. 
 
We also see that Isaac reads Quine’s early work as naturalistic when he claims that Quine’s 
problem with Principia Mathematica was the reliance it had on a metamathematical solution 
to the paradoxes of membership rather than a definitional one. This is described as a problem 
“[f]or a naturalist like Quine” and this is a problem Quine grappled with as a graduate 
student.48 In this reading, Isaac presents a more direct interpretation of Quine’s early work as 
naturalistic, rather than a reading where Quine is moving towards being fully or more 
naturalistic. 
 
Moreover, Ebbs also sees Quine’s early work as naturalistic. He thinks that Quine’s 
arguments against convention are naturalistic, and these are some of Quine’s first 
philosophical views to appear in print. Ebbs writes: 
 
46 Ibid. pp.211-12 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid. pp.227-28 
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Quine’s criticisms of the thesis that logic is true by convention are not directed against 
a truth-by-convention thesis that Carnap actually held, but are part of Quine’s own 
project of articulating the consequences of his scientific naturalism. Quine found that 
logic is not true by convention in any naturalistically acceptable sense.49 
 
On Ebbs’ reading, the standard interpretation of Quine’s arguments against convention, i.e. 
where Quine is criticising Carnap’s view that logic is true by convention, not only gets 
Carnap wrong, but rather it involves Quine arguing against a view of Carnap’s that Quine 
was aware Carnap didn’t hold. Instead, Quine is assessing the idea that logic is true by 
convention from a naturalistic perspective.  
 
Similarly, Verhaegh seems to characterise naturalism as an implicit commitment throughout 
Quine’s early work. Verhaegh writes: “[i]n the first forty years of his philosophical career, 
his [Quine’s] naturalistic commitments were largely implicit”.50 However, Verhaegh rejects 
the idea that Quine was fully naturalistic in this period: “[Quine] did not adopt a fully 
naturalistic perspective until the mid-1950s.”51 And, sitting somewhere between these claims, 
he writes: “[Quine’s] views were already fairly naturalistic in the early 1940s”.52 
 
Exactly what counts as not being fully naturalistic is unclear. And the claim that Quine’s 
“naturalistic commitments were largely implicit” isn’t as strong as reading Quine as a fully 
flourished naturalist from the beginning, but a reading like this puts some emphasis on there 
being naturalistic aspects to Quine’s early work. Verhaegh’s reading is similar to Kemp and 
Creath’s in this respect. Moreover, this type of reading goes against my view because, as I’ll 
explain in §1.4.3, naturalism isn’t something that admits of degrees for Quine. It constitutes a 
strict constraint that Quine’s early work lacks; one either is a naturalist or not.  
 
Indeed, perhaps we don’t even need to turn to a Quine scholar for evidence of Quine’s early 
view being naturalistic. Quine himself says something to similar effect: 
 
49 Ebbs, G. 2011. p.193 
50 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.7 
51 Ibid. p.11 
52 Ibid. p.12. My emphasis. Similarly, Verhaegh claims that an earlier book Quine was 
working on in the early 1940s was “naturalistic in many respects”. p.81 
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‘Two Dogmas’ is occasionally quoted for my depiction of [t]he totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs…[as] a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only 
along its edges.…Clearly my metaphor needed unpacking, and that was largely my 
concern in the ten years between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object. Becoming more 
consciously and explicitly naturalistic, I stiffened up my flabby reference to 
‘experience’ by turning to our physical interface with the external world…53 
 
Now, Quine’s comments here are less clearly an admission of being naturalistic in his earlier 
work than what, say, Ebbs claims. It could be that Quine means that naturalism takes root in 
‘Two Dogmas’ and then emerges “more consciously and explicitly” as we approach Word 
and Object, but that it’s not part of his view before then (this is roughly in line with my 
view), or it could mean that the naturalism was present in some form in his work before 1951, 
and it’s in ‘Two Dogmas’ that it emerges “consciously and explicitly”. This idea is found, we 
saw above, in Kemp’s reading of Quine’s development. 
 
This is one of the many reasons that this problem is so difficult to answer; nowhere does 
Quine clearly and explicitly say when his naturalism first emerged, or whether it was a 
commitment he already held before important developments in his view, like his problems 
with analyticity, emerge. This is in noticeable contrast with other central commitments Quine 
has, e.g. to extensionality and empiricism, where he is proud of such commitments and 
stresses their roots.54  
 
A related problem that makes it difficult to understand the nature of Quine’s early views 
and their relation to his later naturalistic view is that with a few exceptions (for example, 
nominalism and empiricism) Quine doesn’t identify with any particular ‘ism-views’ there. 
As Verhaegh has shown, Quine was reluctant to identify with ism-views because he felt 
that he had more questions than answers, at least in 1938.55 Adopting ism-views is 
something that Quine somewhat reluctantly confesses to in his later work; they are 
 
53 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.398 
54 See, for example, ‘Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist’. ‘Five Milestones of 
Empiricism’ 
55 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.154-55 
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described as “a necessary evil”.56 Pragmatically ism-views help recall to our mind views 
that we’re familiar with, but, at the same time, they suggest shared allegiances and 
prejudices which can be deeply misleading.57  
 
The fact that one of Quine’s few identifications with an ism-term in his early work, 
‘nominalism’, led to problematic interpretations of him as a strict nominalist couldn’t have 
given him much confidence in adopting further labels.58 And in relation to empiricism, 
which might seem like an easy view to attribute to Quine, I’ll explain in Chapter 3 that 
applying the label to Quine’s overall philosophy is liable to give a much too simplistic 
picture of his development. Interpreting the early Quine as falling within a broad position, 
then, is often done with this hurdle (i.e. his reluctance to adopt any informative ism-views) 
in place. 
 
On the face of it, this seems significant. A lack of identification with ism-views indicates a 
lack of identification with widespread traditions in the history of philosophy, or schools of 
thought that are common amongst contemporary philosophers. It singles one out as a sort 
of philosophical lone wolf. This perhaps fits well with the idea that Quine is a 
predominantly negative philosopher, rejecting prominent ism-views, like positivism. It 
also makes Quine’s views hard to orient against the background of the philosophical 
canon. 
 
In the absence of explicit commitments to general viewpoints, it’s notable that Quine doesn’t 
use the term ‘naturalism’ in his early work. At first glance, this might look like a point in 
favour of my interpretation, but it’s only a small one since Quine doesn’t identify explicitly 
with other views that it seems fair to attribute to him.59 Once Quine starts using the term 
 
56 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.461 
57 See also a letter from Quine to Putnam: “[t]he main fault of ismisms is that it generates 
straw men whose isms could never have been embraced by flesh and blood”. Sourced in 
Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.155 
58 Verhaegh links this point about nominalism with Word and Object, p.243 f5. However, 
Quine stresses something stronger there. Quine’s point is that he shouldn’t be interpreted as a 
nominalist. 
59 Quine does use ‘naturalist’ in 1953, but he means natural scientist. ‘Mr Strawson and 
Logical Theory’, p.149. And he uses ‘naturalistic’ in 1946 to describe a style of argument for 
religion. ‘Lectures on David Hume’s Philosophy’, p.112 
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‘naturalism’, and the associated slogans like a rejection of first philosophy, he indulges.60 
Verhaegh notes that “[b]etween March and July 1968 alone…Quine uses these phrases to 
describe his perspective in no fewer than seven lectures, essays and responses”.61 This 
appears to have been effective because many philosophers writing in the late-1960s and 
early-1970s describe Quine’s philosophy as naturalistic, whereas before this period, 
Verhaegh has only found one case of someone doing so. After this period, where Quine is 
widely identified as a naturalist, the term hardly disappears from his work. It becomes 
something Quine is more self-consciously reflective about in his later work. Quine not only 
explains his views as naturalistic, but retrospectively explains the moves he’s made earlier as 
naturalistic.62 However, as I’ve explained above, the reflections that Quine provides are not 
sufficient to clearly establish the idea that Quine considered his early work to be naturalistic. 
Moreover, as we’ll see in §1.4.1, we have good reason to believe that, before 1952, Quine is 
not felicitously called a naturalist. 
 
Verhaegh suggests that Quine’s decision to extensively use the label ‘naturalism’ from the 
late 1960s onwards could be because Quine was dissatisfied with the lack of an 
understanding philosophers had of his overall metaphilosophical view in Word and Object, 
and wanted to find a way of aligning his view with Dewey for his Dewey lectures in 1968.63 
Verhaegh seems right since, as he notes, Quine doesn’t originally use the term ‘naturalism’ in 
his earlier drafts of the papers for these lectures. Quine adds the term in the 1968 drafts, and 
the instructions he was provided for preparing the Dewey lectures explicitly state that he 
should make some aspect of Dewey’s philosophy visible within them; naturalism seems to be 
Quine’s way of doing this. 
 
 
60 The most visible early use of ‘naturalism’ is in 1968’s ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ 
(published 1969). 
61 Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.155-6 
62 See, for example, ‘Naturalism; or, Living within One’s Means’. From Stimulus to Science, 
Ch.1-2 
63 See Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, v, p.26. Dewey explicitly identified as a 
naturalist in the only book of his that it seems Quine studied. Dewey, J. 1925. p.1. See also 
Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.2-3, p.158. It’s worth stressing though, that not only does Quine’s 
naturalism seem different from Dewey’s, Quine also didn’t know much about Dewey when 
he identified this commonality. See Ibid. p.4 f8. p.158 f33, pp.156-9. ‘The Pragmatists’ Place 
in Empiricism’. Verhaegh suggests that Ernest Nagel, who was known to defend naturalism 
and was the John Dewey Professor at Columbia, could also have played a role in Quine’s 
decision to adopt the term. 
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Indeed, Quine has made it clear that by Word and Object, he is naturalistic. Verhaegh has 
uncovered important evidence for this. In response to the idea that naturalized epistemology 
is a response to problems in Word and Object, Quine claims: “Word and Object was already 
utterly naturalistic.”64 The difference between Word and Object and ‘Epistemology 
Naturalized’, roughly 9 years later, is merely that the word ‘naturalism’ is explicitly used in 
the latter. This is also confirmed when Quine describes Ontological Relativity and Other 
Essays, i.e. the volume containing ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, as dealing with an expansion 
of ideas that were misunderstood in Word and Object.65 This supports the above point that 
the term ‘naturalism’ is used by Quine as a response to misunderstandings of his view. Thus 
we can determine that Quine considers himself to be “utterly naturalistic” by 1960, but 
beyond Quine’s claim that he was becoming “more consciously and explicitly naturalistic” in 
the build-up to Word and Object, Quine doesn’t give us much information about the 
development of his naturalism. 
 
So, exactly how far back Quine’s naturalism is meant to extend before 1960 is foggy, but 
there is a trend to read Quine as having been naturalistic throughout his career. Kemp, 
Creath, Isaac, and Ebbs all trace it back, at least partly, to as early as 1933, right after Quine 
finishes his doctorate. Verhaegh claims that naturalism was in some sense an implicit 
commitment that Quine had in his early work which was bolstered in the mid-1950s. And 
Quine’s own reflections don’t shed considerable light on how long-standing a commitment 
naturalism is in his philosophy before Word and Object. 
 
These interpretations have strong consequences for how we understand and evaluate Quine’s 
philosophy. For example, the supposed lack of a substantial change in Quine’s methodology 
has strong pedagogical use for Hylton; it’s for this reason that his monograph on Quine is 
structured in terms of topics rather than chronologically.66 The general idea is that we can 
treat the mass of Quine’s work as, in some over-simplistic but important way, being unified 
by a common methodology. In some sense, Quine stands or falls as his naturalism stands or 
falls, given that this is what constitutes his systematic view on philosophy, and explains a lot 
of the particular views he holds. More particularly, for Isaac, it means that Quine is validating 
 
64 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.158 f32 
65 See Ibid. p.158 f32. Strictly, though, he says it’s dealing with “Word and Object and earlier 
writings”. 
66 Hylton, P. 2007. pp.1-2 
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empiricism on naturalistic grounds even in his early work (a claim I challenge in Chapter 3), 
and this then leads Quine to some of his well-known views like holism. Finally, for Ebbs, it 
highlights how Quine’s problems with convention in his early work are with making it 
naturalistically adequate. 
 
To summarise, thus far, we have seen that there is a general trend in the literature of 
interpreting Quine’s commitment to naturalism to extend into his early work, before 1952. To 
support this view, I highlighted claims that demonstrate this view in a number of Quine 
scholars. On some of these interpretations, Quine appears to be viewed plainly as a naturalist. 
On others, naturalism appears to admit of degrees and so there’s no unique point where 
naturalism enters the picture. However, these interpretations all, at minimum, claim that 
Quine’s early work was to some degree naturalistic. I also explained that Quine’s reflections 
on his naturalism do not illuminate the issue of when Quine becomes naturalistic before 
Word and Object. Moreover, I highlighted some ways in which understanding the nature of 
Quine’s early views is difficult and this consequently makes it difficult to understand the 
development of Quine’s view. Establishing the fact that Quine is often viewed having a 
commitment to naturalism from close to the beginning of his philosophical career is 
important because the argument of this chapter challenges this interpretation by arguing that 
Quine is not a naturalist before, approximately, 1952.  
 
 
1.3 Quine’s Naturalism 
 
In this section, I provide a thorough characterisation of the nature of Quine’s naturalism. This 
is needed in order to show that naturalism is not only a substantial and nuanced view, but that 
it is also a restrictive view. Appreciating how substantial, nuanced, and restrictive Quine’s 
naturalism is allows us to then appreciate that there is a time that Quine lacks such a view. 
This is argued for in the last section of this chapter. 
 
In §1.3.1, I examine the ways in which Quine characterises naturalism and explain that these 
characterisations, by themselves, are of limited value in gaining an understanding of the 
nature of naturalism. This is because they tend to be too brief or misleading. However, these 
characterisations do offer hints at what is needed to understand Quine’s naturalism. Namely, 
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they refer to: (i) a rejection of first philosophy, and (ii) the idea that it’s immanently within 
science that we investigate the nature of the world. 
 
In §1.3.2, I clarify these two aspects of Quine’s naturalism. I demonstrate that focussing on 
Quine’s rejection of first philosophy and his claim that we investigate the world immanently 
within our ongoing scientific theory allows us to understand that Quine’s naturalism is not 
only a developed and nuanced form of philosophical inquiry, it’s also a restrictive one.  
 
In §1.3.3, I clarify Quine’s view of the nature of science that is vital to his naturalism. 
Naturalism involves always working from within our ongoing scientific theory and rejecting 
the idea that we can transcend that theory. Naturalism is therefore intimately bound up with 
science. Understanding Quine’s conception of science, then, allows us to better understand 
the nature of Quine’s naturalism. 
 
   
1.3.1 Quine’s Characterisations of Naturalism 
 
In §1.2, I established that it takes time for Quine to start using the term ‘naturalism’ to 
describe his work. That being said, it was also shown that Quine eventually comes to use the 
term frequently, both to describe his view and to retrospectively explain some of his earlier 
views. Once Quine starts using the label ‘naturalism’, however, he doesn’t elucidate in detail 
what it amounts to. Some of the main places where he does so are either very brief (‘Five 
Milestones of Empiricism’) or very misleading (‘Epistemology Naturalized’).67 So, Quine is 
not only unclear about the development of his naturalism but also about the nature of his 
naturalism. This is a further reason that it’s difficult to understand the scope of Quine’s 
naturalism. In this section, I emphasise how unhelpful these characterisations are, by 
themselves, for understanding the nature of naturalism. I do this by highlighting how brief 
Quine’s characterisations of naturalism often are, as well as explaining how misleading some 
of his more detailed explanations of naturalism are. However, I propose that these 
characterisations at least give us the beginnings of an understanding of Quine’s naturalism 
because they point us towards two vital parts of his naturalism. 
 
 
67 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.7 
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Let me begin by considering the following ways in which Quine presents his naturalistic 
view: 
 
…naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science.68 
 
…the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some priori philosophy, that 
reality is to be identified and described…69 
 
Putting matters thus physiologically was of a piece with my naturalism, my rejection of 
a first philosophy underlying science.70 
 
Such claims are familiar to those with the faintest of familiarity with Quine’s work, and are 
engrained in the minds of those of us who have spent considerable time with it. However, 
these characterisations of naturalism are extremely brief and don’t illuminate what this 
important and substantial approach to philosophy amounts to. It’s no wonder that 
philosophers are so divided about how we understand naturalism. It’s common for Quine to 
characterise naturalism, this central and distinctive approach to philosophy, in a mere 
sentence.  
 
Moreover, some of Quine’s more substantial characterisations of naturalism are misleading. 
For example, Quine describes naturalism as follows: 
 
…rational reconstruction of the individual’s and/or the race’s actual acquisition of a 
responsible theory of the external world. It would address the question of how we, 
physical denizens of the physical world, can have projected our scientific theory of that 
whole world from our meagre contacts with it…71 
 
The problem with this as a characterization of naturalism generally is that it’s focused 
specifically on naturalized epistemology, and so misses out other important aspects of 
Quine’s naturalistic view. Many philosophers writing about naturalism have similarly 
 
68 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.67 
69 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.21 
70 ‘On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma’, p.40 
71 From Stimulus to Science, p.16 
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narrowed their focus to Quine’s views on epistemology, rather than his naturalism 
generally.  
 
Or, on a similar note, take this characterization of naturalism: 
 
…I [Quine as a naturalist] hold that knowledge, mind, and meaning are part of the same 
world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical 
spirit that animates natural science. There is no place for a prior philosophy.72 
 
Verhaegh stresses that this is problematic because it conflates several aspects that are often 
taken to be distinct ways of being a naturalist: it has an ontological claim, a 
methodological claim, and ends on a metaphilosophical claim.73 When Quine’s 
characterisations of naturalism are not extremely brief, then, they still aren’t particularly 
helpful for gaining an understanding of his view. 
 
In the Introduction, I explained that a common reason that Quine’s philosophy generally is 
thought to be hard to understand is the difficulty of his prose. Quine’s writing is often very 
brief and poetic. We can see here that a good example of this problem is Quine’s 
characterisations of naturalism. Indeed, I explained that we see good evidence that Quine’s 
prose is difficult to understand in the reviews of Word and Object, and this is the monograph 
where Quine’s philosophy is supposed to be “utterly naturalistic”.74 Presley claims that 
Quine’s prose “is sometimes condensed to the point of enigma”, and this seems a fitting way 
to explain the short and enigmatic ways that Quine characterises naturalism.75  
 
Quine is aware that characterisations like those above aren’t very helpful for providing an 
understanding of naturalism. Quine writes: “[t]hese characterisations convey the right mood, 
but they would fare poorly in a debate.”76 The main reason for this is that it’s unclear what 
counts as science, or as being internal to science, and what first philosophy is. Quine’s 
 
72 ‘Ontological Relativity’, p.26 
73 Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.159-60 
74 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.158 f32 
75 Presley, C.F. 1961. p.175 
76 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means’, p.462 
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characterisations of naturalism are suggestive, they “convey the right mood”, but the actual 
details of the view they are characterising are left in a very bare state. 
 
That being said, Quine’s enigmatic characterisations of naturalism do seem to reveal two 
parts of his view that are central to naturalism. Indeed, often the nature of Quine’s naturalism 
is explained by emphasising two components. First, naturalism involves an insistence that it’s 
within science “that reality is to be identified and described”.77 Second, naturalism involves a 
rejection of first philosophy. This provides us with only the beginning of an understanding of 
Quine’s naturalism, but a beginning, nonetheless. 
 
 
1.3.2 Immanence and First Philosophy 
 
In the last section, I explained that while Quine’s characterisations of naturalism are often 
unhelpful for gaining an understanding of naturalism, they at least strongly suggest that 
Quine’s naturalism is woven from two elusive strands. First, a stress on the idea that it’s 
immanently within science that theorising takes place: “the recognition that it is within 
science itself…that reality is to be identified and described”.78 Second, naturalism has a 
negative aspect, i.e. a rejection of first philosophy. In this section, I explain what these two 
strands of Quine’s philosophy amount to in order to provide a detailed understanding of his 
naturalism. I also relate immanence and first philosophy to the Neurathian metaphor that 
Quine frequently uses to describe the nature of naturalistic inquiry. The understanding of 
Quine’s naturalism reached in this section allows us to appreciate that it amounts to a 
developed, nuanced, and restrictive form of philosophical inquiry. This understanding is 
crucial in order to appreciate the fact that Quine lacks this developed perspective in his early 
work, which is the argument of the final section of this chapter.  
 
Let me begin by explaining what Quine means when he insists that theorising takes place 
immanently within science. Quine often stresses the immanent nature of inquiry after he has 
explicitly claimed to be naturalistic. He writes that “the immanent is that which makes sense 
 
77 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.21 
78 Ibid. 
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within naturalism, in mediis rebus, and the transcendent is not”.79 These remarks apply to 
philosophical theorising, as well as theorising we’re more likely to think of as scientific. 
Quine stresses the scientific place of philosophy continuously in his later work, perhaps most 
famously at the end of Word and Object: 
 
The philosopher’s task differs from the others’ [within science], then, in detail; but in 
no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point 
outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile.80 
 
Philosophy stands out as a distinctively abstract and general part of our scientific 
theorising, but it is not a part of our theorising that is distinct from the rest of science. 
Quine also thinks that when we look back at earlier work that we regard as philosophical, 
but where at the time they lacked the contemporary imposition of boundaries between 
philosophy and science, we pick out the more abstract and general stuff and call it 
‘philosophy’.81 Philosophy, for Quine, is science in its more general and abstract 
moments. 
 
A dominant theme in interpretations of Quine’s naturalism is to stress that it’s from Quine’s 
naturalism that strict scientific constraints on Quine’s methodology come from. Philosophical 
inquiry occurs immanently within science, and science involves these constraints. As Kemp 
puts it, summarising Hylton’s interpretation: 
 
[Quine’s naturalism] does not require merely that philosophical theories be consistent 
with natural science or even cohere with it, but that philosophical theories – indeed the 
questions themselves – be justified in the same way as the theories and questions of 
natural science.82 
 
This additional demand makes Quine’s methodology more nuanced and stricter than that of 
many other naturalists.   
 
79 ‘Responses to Articles by Abel, Bergström, Davidson, Dreben, Gibson, Hookway, and 
Prawitz’, p.230 
80 Word and Object, p.275 
81 ‘Has Philosophy Lost Contact with People?’, p.191 
82 Kemp, G. 2010. p.283. See also 2012. pp.15-6 
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From the perspective of naturalism, inquiry always takes place immanently within our 
ongoing scientific theory. This approach then grounds what is true, or what is real, as an 
internal aspect of the ongoing scientific enterprise. Let me explain both of these points. 
 
This immanent perspective is notable in Quine’s approach to truth. Quine does not, for 
example, view truth as an issue that involves seeing how scientific theories latch onto the 
world. Truth is not a semantical relation in this sense for Quine.83 Attributions of truth occur 
immanently within our ongoing theory of the world in our affirmations about what is the 
case.84 Quine’s immanent perspective on the notion of truth also makes sense of his emphasis 
on the truths of science being fallible. This is because science might affirm something as true 
at one point in time, and then, due to progress within science, stop affirming it as true at a 
later point. For Quine, this is simply a fact about the internal mechanics of the scientific 
enterprise and how the truth predicate is used therein. Moreover, this immanent perspective 
on truth as a fallible feature of science also allows us to make sense of the fact that Quine 
characterises science as the pursuit of truth: 
 
Pursuit of truth is implicit, still, in our use of ‘true’. We should and do currently accept 
the firmest scientific conclusions as true, but when one of these is dislodged by further 
research we do not say that it had been true but became false. We say that to our 
surprise it was not true after all. Science is seen as pursuit and discovering truth rather 
than decreeing it. Such is the idiom of realism, and it is integral to the semantics of the 
predicate ‘true’. It fittingly vivifies scientific method…85 
 
This passage highlights the close connection between truth and realism for Quine. Claims 
about what is real for the naturalist also have to be understood as immanent claims within 
science. Quine’s attitude is one of “unregenerate realism”, or “robust realism”.86 This is an 
attitude that typifies the scientist. There’s not a further philosophical question that asks 
whether our scientific output reflects the nature of the real world or is true in some sense 
 
83 See also Kemp, G. 2006. pp.119-20 
84 See Word and Object, pp.23-5 
85 From Stimulus to Science, p.67. See also ‘Propositional Objects’, p.141 
86 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.72. ‘Relativism and Absolutism’, p.321 
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over and above what science tells us is the case. Again, we see that Quine’s naturalism 
requires the philosopher’s claims be an immanent part of our ongoing scientific theory.  
 
The second aspect found in Quine’s characterisation of naturalism is his talk about rejecting 
first philosophy. As is often the case with important aspects of his view, Quine doesn’t 
provide much clarity about what first philosophy is. Yet he continually, sometimes solely, 
focusses on its denial as crucial to naturalism: “[naturalism is] abandonment of the goal of a 
first philosophy prior to natural science.”87  This negative feature of naturalism is crucial 
because it shows Quine’s rejection of first philosophy is a constraint on what counts as 
legitimate theorising. First philosophy is often meant to provide support for science while 
being independent of science, or to provide a perspective on the nature of the world from 
outside of science. It belongs to theorising that is extra-scientific, or that is meant to 
transcend science. Quine’s rejection of first philosophy is the claim that such theorising is 
illegitimate. 
 
One way to appreciate the nature of first philosophy is to consider things that might seem 
like they should be counted as first philosophical, but which Quine does not consider first 
philosophical. Phenomena like this are important because, while it might seem like Quine 
would want to eschew them due to their suspicious scientific credentials by viewing them 
as outside the apparatus of science, his attitude is not so dismissive. Understanding what 
further features would be required to make such phenomena first philosophical sheds some 
light on the nature of first philosophy, and it shows us that Quine’s view of what 
constitutes first philosophy is more subtle than it might seem. 
 
Consider what Quine says about areas of science that we might worry aren’t a part of 
science, but which Quine still counts as scientific, i.e. areas that it might seem like Quine 
ought to view them as first philosophical. One of the most commonly discussed examples 
of such a phenomenon is Quine’s treatment of higher, non-applied, set theory. The rough 
idea is that Quine should view higher set theory as external to science since it’s not 
applied in science. However, Quine holds that higher set theory still counts as science 
because, despite not being applied in science, it’s in the interest of the simplicity of our 
 
87 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.67. See also From Stimulus to Science, p.16. ‘Things 
and Their Place in Theories’, p.22 
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theory to not exclude it as meaningless. The reason that it’s in the interest of the simplicity 
of our theory to keep it within science is that it contains the same vocabulary, and deals 
with issues also framed in the same vocabulary, as applied mathematics.88 Therefore, 
higher set theory counts as part of science for Quine. 
 
First philosophical notions and posits fail to even meet this criterion. After discussing why 
higher set theory is meaningful, Quine writes: 
 
There are further reaches of discourse, however, for which not even these claims to a 
scientific status can be made. One thinks here of bad metaphysics and benighted forms 
of religion. Also there is great poetry and fiction. For all their greatness these do not 
describe reality, for the most part, nor are they true.89 
 
This is a significant part of what qualifies something as first philosophical. First 
philosophical theorising, notions, posits, etc. occur outside of the language game of science (a 
game that I’ll describe in §1.3.3). Quine thinks that making claims about the nature of reality, 
and stating truths about the nature of the world, is the business of science. First philosophical 
discourse, unlike higher, unapplied, set theory, doesn’t even indirectly figure in theorising 
that brings us these ends. 
 
We saw above that Quine conceives of science broadly enough for philosophy to fit in. 
But Quine’s naturalism is also restrictive in that philosophy has to be naturalistically 
legitimate to earn its place within science. There are aspects of traditional philosophy that 
don’t make the cut. Quine claims that “ethics is not included in science, for all its 
importance.”90 Ethics, in contrast to an area like epistemology, doesn’t survive naturalistic 
reorientation. The language game of science, at the centre of Quine’s naturalism, is 
constraining what philosophy counts as naturalistically respectable. Ethical theorising, at 
least typically, doesn’t abide by the rules of science and so fails to earn its place within 
science.  
 
 
88 ‘Naturalism; Or Living within One’s Means’, p.468 
89 ‘The Way the World Is’, p.169 
90 ‘Pressing Extensionality’, p.174 
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However, that isn’t to say that Quine rejects the idea that there are other language games 
one could operate within legitimately, e.g. poetry. The important point is that science has 
the rights to most of the things that we think are very important, e.g. the right to truth 
about the nature of reality and to providing descriptions of reality.91 To properly 
appreciate this point, we need a more thorough understanding of Quine’s conception of 
science. I’ll provide this in the following section. For now, however, the important point 
that this establishes is that the fact that some theorising occurs outside of science isn’t 
sufficient to make it first philosophical, and so illegitimate by naturalistic standards. Such 
theorising could occur independently of science but not try to impinge on science, and 
hence be legitimate. In such a case, one is simply playing a different language game from 
science. First philosophical theorising, however, does more than occupy a perspective 
independent of science. That is, it also tries to impinge on science, either by trying to 
support it or by making claims that are the proper business of science. For example, first 
philosophy could try and provide an independent foundation for science, and so provide 
support for science, while trying to be independent from science. Alternatively, the first 
philosopher might try to play the game of science without properly being subject to its 
rules. For example, the first philosopher might make claims that belong within the proper 
domain of science, e.g. by being about the nature of reality, but without also intending this 
theorising to be part of our ongoing scientific theory, e.g. by not making those claims 
vulnerable to scientific evidence.  
 
Now, despite Quine’s reference to “bad metaphysics” above, first philosophy is not merely 
the matter of weird metaphysical theorising or posits that naturalists tend to dislike. We can 
appreciate this by looking at Quine’s attitude towards dualism. Quine writes that, in principle, 
he has no objection to dualism; a view which we might take to be paradigmatically anti-
naturalistic metaphysics, or paradigmatically first philosophical.92 Quine claims: “Descartes’ 
dualism between mind and body is called metaphysics, but it could as well be reckoned as 
science, however false.”93 The reason that it could be viewed simply as false science (and not 
meaningless or first philosophical) is that dualism could, but doesn’t, provide us with a 
 
91 Word and Object, pp.22-3. ‘The Way the World Is’, p.169 
92 For the view that dualism is paradigmatically anti-naturalistic see Weir, A. 2005. p.461. 
Glock, H. 2003. pp.27-9 
93 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.462. This also shows that naturalism isn’t 
merely physicalism. p.467 
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hypothesis which has predictive utility, i.e. that is scientifically valuable. Dualism is not 
warranted because positing minds in addition to bodies is redundant – the bodies do fine on 
their own, if we opt for some form of predicate dualism or anomalous monism.94 Quine 
thinks this is the case not only for dualism, but for many of the metaphysical issues that he’s 
known for rejecting. We see this clearly when he writes: 
 
If I saw indirect explanatory benefit in positing sensibilia, possibilia, spirits, a Creator, I 
would joyfully accord them scientific status too, on a par with such avowedly scientific 
posits as quarks and black holes.95 
 
Seen in this light, Quine’s naturalism differs from many other forms of naturalism. For 
example, naturalism is often viewed as being a negative view in a different way from a 
rejection of first philosophy. That is, as a rejection of the supernatural.96 Naturalism is 
restrictive in that it wants to exclude supernatural phenomena and explanations from 
legitimate explanations. Verhaegh suggests that this characterises more traditional forms 
of naturalism in the history of philosophy.97 However, Verhaegh doesn’t think that this is 
new. For the past century or so, philosophers have tended to provide natural, as opposed to 
supernatural, explanations of the world. New or not, Quine’s naturalism and its attitude 
towards first philosophy shows one way that it’s more nuanced than many other forms of 
naturalism. Many supposedly supernatural phenomena aren’t strictly disqualified in 
principle by his naturalism. Both supernatural phenomena and traditional metaphysical 
phenomena can be viewed in two ways. They can be understood as part of science, in 
which case they’re judged immanently within science for their scientific worth (and likely 
to be viewed merely as false science). Or, alternatively, they can be presented as extra-
scientific posits, and not part of our ongoing scientific theory. It’s only in the latter case 
that they’re first philosophical, and illegitimate from the perspective of naturalistic 
inquiry.  
 
 
94 See ‘States of Mind’, p.323 
95 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.462 
96 See Stroud, B. 1996. pp.44-5 
97 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.2 
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Quine’s naturalistic picture of inquiry is often presented in his work through the use of the 
Neurathian metaphor of inquiry being like repairing a boat while out at sea.98 This 
metaphor is used continually after Quine starts to focus on the naturalistic picture that 
emerges most conspicuously in Word and Object to both explain the nature of scientific 
inquiry as well as the place of philosophy within scientific inquiry.99 Reflecting on this 
metaphor can help us appreciate what it is like to work immanently within our ongoing 
scientific theory as well as what a rejection of first philosophy amounts to. Quine claims: 
 
The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a 
going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified 
portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the system from 
within. He is a busy sailor adrift on Neurath’s boat.100 
 
We can use this metaphor to better explain Quine’s view that we start and remain 
theorising immanently within science. Our adjustments to science, as well as our starting 
place when we begin to theorise, both involve us being located within that very theory of 
the world. Our boat may need to be repaired, but we do so while remaining afloat onboard 
the vessel. Quine employs this metaphorical picture of inquiry to demonstrate an attitude 
that makes sense of inquiry as an activity that occurs immanently within our ongoing and 
developing scientific theory. 
 
We can also use the Neurathian metaphor to better explain Quine’s rejection of first 
philosophy. In terms of the metaphor, having a rejection of first philosophy is the idea that 
we’re trying to keep the ship of science afloat while dealing with the realization that 
there’s no hope of jumping ship. The ship of science is being repaired while sailing the 
never-ending sea. 
 
98 Quine doesn’t seem to have known much about Neurath when he adopted this metaphor. In 
a letter to Dirk Koppelberg, who compared Quine and Neurath’s views, Quine writes: “my 
reading of my predecessors has been very sporadic and inadequate. I was aware superficially 
of my affinity with Neurath…and I am glad now to see the degree to it and the detail…”. 
Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.74 f38 
99 See Word and Object, p.3, p.124 
100 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.72. Verhaegh has found a note from 1965 where 
Quine describes the position of always working within our ongoing theory as 
“involutionism”. Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.61 f17. ‘The Sophisticated Irrational’, p.189. Quine 
attributes this view to Neurath and Popper. 
 
 
39 
 
We find the Neurathian metaphor in Quine’s papers in the interim between ‘Two Dogmas’ 
and Word and Object. We saw earlier, in §1.2, that this is the period in which Quine 
claims to have been “[b]ecoming more consciously and explicitly naturalistic” and that he 
considers Word and Object to be naturalistic.101 The papers in which the Neurathian 
metaphor is cited have important relations to this monograph, and consequently to the 
development of naturalism. Quine is rapidly developing his picture of what inquiry looks 
like and using this metaphor extensively to illustrate his emerging naturalistic perspective. 
For example, in ‘Speaking of Objects’, which serves as a prospectus for Word and Object, 
presented in 1957, Quine writes: 
 
At any rate the ontology of abstract objects is part of the ship which, in Neurath’s 
figure, we are rebuilding at sea. We may revise the scheme, but only in favor of some 
clearer or simpler and no less adequate overall account of what goes on in the world.102 
 
Moreover, in ‘Posits and Reality’ (1955), an early draft of the opening part of Word and 
Object, Quine writes: 
 
Epistemology, on this view, is not logically prior somehow to common sense or to the 
refined common sense which is science; it is part rather of the overall scientific 
enterprise, an enterprise which Neurath has likened to that of rebuilding a ship while 
staying afloat in it.103 
 
Just before this, we see Quine start to talk about our theory of the world as being something 
that we inherit, something that we begin in the middle of, and that we acquire “from our 
forebears”.104 Similarly, in ‘Two Dogmas’ Quine describes human beings as being “given a 
scientific heritage”.105 
 
 
101 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.398 
102 ‘Speaking of Objects’, p.16 
103 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.253, p.246 
104 Ibid, p.222 
105 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.46 
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To summarise, in this section, I have explained Quine’s naturalism by focussing on the idea 
that naturalism involves approaching theorising from a perspective immanent to our ongoing 
scientific theory and that it involves a rejection of first philosophy. In doing so, I have 
explained naturalism as a developed, nuanced, and restrictive form of philosophical inquiry. 
The naturalist begins immanently within their ongoing scientific theory and, from this 
immanent perspective, rejects as illegitimate any theorising that tries to transcend science. All 
of these points show how important the notion of science is to Quine’s naturalism. In the next 
section, then, to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of Quine’s naturalism, I explain 
the esoteric notion of science that is central to his naturalism. 
 
 
1.3.3 Science 
 
Quine’s naturalism is intimately bound up with science. As a clear point of contrast, first 
philosophy aspires to escape the confines of science, while the naturalist works 
immanently within science. It’s therefore crucial to understand Quine’s conception of 
science in order to properly understand the nature of naturalism. In this section, I’ll 
explain the conception of science at the heart of naturalism in detail. This will reveal it to 
be very esoteric, but vital for understanding naturalism. To do this, I’ll first make sense of 
the place of prediction within science which will, in turn, help to explain what Quine 
means in thinking of science as a language game. I will then explain how broad Quine’s 
view of science is, and relate this to his lack of emphasis on subject boundaries. I finally 
look at the way in which Quine conceives of the relationship between science and 
common sense and emphasise the importance of this relationship for the status of notions 
like reality and evidence, which are vital for science, and so for naturalism. 
 
One important aspect of Quine’s view of science is the role that prediction plays within it. 
Quine often emphasizes the predictive function of science. For example, he writes: 
 
Our talk of external things…is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and 
control the triggering of our sensory receptors in the light of previous triggering of our 
sensory receptors.106 
 
106 ’Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.1 
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But Quine also denies that prediction is main purpose of science.107 Prediction doesn’t 
seem to capture the essence or goal of science for Quine. Prediction might sometimes be a 
goal of science, but it’s not the main purpose; things like “understanding”, “control and 
modification of the environment”, and “technology and intellectual curiosity” are.108 
Rather, predication sets the limits as to what counts as part of the language game of 
science; if something isn’t ultimately predictive, it’s not scientific. Quine makes this point 
clear in Pursuit of Truth: 
 
But when I cite predictions as the checkpoints of science, I do not see that as normative. 
I see it as defining a particular language game, in Wittgenstein’s phrase: the game of 
science, in contrast to other good language games such as fiction and poetry. A 
sentence’s claim to scientific status rests on what it contributes to a theory whose 
checkpoints are in prediction.109  
 
This is a very minimal requirement for making something scientific, and it doesn’t really 
tell us anything about what goes on within the parameter of the predictive language game 
of science.110 I’ll explain the significance of this fairly minimalistic picture of science for 
Quine’s naturalism shortly, but the important point to note here is that Quine thinks of 
science as a language game in which prediction plays a special role in setting the 
boundaries of that game. 
 
Regardless as to what the purpose of science is, the function of prediction is to test 
science. For something to be part of science, it needs to figure in the game of prediction; it 
needs to be part of the body of links of implication which lead one to have a prediction. In 
 
107 Although Quine does seem to think that epistemology, as opposed to science generally, is 
aiming at prediction or truth. He writes: “[t]here is no question here [within naturalized 
epistemology] of ultimate value…it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth or 
prediction.” ‘Reply to White’, pp.663-65. See also Pursuit of Truth, p.19. Foley, R. 1994. 
pp.243-60. Quine also relates prediction to truth: “normative epistemology…is the 
technology of truth-seeking, or, in more cautiously epistemic terms, prediction.” ‘Reply to 
White’, pp.663-65 
108 First two quotes from Pursuit of Truth, p.2. Last from ‘The Way the World Is’, p.169. The 
Roots of Reference, p.130 
109 Pursuit of Truth, p.20 
110 See Roth, P. 1999. pp.106-07 
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this way, some creative spark which helps us develop a scientific hypothesis that comes 
from, say, reading fiction wouldn’t count as scientific because it doesn’t figure in the 
relevant body of theory. Prediction is a negative test; “a test by refutation”.111 And 
prediction is “[t]he utility of science”; that which the instrument of science is able to 
achieve, even if its function is something more particular than this.112 
 
This picture of the role of prediction within science has to be appreciated in the context of 
the broad nature of science that is crucial for Quine’s naturalism. Some parts of this 
conception of science do not standardly make use of prediction, at least not directly. We 
see this when Quine writes: 
 
Prediction of observable events, then, is the test of science. It is how science keeps 
contact with its subject matter, namely, the world. What I am calling science, moreover, 
for want of a better name, includes various pursuits in which prediction is not at all 
common; it includes economics, history, even mathematics. Ultimately and indirectly, 
however, prediction is what also keeps these sciences empirically significant, because 
of systematic connections between these sciences and other domains where prediction 
does prevail.113 
 
It’s not, for example, at the level of the sentences of science that prediction is crucial: “a 
sentence does not even need to be testable in order to qualify as a respectable sentence of 
science.”114 Lots of sentences that are respectably scientific don’t meet this criteria, but are 
important for science because they “fit in smoothly by analogy, or they symmetrize and 
simplify the overall design.”115 And, moreover, such sentences can lead to sentences that 
are themselves testable; lots of statements in history will be like this, and this view seems 
to make sense of Quine’s treatment of non-applied set theory that I explained above. 
Quine’s point is more that when scientific hypotheses can be tested, prediction is the 
test.116 
 
 
111 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’. p.467 
112 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, p.258 
113 ‘The Way the World Is’, pp.167-68 
114 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means’, p.467 
115 Ibid 
116 See Ibid, pp.468-69 
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Through looking at the place of prediction within Quine’s view of science, we’ve found that 
Quine intends science to be understood broadly. This broad nature is another important part 
of the science at the centre of Quine’s naturalism that makes it distinctive.117 Quine 
emphasises the place of softer sciences, like sociology, history, and economics, in his picture 
of science,118 and he continually emphasises that mathematics is included within science.119 
One might worry that such a broad picture of science makes Quine’s use of the term esoteric, 
and so calling it ‘science’ is misleading. In a sense, Quine agrees. He likens his use of science 
to Wissenschaft, but notes that in English, we don’t really have an equivalent term.120 
 
Related to this broad picture of science is the lack of emphasis that Quine places on subject 
boundaries. Subjects within science are not separated by sharp boundaries. Quine writes that 
“[n]ames of disciplines should be seen only as technical aids in the organization of curricula 
and libraries”.121 In this way, Quine claims they are “useful for deans and librarians”.122 This 
is too strong a claim. Within Quine’s naturalistic picture of science, names of subjects have 
important pragmatic use in allowing us to get scientific work done effectively, not just for 
“deans and librarians”. For example, they help us effectively sort out problems that are 
primarily to be dealt with by people identified as belonging to that discipline. Naturalized 
epistemology, as we’ll see in Chapter 3, is a good case of this. Most scientists outside 
philosophy simply have no need to worry about the main problems in naturalized 
epistemology, and hence it’s effective in dealing out the scientific labour to view these 
problems as distinctively philosophical, even if they’re not detached from science. This is a 
practical point about the value of subject boundaries for the progress of science. Quine’s 
point, however, is to stress that there isn’t a substantial theoretical difference in the natures of 
the inquiries involved in different fields of science. 
 
Indeed, the main reason Quine puts such emphasis on the irrelevance of subject boundaries is 
because it distracts us from important points about the nature of science. It’s liable to present 
 
117 Quine often stresses his broad picture of science in response to criticism. See ‘Responses 
to Essays by Smart, Orenstein, Lewis, Holdcroft and Haack’, p.255. ‘Response to Gary 
Ebbs’, p.34 
118 From Stimulus to Science, p.49 
119 See ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.462 
120 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.462. See also Kemp. G. 2012. p.16 
121 ‘On Austin’s Method’, p.88 
122 ‘Necessary Truth’, p.76. See also ‘Reply to Jules Vuillemin’. p.620 
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science as too segregated. This detracts appreciation from the holistic picture of inquiry 
Quine has. This is a vital truth about the nature of how scientific theories, broadly construed, 
relate to their evidence: 
 
When we abstract from them, we see all of science—physics, biology, economics, 
mathematics, logic, and the rest—as a single sprawling system, loosely connected in 
some portions but disconnected nowhere. Parts of it—logic, arithmetic, game theory, 
theoretical parts of physics—are farther from the observational or experimental edge 
than other parts. But the overall system, with all its parts, derives its aggregate 
empirical content from that edge; and the theoretical parts are good only as they 
contribute in their varying degrees of indirectness to the systematizing of that 
content.123 
 
This is an important “philosophical error” that the seemingly strict boundaries between 
subjects leads to.124 It suggests, for example, that physics is a deeply empirical discipline 
in contrast to the purely formal subject of mathematics. This perspective is lost if we deal 
with things “sentence by sentence, or problem by problem, without reference to the 
nominal demarcation of disciplines.”125 
 
Quine even distances a concern with subject boundaries from his naturalism: 
 
The motivation [for the naturalistic project] is still philosophical, as motivation in 
natural science tends to be, and the inquiry proceeds in disregard of disciplinary 
boundaries but with respect for the disciplines themselves and appetite for their 
input.126 
 
According to Quine, if one reflects on the nature of the practice of science, we see that 
sharply separating out distinct fields of inquiry isn’t part of scientific practice, and, moreover, 
crossing those supposed lines is helpful for the progress of science. This is an immanent fact 
 
123 ‘Necessary Truth’, p.76 
124 ‘On Austin’s Method’, p.88 
125 Ibid 
126 From Stimulus to Science, p.16 
 
 
45 
about the nature of scientific inquiry, philosophy included, that is arrived at by reflecting on 
the practice of science from a perspective internal to science. 
 
Given that naturalism insists that there’s no higher authority to appeal to than science itself, 
the naturalist also claims that, providing that some part of our theory can be tested 
empirically via the hypothetico-deductive method, (i.e. providing it’s scientifically testable), 
then it’s acceptable and included within science. There’s no reason beyond that, or in 
principle restriction, which would prohibit the softer sciences from fitting within Quine’s 
picture of science. As Quite puts it: 
 
Naturalism need not cast aspersions on irresponsible metaphysics, however deserved, 
much less on soft sciences or on the speculative reaches of the hard ones, except insofar 
as a firmer basis is claimed for them than the experimental method itself.127 
 
Appreciating the broad nature of science at the heart of naturalism, then, is vital for both 
understanding what it means to work within science, since one works within science broadly 
conceived, as well as what first philosophy amounts to. Science is viewed broadly, the 
language game of science is focussed on prediction, and science is characterised, loosely, as 
following the hypothetico-deductive method. This means that violating these aspects of 
theorising and claiming a perspective external to science that makes claims about the nature 
of the world, or tries to provide support for science, is what can lead to first philosophy. 
Otherwise, the value of theorising is just a question of how useful it is for prediction, because 
Quine’s minimal standards for science qualify it as scientific in a minimal sense. And this 
point is especially crucial for philosophy, because this allows philosophical theorising, or at 
least much of philosophy, to fit within science.  
 
This broad picture of science gives us a whole bundle of what seem to be diverse and 
separate fields of inquiry. Quine, of course, thinks that there are differences between parts of 
science, there’s just no difference substantial enough to exclude them from the overall game 
of science. The precise details about how the various gradations between the harder and 
softer sciences change as Quine’s view develops. But the basic idea is that the difference 
between the harder and softer sciences relates to how sparse the empirical checkpoints within 
 
127 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living Within One’s Means’, p.462 
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a specific science are. Indeed, in places the sparseness of the checkpoints “becomes rather the 
rule than the exception.”128 For example, in areas like history, if we constrained our 
theorising by placing a lot of weight on implying testable predictions, the field would 
deteriorate. 
 
One area of theorising that sits at a considerable distance from respectable science are idioms 
that are useful, but intensional and unable to be extensionalized, namely propositional 
attitudes de re and modal idioms.129 Statements involving these locutions are described as 
“outriders of the scientific enterprise”, or “extraneous aids” to science, together with things 
like indexicals, and occasion sentences generally.130 In some sense these lie outside of 
science as Quine describes them as being set “outside the systematic fabric of science as a 
useful outrider”.131 But Quine isn’t claiming that these are first philosophical. Rather, Quine 
is stressing that they lie outside of regimented science, which is extensional. They are still 
part of scientific theorising in that they are useful for science; they provide us with 
“informative leads”.132 By this, I take Quine to mean that they have value in allowing us to 
eventually make predictions. Quine also stresses that as science develops, the more rigorous 
and objective it becomes, the less statements with such locutions in them will figure.133 
 
Now, while Quine clearly intends science to be understood broadly, he sometimes says 
things that suggest alignment with the idea that he’s interested in science narrowly. For 
example, Quine claims that “[t]he world is as natural science says it is…”.134 This doesn’t 
just push knowledge into the purview of science but suggests something narrower, i.e. that 
knowledge only comes from natural science. This idea is also found in other philosopher’s 
presentations of Quine’s naturalism. Gibson, for example, emphasises the role of physics, 
claiming naturalism holds that “it is up to science (and, in particular, to physics) to 
identify and describe what there is”.135 To understand Quine’s view of science properly, 
then, we need to make sense of what role physics has within it. 
 
128 From Stimulus to Science, p.49. See also ‘On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma’, p.41. ‘The 
Scope and Language of Science’, p.237 
129 See Roth, P. 1990. pp.97-9 
130 From Stimulus to Science, p.98 
131 Ibid 
132 Ibid. pp.97-8 
133 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.242 
134 ‘Structure and Nature’, p.405 
135 Gibson, R. 1992. p.17 
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It would be a mistake to think that while Quine is pushing a broad picture of science, he’s 
holding that it’s unified in the sense of all reducing to something like physics. Rather, science 
is a unified whole for Quine in the sense that it’s not discontinuous. Quine makes this clear 
when he writes: “[s]cience is neither discontinuous nor monolithic. It is variously jointed, and 
loose in the joints in varying degrees.”136 Quine thinks that part of the reason that science 
isn’t discontinuous is because logic and mathematics tend to be shared amongst all branches 
of science.137 
 
But Quine does place a special role on physics.138 Quine describes it as “an ultimate 
parameter”.139 It’s difficult to understand exactly what Quine means. He says something 
similar, but more substantial, elsewhere: “[l]et me begin by stating what I take to be the 
business of physics. It is the discovery of the ultimate constituents of the world and their 
regularities.”140 In describing physics as ‘ultimate’, Quine is claiming that the very task of 
physics is to understand reality at its most fundamental level.141 Understanding this point 
requires that we appreciate Quine’s naturalism. As a naturalist, there’s no first philosophy, 
and so there’s nothing firmer than science we can appeal to in understanding the world. And 
since physics is the part of science dealing with reality at its most fundamental, this 
immanent predicament is especially notable at the level of physics. Quine then explains that 
while we can’t reduce other parts of science and their objects to physics, their behaviour “is 
nevertheless the sum of the behavior of the ultimate physical constituents, however 
incalculable.”142 In this way, physics isn’t just ultimate, it’s “basic”.143 Physics is basic in the 
sense that “nothing that happens in the world…without some redistribution of microphysical 
states.”144 This general and fundamental claim is a hallmark of the success of physics itself. 
 
136 ‘On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World’, p.230 
137 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.71 
138 This isn’t meant to suggest that we can separate out a chunk of science sharply as being all 
and only physics. See ‘Necessary Truth’, pp.75-6. Nor that physics is complete. We just have 
very strong evidence for thinking physics will continue along the same lines as it develops. 
See Kemp, G. 2012. p.19.  
139 ‘Reply to Chomsky’, p.303. See also ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.222-23 
140 ‘The Way the World Is’, p.166 
141 See also Hylton, P. 2007. pp.313-14. ‘Smart’s Philosophy and Scientific Realism’, p.93 
142 Ibid 
143 Ibid. See also ‘Facts of the Matter’, pp.279-80 
144 ‘Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking’, p.98. Note also that this gives Quine a physicalistic 
view, despite accepting abstract objects. ‘Facts of the Matter’, p.283 
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That is, it comes from appreciating not the essential nature of physical science, but the 
immanent nature of physics as it currently stands within science. We can see this, Quine 
claims, if we appreciate that were there some phenomena which, according to physics, wasn’t 
accounted for by changes in elementary physical states, physicists would supplement their 
physics. Physics is the part of science that is maximally general in its scope.145 This is true 
especially of the laws of physics in contrast to laws in other areas like psychology.146 Quine 
is able, then, to hold that physics has a special role within science while also thinking of 
science broadly.  
 
A feature of Quine’s view of science closely related to its broad nature is the relationship 
between science and common sense. Quine sees the relationship between science and 
common sense as not sharply separate. Science simply lies at the more refined end of our 
theorising. Quine writes: “[s]cience…differs from common sense only in degree of 
methodological sophistication.”147 He explains that science is more systematic than common 
sense, and that science makes an extended and refined use of the sort of simplicity that we 
use in common sense theorising.148 Common sense language relies heavily on 
intersubjectivity to be effective, and science stresses this factor even further: “[l]anguage in 
general is robustly extravert, but science is more so.”149 
 
In emphasising that science and common sense aren’t detached from one another, Quine 
writes: “[s]cience is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it.”150 He then 
gives a more elaborate explanation of how they differ, writing: 
 
The scientist is indistinguishable from the common man in his sense of evidence, 
except that the scientist is more careful. This increased case is not a revision of 
evidential standards, but only the more patient and systematic collection and use of 
what anyone would deem evidence.151 
 
 
145 “Full coverage in this sense is the very business of physics, and only of physics.” Ibid. 
146 ‘Smart’s Philosophy and Scientific Realism’, p.93 
147 ‘Natural Kinds’, p.129 
148 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.233-34 
149 Ibid. p.234 
150 Ibid. p.229 
151 Ibid. p.233 
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This shows that for naturalism, the notion of evidence in science is just a refinement of the 
same notion we find in common sense. Similar remarks apply to other important notions 
like reality and truth.  
 
Indeed, examining this relation between science and common sense can help us understand 
why Quine thinks that science has the rights to many of the things that are important when we 
theorise. This is vital to appreciate because we saw in the last section that, while Quine thinks 
there are other language games apart from science that one could take part in, e.g. poetry, 
science is the language game that legitimately involves pursuing important things like truth 
and the nature of reality. Quine claims that science is just refined common sense, and some of 
the aspects of common sense theorising that science refines are important notions like reality 
and evidence. Science does not deal with distinct scientific variants of these notions, and the 
naturalistic philosopher, similarly, doesn’t deal with distinct philosophical variants of them 
either. The notions of reality, and so on, that we find at work in science is just what happens 
with the ordinary notion once it reaches a sufficient level of sophistication. At one end of the 
scale we have our commonsensical notion of what it’s like to understand the nature of the 
world, and, at the other, we have the sort of understanding we find in physics.  
 
Understanding this point helps us understand naturalism because while Quine thinks there are 
other language games from science that one could legitimately take part in, those language 
games will not involve things like pursing truth and making claims about the nature of 
reality. Attempting to do these things, without conceding that one is doing science, is 
illegitimate and constitutes first philosophy. Quine claims not to know in any substantive 
sense what someone means if they use a term like ‘exists’, ‘real’, or ‘truth’ without meaning 
it in the way it’s used in ongoing science, since those terms figure in science merely as more 
careful and systematic extensions of the ordinary notions. If one means something distinctly 
philosophical, something that isn’t vulnerable to empirical refutation, or something that isn’t 
founded by the experimental method, in making a claim about what is real or true, then one 
just doesn’t seem to be using the same vital notion of truth and reality that science deals in 
and that we intend when we talk ordinarily of these things.152 Understanding science as a 
language game, then, shows us why first philosophy is illegitimate from the perspective of 
naturalism, and hence why the naturalist is prohibited from theorising in this way. 
 
152 See ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.229. Word and Object, p.3 
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Of course, Quine thinks that notions that deviate substantially from common sense can 
still be scientifically respectable. He considers this point in relation to the idea that we 
might view causation in terms of energy flow, which might seem too refined to explicate 
our common notion of causation. Quine responds by claiming: 
 
…that we may reasonably allow concepts, however primordial, to evolve and sharpen 
with the progress of science. After all, even the scope or subject matter of a science 
may not be definable until the science has made great strides; so it was with 
chemistry.153 
 
Quine’s point is that this sort of evolution can only occur immanently within our ongoing 
scientific theory, and that theory is already an extension of common sense theorising. This 
means that the ties between scientific theorising and common sense are never completely 
detached.  
 
Now, let me clarify that, while I’ve set out Quine’s view that we always work immanently 
within science and his rejection of first philosophy as two aspects of his naturalistic 
perspective, these theses have a close connection. We’re now in a position to better 
understand how these views relate, and therefore to have a more thorough understanding of 
the nature of Quine’s naturalism. 
 
As Verhaegh stresses, strictly, these two views are logically distinct.154 If one is always 
working immanently within science, then this perspective rules out any appeals to first 
philosophy. That is, by contraposition, if one was doing first philosophy, then they would not 
be working immanently within science. The view that we are always working from within 
science implies a rejection of perspectives that transcend science. However, one could think 
that first philosophical inquiry is illegitimate, and so reject the idea that we can occupy a 
perspective that transcends science, but at the same time not adopt the view that we have to 
always work from within science. A sceptic could do this by stressing that while first 
philosophical inquiry has to be viewed as illegitimate, science does not meet certain 
 
153 Roots of Reference, p.6. See also ‘Natural Kinds’, pp.127-29 
154 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.54-5 
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standards that qualify it as legitimate or warranted inquiry. The sceptic denies that we have 
any theories that are true, or that meet whatever the relevant standard is, and thinks that we 
should only work within a theory that we know to be true, or that meets whatever standard is 
relevant. The sceptic, therefore, could reject first philosophy, but deny that we can rely on the 
immanent claims of science.155 
 
It’s true that these two theses are strictly logically distinct, albeit with the implication from 
one to the other being blocked only in one direction. But, for Quine, they are two sides of the 
same coin. Quine writes that “the immanent is that which makes sense within 
naturalism…and the transcendent is not”.156 Naturalism requires, positively, that we always 
work immanently within science, and, negatively, that we do not occupy a first philosophical 
perspective. 
 
For these two views to be logically distinct for Quine, it would have to be plausible that 
Quine can be read as a sceptic. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that Quine’s naturalism has little 
tolerance for traditional scepticism, and so it is not plausible to read Quine as a sceptic. But 
the points I’ve established in this section also help us appreciate why Quine maintains that 
the two theses of his naturalism are intertwined. Quine writes: 
 
We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is 
evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses; for, to do so is simply to 
dissociate the terms ‘reality’ and ‘evidence’ from the very applications which originally 
did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us.157 
 
This is intimately connected with the idea that science itself aims to tell us what reality is 
like, and hence what is real is part of the game of science. And it’s also closely connected to 
the idea that science is just refined common sense, since the notions of reality and evidence in 
science are just sophisticated refinements of the notions that we use every day. For Quine, if 
 
155 A relativist, plausibly, could hold a similar position. It should be clear from my 
characterisation of Quine’s naturalistic outlook, however, that naturalism is not a form of 
relativism.  
156 ‘Responses to Articles by Abel, Bergström, Davidson, Dreben, Gibson, 
Hookway, and Prawitz’, p.230 
157 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.229. See also Word and Object, p.3 
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we reject the coherence of first philosophy, we simply have to take the immanent claims of 
science as seriously as possible, for we can hope for nothing better or worse. 
 
Throughout, we’ve seen that Quine’s view of science emerges from reflecting on the practice 
of science as an evolving discipline. Facts about the nature of science are scientific facts that 
are discovered immanently within ongoing scientific inquiry. This is what we should expect 
from Quine, given his naturalism. Such a strategy leaves open the possibility that many of the 
aspects of science that Quine stresses as being important might no longer be important were 
science to develop in a different direction. We see this when Quine writes: 
 
We have reached the present stage in our characterization of the scientific framework 
not by reasoning a priori from the nature of science qua science, but rather by seizing 
upon traits of the science of our day…One or another of these traits might well change 
as science advances.158 
 
The immanent claims of science are fallible, and the picture we have of what science itself 
is comes from reflecting on the practice of science, and so inherits this fallibility. 
 
This also shows that Quine is not attempting to specify the nature of science in some way 
that picks out the essence of scientific inquiry.159 This is important because specifying the 
precise and essential nature of scientific inquiry is often taken to be a vital philosophical 
task. One might think that we gain an understanding of the nature of science by reflecting 
on science a priori, by working out what kind of thing science, in essence, is. In particular, 
we might, discover on reflection that the essence of science involves some special feature, 
in the way that some philosophers think we do when finding out the nature of something 
like water. But Quine doesn’t do this. He looks into science as an ongoing and evolving 
theory, examining what science currently tells us, but being sensitive to the idea that 
science might develop, such that features that seem to be constitutive of it change. 
 
 
158 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.244-45 
159 See Ibid: “[i]t would be unwarranted rationalism to suppose that we can stake out the 
business of science in advance of pursuing science and arriving at a certain body of theory…” 
pp.234-34 
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The picture of science that Quine provides us with is also fairly minimalistic. Quine 
doesn’t attempt to provide a definitive and exhaustive characterisation of the method of 
science. Providing such a characterisation is often taken to be an important task in the 
philosophy of science, and so this is another way in which Quine’s approach, in lacking 
this aim, is distinctive. What is important for Quine’s picture of science is that the 
scientific method is characterised in a way where scientific theories are connected to 
experience such that that the only process involved in going from experience to that theory 
is the scientific method itself; there are no “ulterior controls” supporting science.160 In 
other words, Quine’s picture of science only involves science and nothing first 
philosophical. 
 
Moreover, with science being thought of in terms of a language game, we can appreciate 
part of the reason why Quine denies that he’s aiming to provide an answer to the 
demarcation problem.161 Just like the related questions of the essence of science and the 
method of science, the demarcation problem is often taken to be a central question in 
philosophy, and so it’s important to understand Quine’s esoteric view of science in order 
to see why he doesn’t spend time dealing with this issue either. There are other language 
games from science, as we’ve seen, but these don’t constitute non-science in the sort of 
way that someone looking for a strict demarcation between science and non-science is 
looking for. The important distinction is between science and first philosophy; between 
something immanent to science and something that illegitimately tries to transcend it. The 
question of where we draw the line between different subjects, or even between what we 
ought to exclude as non-scientific, isn’t all that important. What is important is that we 
have a picture of what it is for something to be scientific and then ask of a hypothesis 
whether it meets that standard. 
 
To summarise, in this section, I explained the picture of science at the heart of Quine’s 
naturalism. I argued that Quine’s view of science is esoteric and crucial for understanding 
naturalism. I made sense of the place of prediction within this picture, which allowed us to 
understand Quine’s view of science as a language game, where prediction functions to test 
 
160 Word and Object, p.23 
161 Quine claims that “[d]emarcation is not my purpose”. ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within 
One’s Means’, p.462. And also: “I don’t censor à la Carnap nor demarcate à la Popper”. 1993 
letter to Putnam, sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.51 f33 
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science. I also established that Quine intends science to be understood broadly and this fits 
with the lack of emphasis he places on subject boundaries. Moreover, I also demonstrated 
that Quine doesn’t view science and common sense as sharply separate and that this is 
important because it shows that science doesn’t engage with notions of reality or truth that 
are substantially different from those employed within common sense. All of these claims 
about science are taken by Quine to be immanent truths about science made from within 
our ongoing scientific theory. This makes such claims fallible, but as a naturalist, Quine 
can’t expect anything more. These points shed considerable light on what it means to work 
immanently within science, as well as why one can’t appeal to first philosophy, i.e. what it 
means for Quine to be a naturalist.  
 
 
1.4 First Philosophy in the Early Quine 
 
Thus far, we’ve seen that there is a tendency to see Quine’s naturalism as extending back, in 
some form at least, into his early work, i.e. substantively before he is explicitly naturalistic. 
We’ve also seen that understanding Quine’s naturalistic perspective involves appreciating 
that it’s not only a developed and nuanced view of inquiry, but also a restrictive one. For 
Quine’s naturalism, inquiry begins and remains within our ongoing scientific theory, and it 
rejects, in principle, any theorising that tries to transcend science while trying to support or 
impinge on it, i.e. it rejects first philosophical theorising. 
 
In this section, I argue that Quine was not always a naturalist. This is because, until 
approximately 1952, Quine is open to a form of theorising that would qualify as first 
philosophical, namely, a form of phenomenalist theorising. Because Quine is tolerant of such 
first philosophical theorising, and because first philosophical theorising is prohibited by 
naturalism, we see that Quine’s early work cannot be plausibly interpreted as naturalistic.162 
 
The structure of this section is as follows. In §1.4.1, I establish that Quine was not always a 
naturalist. I do so by, first, presenting some suggestive support for this idea based on Quine’s 
 
162 My argument in this section has benefitted substantially from the recent publication of 
Verhaegh, S. 2018. This has allowed me to sharpen the argument in ways not possible before 
his publication, in large part due to his drawing skilfully on unpublished work of Quine’s. I 
have, therefore, tried to present my own view in ways that also differ subtly from his own. 
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remarks in 1946. Following from this, I then strengthen my case by examining Quine’s early 
attitude towards phenomenalism. I establish that, in this era, Quine is tolerant of 
phenomenalism, though, ultimately, he does not commit to endorsing phenomenalism, nor 
does he commit to endorsing alternatives, such as physicalism. While Quine does have 
worries about the prospects of phenomenalism, I establish that these worries are not sufficient 
for him to discount it as a legitimate view. Crucially, I then show that this particular form of 
phenomenalist theorising is first philosophical. Quine’s early tolerance to this form of first 
philosophical theorising, I contend, demonstrates that Quine was not always a naturalist.  
 
In §1.4.2, I then show that, around 1952, Quine’s attitude towards phenomenalism changes in 
a way vital for understanding the emergence of his naturalism. Namely, I show that Quine 
shifts from being tolerant of phenomenalism to viewing it as involving a perspective that is 
illegitimate. This shift, I argue, is indicative of his development into a view that is 
naturalistic.  
 
 
1.4.1 Quine Before Naturalism 
 
Here, I argue that Quine was not always a naturalist. I begin by presenting some preliminary 
support for this idea by examining suggestive claims that Quine makes in response to first 
philosophical epistemology in 1946. Having done so, I then provide more substantive 
evidence for the absence of naturalism in Quine’s early work. To this end, I examine Quine’s 
early attitude to phenomenalism. I argue that, while Quine’s attitude towards phenomenalism 
doesn’t seem quite so positive as some philosophers have claimed, he is still open to 
phenomenalism as a legitimate theory. In order to establish this, I consider worries that Quine 
has in his early work about phenomenalism and argue that, while Quine has genuine concerns 
about the prospects of phenomenalism, these worries aren’t sufficient for him to rule it out as 
an option. I also explain that part of the appeal of phenomenalism for Quine is that the view 
involves the notion of epistemological priority. Having done so, I then argue that this form of 
phenomenalism is, in fact, a form of first philosophical theorising. In this way, Quine’s early 
tolerance of phenomenalism amounts to an early tolerance of first philosophy. This, I take it, 
establishes that Quine was not always a naturalist.   
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First, then, let me motivate the idea that Quine lacks a naturalistic outlook in his earlier work 
by identifying some preliminary evidence suggestive of this fact. In 1946, Quine comes close 
to characterising traditional epistemological views as first philosophical in his lectures on 
Hume. Quine stresses that at the heart of the theory of knowledge is a drive for certainty to 
subdue doubts one has about the lack of certainty we find in science. Quine explains these 
attempts in ways that make them first philosophical (though he doesn’t use the term). He 
speaks of the “philosophical urge to find a bed-rock of certainty somewhere beneath the 
probabilities of natural science.”163 And he characterises Plato’s epistemology as follows: “he 
was in search of basic principles, to which certainty might attach, behind the science of 
nature.”164 
 
Crucially, though, Quine doesn’t respond to these approaches with his naturalistic alternative 
to first philosophical epistemology, nor does he stress that the perspective that they are 
looking for is illegitimate, as he does in his later work. Quine raises a response to the idea 
that appealing to probability isn’t stable enough to secure science because it leads to an 
infinite regress of higher-order probabilities. Moreover, at the end of the lectures, where 
Quine explains how Hume’s influence remains in contemporary empiricism, he outlines two 
main projects that are Humean in spirit. Neither of them is naturalistic. One is reductionism 
(“constructive empiricism”) and the other is pragmaticism.165 If Quine had his naturalistic 
view at this time, it seems plausible to expect that it would materialize in some way.  
 
Of course, this evidence is suggestive. Let me now bolster this by providing a more rigorous 
case in favour of the idea that Quine lacks a naturalistic perspective in his early work. In 
order to do this, let us now turn to Quine’s attitude towards phenomenalism. Some 
philosophers have taken a strong reading of Quine’s early view on phenomenalism according 
to which Quine accepts phenomenalism. For example, Murphey has attributed this view to 
Quine.166 Putnam also reads Quine, before the 1950s, as a phenomenalist, at least about 
observation sentences.167 Quine himself also seems to endorse phenomenalism at the Harvard 
Logic Group meetings in 1940-41. In contrast to Carnap and, probably, Tarski, Quine 
 
163 ‘Lectures on David Hume’s Philosophy’, p.51 
164 Ibid. p.52 
165 Ibid. p.135 
166 Murphey, M. 2012. pp.54-5 
167 Putnam, H. 1982. p.156. See also Yolton, J. 1967. p.156. He reads Word and Object as 
involving a meta-philosophy which leads to phenomenalism. 
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advocated on behalf of the view that the language they developed for nominalism starts with 
predicates for sense-data over predicates for things.168 Similarly, Lugg sees the following 
claim in ‘Truth by Convention’ as Quine’s expression of hope about Carnap’s reductionism: 
 
In Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Carnap has pursued this program [reductionism] with 
such amazing success as to provide grounds for expecting all the expressions to be 
definable ultimately in terms of logic and mathematics plus just one “empirical” 
primitive…169 
 
This early apparent hopefulness is different from most of Quine’s other discussions of 
Carnap’s project in the Aufbau where, while Quine praises the ingenuity in Carnap’s 
constructions, he raises numerous problems for it.170  
 
Let me address Lugg’s claim first. This evidence is from 1935, after Quine has witnessed and 
discussed parts of the Logical Syntax with Carnap. It is therefore unclear why Quine would 
place any weight on the strict reductive aspirations of the Aufbau being true, as Quine was 
certainly aware Carnap’s view had, by that point, moved on. Hylton has warned against 
reading Quine as having a developed view of epistemology this early in his work, and uses 
the same quote as evidence for this claim.171 According to Hylton, the fact that Quine is still 
expressing optimism for the Aufbau project after Carnap has given up on it shows a naivety 
and a lack of depth in Quine’s understanding of epistemological issues at this time. Hylton 
seems right that Quine’s epistemological views at this time are fairly naïve. In Chapter 2, I’ll 
explain in detail just how in flux they are, such that it’s not plausible to attribute to Quine a 
substantive and developed epistemological outlook this early. This undermines Lugg’s claim 
 
168 See Mancosu, P. 2010. p.397. On these meetings, Carnap writes: “[w]e have not agreed 
among ourselves whether it is better to begin with thing-predicates or sense-data-predicates. 
For the first: I and Tarski…For the second: Goodman and Quine”. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 
2018. p.95. And in a letter from Goodman to Quine, Goodman writes: “Carnap’s resistance 
may have softened a little as a result of being shown that his argument that phenomenal 
sentences are incomplete presupposes the physicalistic basis he uses it to defend. I hope you 
are as successful at the department meeting […] as you were in getting phenomenalism 
another hearing in the group.” Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.95 f40 
169 ‘Truth by Convention’, p.100 f20. Lugg, A. 2012. p.236 
170 See, for example, ‘Two Dogmas’, p.40 
171 Hylton, P. 2001. p.269 f26 
 
 
58 
that Quine’s early view should be seen as aspiring for the phenomenalistic project involved in 
the Aufbau to be shown successful. 
 
Indeed, I think there might be something further going on here that’s plausible to attribute to 
Quine, and that explains why he includes this link to Carnap in ‘Truth by Convention’. This 
nod to Carnap (and a minor nod too, given the above quote is given in a footnote) is similar 
to Quine’s nod to Duhem in ‘Two Dogmas’.172 Quine is often taken to be stressing his 
commonality to Duhem’s holism in that paper, just as Lugg takes the above as evidence of 
Quine stressing a commonality to Carnap. However, when Quine wrote ‘Two Dogmas’, he 
wasn’t aware of Duhem’s view, and so the mention of Duhem was added at the suggestion of 
Carl Hempel and Phillip Frank to locate Quine’s view within the broader landscape.173 It’s 
plausible that, while Carnap’s view is far from unknown by Quine at this time, given ‘Truth 
by Convention’ occurs so close to the Carnap lectures, this emphasis of the Aufbau is given 
with a similar purpose. Quine is not really in tune with deep issues in epistemology at this 
time, but he wants to highlight that such work does exist, especially work that he’s fond of. 
This is further suggested by the last sentence of the footnote: “[b]ut for the present cursory 
considerations no such spectacular reducibility need be presupposed.”174 Lugg’s 
interpretation of the hopeful nature of this early link Quine makes to Carnap’s view seems 
too optimistic to establish that Quine outright accepts phenomenalism in his early work. 
 
Now, let me address the more general idea that Quine’s early work involves a commitment to 
phenomenalism. A further way in which Quine seems to accept phenomenalism in his very 
early work is that Quine accepted Lewis’ distinction between sense-data as ‘the given’ and 
the ‘pragmatic a priori’ in a graduate paper from 1931.175 This would give us extremely early 
 
172 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.41 f17 
173 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.394. In a slightly later paper, Quine explains Duhem’s 
view explicitly, likening his own view to it. ‘On Mental Entities’, p.222. Moreover, in a 
posthumously published paper given five days after ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine also includes a 
mention of Duhem, hence Quine must have had this realization very quickly. Verhaegh 
includes in the published version of this paper the note from Hempel which alerted Quine to 
Duhem’s holism. ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, p.182. Quine is more constructive, 
though brief, in Pursuit of Truth: “[t]his is the important insight called holism. Pierre Duhem 
made much of it early in this century, but not too much.” p.14. Quine must be more 
acquainted with Duhem’s view at this later time, given he thinks it’s insufficient. 
174 ‘Truth by Convention’, p.100 f20.  
175 Isaac, J. 2005. p.220. Quine relates notions like the given to sense-data in ‘The Sensory 
Support of Science’. p.327 
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evidence of Quine siding with phenomenalism. However, as Isaac notes, Quine seems 
worried about there being a strict distinction between the given and the pragmatic a priori 
even in this very early paper. It’s not clear, therefore, that we can even attribute a stable form 
of phenomenalism to Quine’s very early work. So, despite Quine’s appearance of receptivity 
to phenomenalism in this early work, I take it that we have good reason to be cautious of 
attributing to him an overtly positive attitude towards the view.  
 
A further reason for exercising caution is that, while Quine appears to be open to 
phenomenalism in his early work, he also raises some worries for the view. Now, these 
worries aren’t substantial enough that they move Quine to reject phenomenalism as a 
plausible position, but the fact that he has such worries might explain why his attitude 
towards phenomenalism lacks proper positive commitment. For example, Quine starts to 
have serious worries about the relevance and value of phenomenalism in the mid-1940s. We 
see this in some of the problems that Quine raises for the view in his notes.176 Here, Quine 
worries that epistemological, and particularly, phenomenalistic (which he seems to consider 
as the sole approach to epistemology at this point) issues are irrelevant to his ontological 
ideas at the time. Indeed, Quine’s reflections on his earlier work show that he was interested 
more in ontological questions than epistemological ones.177 His focus then switches in his 
later work to epistemology. It’s plausible that part of the reason Quine doesn’t have a more 
definitive and developed epistemology in his early work, and so doesn’t take sides between 
views like phenomenalism and physicalism, is that he’s more concerned about developing his 
ontological views during much of this period. Quine also seems to appreciate an important 
part of his later main worry about phenomenalism when he considers the idea that perception 
itself should be understood as a physical aspect of a physical organism.178 This further 
reinforces the idea that while Quine is open to accepting phenomenalism, he’s also 
considering other, rival, epistemologies, in this case, a physicalistic one. 
 
We also see early worries for phenomenalism in Quine’s views on confirmation before ‘Two 
Dogmas’. Quine is wary about adhering to the notion of confirmation compared to many 
 
176 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.95 f37 
177 For example, he writes: “[i]n my youth I thought of the question of existence, or what 
there is, as perhaps the most basic question of philosophy and science. In the fullness of time 
the scales fell from my eyes.” ‘The Growth of Mind and Language’. p.189 
178 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.95 
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other empiricists at that time. But Quine also highlights what role he would take logic to play 
in order to make the notion of confirmation respectable. Quine makes this point in relation to 
the idea that, because outright reductionism doesn’t seem like it will work when it comes to 
reducing our theory of the world to experience, something less rigid that people hope for 
instead is that statements will be confirmed, to some degree, by experience, or by statements 
in phenomenalistic language. This then raises the issue of making sense of degrees of 
confirmation. However, Quine claims that, if one is still going to pursue something like the 
reductive programme, i.e. something like phenomenalism, then one is stuck with this 
problem: 
 
This is a vast problem, but, according to the considerations I have just sketched, it 
would seem to be an essential problem for empiricism; for, degree of confirmation 
seems to be the one surviving connection between sciences, or common sense, and the 
direct experience which is the empiricist’s bedrock.179 
 
Quine then mentions some people who are engaged in this problem, noting that he is “far 
from content with the results to date”.180 So, Quine is far from optimistic about reductionism 
via confirmation at this time, yet he doesn’t give up on the view. The significance of 
confirmation that Quine highlights is the essential role that developments in modern logic are 
playing in attempting to make empiricism work. Either the problem of confirmation will be 
solved, using modern logic, or it will be found unsolvable, but “any conclusive arguments to 
this negative effect will probably have to exploit the resources of modern logic in subtle ways 
that none of us have yet envisaged.”181 
 
So, in light of the fact that Quine raises worries for phenomenalism, but doesn’t dismiss the 
view in light of these worries, it seems fair to characterise Quine’s early attitude as tolerant 
towards phenomenalism. In his early work, Quine remains open to accepting phenomenalism, 
but he doesn’t take sides on whether to accept it or a physicalistic alternative.182 Quine’s 
attitude towards phenomenalism, then, is tolerant, if not overly positive. We see this most 
famously in ‘On What There Is’ where Quine outlines the relative benefits of two conceptual 
 
179 ‘The Importance of Logic for Philosophy’, p.142 
180 Ibid 
181 Ibid 
182 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.102 
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schemes in terms of their simplicity; the phenomenalistic one being ontologically simpler, 
and the physicalistic one being conceptually simpler.183 While Quine isn’t settling for a 
choice of conceptual scheme here — “the question what ontology actually to adopt still 
stands open, and the obvious counsel is tolerance and an experimental spirit” — he isn’t 
presenting phenomenalism as a poor choice, nor does he exclude it as something that doesn’t 
make sense.184 Quine even has traces of this tolerant view as late as 1951.185 This attitude 
contrasts sharply with the attitude Quine displays in 1952, as I’ll argue in the next section.  
 
Now, to clarify, by characterising Quine's attitude towards phenomenalism as tolerant, I do 
not mean to suggest that Quine is viewing phenomenalism as one amongst many possible 
conceptual schemes that are all equally correct. Quine's tolerance is not so liberal that he 
intends us to tolerate rival conceptual schemes without hope of ever crowning one the victor. 
Rather, Quine's view is tolerant towards phenomenalism in the sense that phenomenalism is a 
plausible and motivated view that may turn out to be the one he adopts. We see this in 'On 
What There Is'. Here, as I have just explained, Quine stresses that the "obvious counsel is 
tolerance" and that each conceptual scheme "deserves to be developed".186 At the same time, 
however, Quine also counsels "an experimental spirit" and is asking the question of "what 
ontology actually to adopt" or “[w]hich [conceptual scheme] should prevail?”.187 
 
In addition to Quine’s tolerance of phenomenalism, the phenomenalistic conceptual 
scheme is singled out as claiming “epistemological priority.”188 Indeed, one of the main 
reasons for Quine’s tolerance of phenomenalism at this time is that Quine retains 
epistemological value for epistemological priority, and he thinks that epistemological 
priority plays an important role in phenomenalism. Namely, that phenomenalism is tied to 
epistemological priority in that the reduction it’s trying to accomplish is a reduction of 
 
183 ‘On What There Is’, pp.17-8. The phenomenalistic conceptual scheme is ontologically 
simpler because it only posits sense-data. 
184 Ibid 
185 See, for example, Quine’s letter to James B. Conant: “[t]he philosopher who 
epistemologizes backward to sense data […] is fashioning a conceptual scheme just as the 
physicist does; but a different one, for a different subject. […] He agrees that there are 
electrons and tables and chairs and other people, and that the electrons and other elementary 
particles are ‘fundamental’ in the physical sense. […] But sense data are ‘fundamental’ in the 
epistemological sense.” Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.27 
186 ‘On What There Is’, pp.17-9 
187 Ibid 
188 Ibid, p.19 
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knowledge to something that is epistemically prior to that knowledge, e.g. scientific 
knowledge to sense-data. 
 
In fact, Quine thinks that epistemological priority is one of the main problems in 
philosophy in the mid-1940s. In a letter suggesting the most urgent issues in philosophy 
for a Rockefeller conference, for example, Quine claims that not only is epistemological 
priority one of the two most urgent issues (the other being clarification of cognitive 
synonymy), but that epistemological priority is crucial for getting clear on the task of 
epistemology itself: 
 
Clarification of the notion of epistemological priority is needed to know what the task 
of epistemology (as distinct e.g. of psychology) is; for, epistemological priority is the 
direction in which epistemological reduction of knowledge to more fundamental or 
immediate knowledge seeks to progress.189 
 
This is a strong claim. Quine thinks that we need to clarify the notion of epistemological 
priority in order to clarify the very task of epistemology. This helps to explain why Quine 
seems to consider reductionism as the only real candidate in epistemology at times, since the 
very task of epistemology is characterised here in terms of epistemological priority, and 
epistemological priority is a crucial part of reductionism. More generally, that which is 
epistemologically prior to science is traditionally used to justify science from a perspective 
independent of science, or it is used to reduce science to such a perspective. The 
independence of science is required in the first case because if that which was meant to 
support science wasn’t independent of science, the justification would be circular. And in the 
second case, the independence is required because otherwise the reduction wouldn’t work, 
that is, it would not reduce scientific knowledge to “more fundamental or immediate 
knowledge”. While my focus is on phenomenalism, since this is the view Quine is open to, 
Quine also emphasises the function of epistemological priority in rationalist views, e.g. in 
Plato or Descartes.190 
 
So, thus far, we’ve seen that Quine, while lacking an overtly positive attitude towards 
 
189 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.96 
190 See, for example, ‘Lectures on David Hume’s Philosophy’, p.51 
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phenomenalism, maintains a tolerance of the view, and this tolerance is at least partially 
explained by his retaining value in the notion of epistemological priority. Now, what I will 
show is that this early tolerance to phenomenalism is the key to understanding the fact that 
Quine cannot have been a naturalist in this early work. This is because the phenomenalist 
perspective that he is tolerant to is, in fact, first philosophical. Let me explain.  
 
In order for Quine’s view of phenomenalism to be characterised as first philosophical it needs 
to be the case that sense-data, experience, or whatever it is that is meant to be 
epistemologically prior to science, is viewed as real in some special sense when compared 
with ordinary objects, or, more generally, when compared with everything else that we accept 
as real in our overall scientific theory. First philosophical items must be epistemologically 
prior, relatively fundamental, or even absolutely fundamental, with respect to (merely) 
ordinary objects or the empirical entities found out by science. Sense data, or similar notions, 
are not supposed to be part of our ongoing scientific theory so that they can provide support 
for science, or so that they can provide a perspective on the nature of reality that transcends 
science (which science can then be reduced to). Such philosophising takes place outside of 
the experimental method that governs our ongoing scientific theory. In such a way, sense-
data cannot merely be posits, i.e. they must be real in some more substantive sense than 
everything else that we accept as real. 
 
What makes appreciating Quine’s openness to phenomenalism as a first philosophical view 
difficult to grasp is that Quine often uses terms like ‘myth’ and ‘posit’ in different ways. In 
his naturalistic work, Quine uses them interchangeably, and such terms are not meant to 
suggest that what they’re talking about are not real in the fullest sense that science can 
accommodate. As Quine stresses in Word and Object: “[t]o call a posit a posit is not to 
patronize it”.191 
 
While Quine has a robustly realist view of myths and posits by 1960, this view doesn’t 
extend smoothly throughout his work. In his earlier work, we find some differences in how 
he views the status of myths. Quine’s use of myths is perhaps most well-known in ‘On What 
There Is’, even if, here, he doesn’t seem to offer as robust a view in terms of realism as he 
does in his later naturalistic view. Quine claims that we can choose between different 
 
191 Word and Object, p.22 
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conceptual schemes, and, on some schemes, some posits will figure merely as myths, the 
latter being ultimately eliminable and are included merely to help streamline our theory. 
Myths contrast with what our conceptual scheme has to quantify over in order to be true; 
myths in this sense are not values of our variables, and so not proper ontological 
commitments. This is clear, for example, when Quine likens the myth of physical objects on 
a phenomenalistic conceptual scheme to the nominalistic approach of formalism about 
mathematics. Quine writes: “…an attitude of formalism may with equal justice be adopted 
toward the physical conceptual scheme, in turn, by the pure aesthete or phenomenalist.”192 
This doesn’t make Quine’s use of mythmaking notably negative, but it does show a contrast 
between the phenomenalist’s fundamental posits, and ordinary scientific objects. In 1948, 
then, Quine is suggesting that physical objects are less real than sense-data on a 
phenomenalistic scheme, and, as argued above, Quine open to such a scheme.193  
 
Importantly, we can also see evidence for this view slightly later on. In the later version of 
‘Two Dogmas’, published in From a Logical Point of View, Quine seems to use ‘positing’ 
and ‘myth-making’ interchangeably. Quine stresses that while the myth of physical objects, 
epistemologically, has “proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working 
manageable structure into the flux of experience”, this doesn’t mean that it’s 
epistemologically a substantially different type of thing than, say, the myth of the Greek 
gods, which we tend to think of as paradigmatically unreal objects. Quine no longer seems to 
have the earlier view where ‘myth’ means ultimately eliminable.194 He says of the myth of 
physical objects that “[p]ositing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects” and 
 
192 ‘On What There Is’, p.18 
193 See also a letter from Quine to James B. Conant, where Quine emphasises, just like he 
does in ‘On What There Is’, that from the perspective of epistemology, sense data have 
fundamental nature compared to the posits involved in science: “The philosopher who 
epistemologizes backward to sense data […] is fashioning a conceptual scheme just as the 
physicist does; but a different one, for a different subject. […] He agrees that there are 
electrons and tables and chairs and other people, and that the electrons and other elementary 
particles are ‘fundamental’ in the physical sense. […] But sense data are ‘fundamental’ in the 
epistemological sense.” Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.27. Quine also claims, elsewhere, 
that his aim is to “give to the conceptual scheme everything except the raw confirmatory 
experiences, & to find the external purpose of the conceptual scheme in those experiences”. 
Sourced in and emphasis from Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.99. And, in ‘On What There Is’, Quine 
describes the construction of a conceptual scheme as aimed at providing a “set of concepts 
adequate to the play-by-play reporting of immediate experience.” pp.17-19 
194 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.44 
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[p]hysical objects, small and large, are not the only posits”.195 The focus on myth here, rather 
than merely talking about posits, seems to be a product of the fact that Quine appreciates that 
scientific theorising is expressed in language, and language doesn’t aim to do anything like 
correspond to some underlying reality. Hence, all of our posits are weaved into our human-
made tapestry of science.196 Quine appears to view posits and myths as all on the same 
footing, it’s just that some have “proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for 
working a manageable structure into the flux of experience”. By “manageable structure”, 
Quine means a structure that allows us to “expedite our dealings with sense experience.”197 
 
These claims are also present in the original version of ‘Two Dogmas’.198 However, there is 
an important difference in this earlier version of the paper. While discussing the same points, 
Quine introduces an analogy that is missing from the later version. Quine supposes that we 
develop an algebraic theory to reason about the rational numbers, but, due to it being 
complex to handle practically, we find that we can simplify the algebraic theory “by 
conceptually augmenting our ontology with some mythical entities, to be called irrational 
numbers”.199 Quine clearly doesn’t think that the myth of the irrational numbers are real in 
the same way as the rational numbers because, he stresses, our interests are still only about 
the rational numbers and, crucially, while practically we’re able to get by much easier, we do 
this “simply by pretending that the irrational numbers are there too.”200 In this way, Quine 
claims that the irrational numbers are not real in the same way as the rational numbers. Quine 
then extends this reasoning to the difference between physical objects and experience: “[n]ow 
I suggest that experience is analogous to the rational numbers and that the physical objects, in 
analogy to the irrational numbers, are posits which serve merely to simplify our treatment of 
experience.”201 This shows clearly that Quine thinks there’s a substantial difference in the 
 
195 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.45. My emphasis. 
196 See, for example, Quine’s claim in 1952, in relation to the idea for Word and Object, that 
he wants to present science as “a gradual warping and adjusting of the pattern of language, or 
myth, in such ways as seem increasingly to serve the pragmatic purpose of anticipating 
experience”. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.142 
197 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.45 
198 ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’. 1951. The Philosophical Review. Jan., Vol. 60, No. 1. 
pp.20-43. All quotes in this paragraph are from this version of the paper. 
199 p.41 
200 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
201 Ibid. p.42. Quine draws a similar analogy in ‘On What There Is’: “Physical objects are 
postulated entities which round out and simplify our account of experience, just as the 
introduction of irrational numbers simplifies laws of arithmetic. From the point of view of the 
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sense in which experience is real and the sense in which everyday objects are real, if we can 
even say something so strong about the latter. Moreover, and in a similar vein, in 1951, on 
the cusp of ‘Two Dogmas’ being published, Quine writes the following in a note: “everything 
is a posit except the flux of raw experience”.202 
 
To return to the main thread of my argument, these claims show that inquiry is less 
constrained in Quine’s early work than in his naturalistic work. This is because, in his early 
work, Quine lacks the constraint of always working from within science and the rejection of 
first philosophy. As I explained in §1.3, first philosophical theorizing can involve making 
claims about the nature of reality that are supposed to be understood in some special way 
when compared with the claims about the nature of reality that are made within science. As 
I’ve demonstrated above, it is precisely this type of theorising that Quine is open to in his 
early work. This is important when one considers the reason concerning why physics is 
‘ultimate’ for Quine as a naturalist (as discussed in §1.3.3). Physics is viewed as 
understanding the world at its most fundamental level. This is because we’re working from 
within science and there’s no first philosophy, i.e. there’s nothing firmer than or beyond 
science that we can appeal to. The immanence of naturalistic inquiry is felt strongly at the 
level of physics. But Quine lacks this constraint in his early work. There are avenues that are 
open to him that would provide him with something that is fundamental and outside of 
physics, as well as the rest of science, e.g. sense-data. Sense data, or their equivalents, are 
viewed as real in some special sense when compared with the things that we accept in science 
and they are also viewed as separate from our ongoing scientific theory. The philosopher, on 
this view, is presented as occupying a position external to science but that bears on science. 
The philosopher, in other words, is conducting first philosophy. Such a philosopher cannot be 
felicitously described as a naturalist. Therefore, Quine, with his openness to such 
phenomenalist theorising, was not a naturalist.  
 
 
conceptual scheme of the elementary arithmetic of rational numbers alone, the broader 
arithmetic of rational and irrational numbers would have the status of a convenient myth, 
simpler than the literal truth (namely, the arithmetic of rationals) and yet containing that 
literal truth as a scattered part. Similarly, from a phenomenalistic point of view, the 
conceptual scheme of physical objects is a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth and 
yet containing that literal truth as a scattered part." p.18  
202 Letter to Paul Weiss. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.99 f47. Emphasis added. 
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Here’s the upshot of this discussion. Recall that, in §1.2, I argued that philosophers often 
view Quine as having been a naturalist for much longer than he explicitly describes himself 
as being one. Quine is interpreted as being implicitly a naturalist for a considerable amount of 
time before 1960. On some of the interpretations I examined, Quine is interpreted as moving 
towards being fully naturalistic, with the seeds of naturalism having been sown very early in 
his work, perhaps even as far back as his graduate work. On others, Quine is more directly 
interpreted as being a naturalist in his early work. However, importantly, the characterisation 
of Quine’s naturalism I’ve provided in §1.3 shows that it does not admit of degrees. Either 
one works immanently within our ongoing scientific theory, rejecting theorising that is first 
philosophical, or they don’t. Quine either is a naturalist, or he’s not. Naturalism can’t allow 
for the possibility that one works from within science most of the time, but occasionally 
carries out first philosophy. Quine insists that “[t]here is no such cosmic exile.”203 
 
Indeed, it is through appreciating this fact that we are able to see that Quine is not a naturalist 
until much further into his development than is often thought. Naturalism involves an in-
principle rejection of the legitimacy of first philosophical perspectives, otherwise one is not 
always working within ongoing science. Quine lacks this perspective as late as 1951, as I’ve 
argued above. Both of these ways of interpreting Quine’s commitment to naturalism as 
implicit in his early work — where Quine is either a naturalist from very early on or is 
naturalistic in some sense and becomes more fully naturalistic — are undermined by the 
argument of this chapter. The generality of Quine’s naturalism has been greatly exaggerated 
and, consequently, Quine’s development has to be understood in a different, more complex, 
way.  
 
 
1.4.2 From Phenomenalism to Naturalism 
 
Now that we’ve recognised that the extent of Quine’s naturalism has been exaggerated, given 
that Quine was not a naturalist in his early work, let me conclude this chapter by proposing a 
way in which we can recognise Quine’s consequent shift to naturalism. Namely, in this 
section, I establish that Quine’s attitude towards phenomenalism changes in a way that is 
vitally important for understanding the development of his naturalism. Recall that what 
 
203 Word and Object, p.275 
 
 
68 
established that Quine was not a naturalist was his openness to a particular form of 
phenomenalism. What I will show here is that Quine later rejects phenomenalism on grounds 
which are plainly naturalistic. It is this change in attitude, then, that illuminates the 
emergence of Quine’s naturalism.  
 
I’ll begin by explaining the main argument that Quine uses in his later work against 
phenomenalism. This argument, I contend, demonstrates that Quine’s perspective on 
phenomenalism is multifaceted. More specifically, Quine entertains two possibilities for 
phenomenalism. On the one hand, epistemological priority and related notions like sense-data 
could be understood as internal to science, in which case Quine thinks that such an approach 
is at best moot, and at worst it gets in the way of theorising. On the other hand, such notions 
could purport to be external to science, in which case Quine rejects this theorising as 
illegitimate. Crucially, both of these ways of viewing phenomenalism display an attitude 
indicative of naturalism. Either phenomenalism is made sense of immanently within science, 
or it is rejected as first philosophical.   
 
First, let us consider Quine’s argument against phenomenalism as it is typically presented. 
The argument is that sense-data, or that which is supposed to be epistemologically prior to 
science, can’t provide us with a science-independent foundation for science. The 
phenomenalist wants this foundation so that they can either justify science on the basis of it 
or reduce science to that foundation. Against this picture, Quine stresses that sense-data, or 
similar notions, belong to our scientific theory. As Quine puts it: “it is a mistake to seek an 
immediately evident reality, somehow more immediately evident than the realm of external 
objects.”204 Both the physical objects that we’re trying to account for (as well as the rest of 
science) and the means by which we try and account for them, using sense-data or something 
similar, are theoretical posits in our overall scientific theory; there is nothing higher than our 
ongoing theory we can appeal to. Attempts to reduce our theory of the world to something 
epistemologically prior to that theory, therefore, won’t work, since the perspective needed for 
that reduction is unintelligible. This is an argument that Quine often gives in his later work 
against phenomenalism and it’s an argument that, once it’s been originally presented, starts to 
 
204 ‘On Mental Entities’, p.225. See also ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.238 
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proliferate into Quine’s work both as a general worry for phenomenalism, as well as 
particular worries for specific phenomenalists.205 
 
Now, within this argument, Quine is considering two possibilities for phenomenalism. The 
first of which is that notions such as sense-data and epistemological priority are internal to 
science, in which case these notions are not rejected as illegitimate but end up being moot 
and unmotivated. The second of which is that notions such as sense-data and 
epistemological priority aim to be external from science, and so are rejected as 
illegitimate. In what follows, I will present each of these in turn, and explain that both of 
these arguments are indicative of a naturalistic perspective.  
 
Let’s begin with the first option. Quine often writes as if the phenomenalist is simply wrong 
in thinking that they’re appealing to anything outside of science. Accordingly, what sense 
Quine can make of the phenomenalist position, which includes notions like sense-data or 
epistemological priority, is reinterpreted into scientific terms. For example, Quine writes: 
“[t]he old epistemologists may have thought that their atomistic attitude toward sense data 
was grounded in introspection, but it was not. It was grounded in their knowledge of the 
physical world.”206 Phenomenalists thought that they were relying on introspection to make 
claims about sense-data, but they were actually making scientific claims. More generally, 
phenomenalists were wrong to think that they were appealing to anything other than plain old 
science. 
 
With this perspective, Quine emphasises that, in being treated as scientific posits, sense-data 
can therefore be seen to be real: “[s]ense data are posits too. They are posits of psychological 
theory, but not, on that account unreal.”207Appreciating that sense-data are posits 
demonstrates that they are the sorts of things that could be real, and allows us to ask 
questions about what, exactly, sense-data are within the context of our developing scientific 
theory. 
 
205 For Quine’s argument directed against Berkeley see ’The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, 
p.258. And against the Aufbau see Word and Object, p.2. To see this problem related to the 
phenomenalist’s appeal to memory, see ‘On Mental Entities’, p.224. From Stimulus to 
Science, p.15. See also ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means’, p.462. ‘Posits and 
Reality’, p.251 
206 The Roots of Reference, p.2. Emphasis added. 
207 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.252 
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With the phenomenalist’s posits understood in scientific terms, Quine often explains how 
they relate to other scientific posits. In particular, Quine stresses that not only are sense-data 
impure, in being part of ongoing science, but, actually, they are more theoretical and 
conjectural than the ordinary objects that they are meant to support or account for. He writes 
that “the notion of pure sense datum is a pretty tenuous abstraction, a good deal more 
conjectural than the notion of an external object”.208 Sense data, as Quine puts it in Word and 
Object, are a “derivative idiom”; an idiom that depends “upon sidelong glances into natural 
science”, not unlike physical objects.209 
 
This relates closely to Quine’s stress on the fact that physical objects are the paradigmatically 
real theoretical objects.210 Ordinary objects not only anchor our sense of what an object is, 
but they are also our conceptual entry-point into what an object is.211 We start with these 
objects and then, by analogy, expand and develop our science to include more exciting 
things. Quine’s claim is that sense-data are more theoretical than ordinary objects. We see 
this when Quine writes: 
 
…it is by reference to them [ordinary objects] that the very notions of reality and 
evidence are acquired, and that the concepts which have to do with physical particles or 
even with sense data tend to be framed and phrased.212 
 
In order for Quine to do this, he has to stress that there’s a similarity between the way in 
which we posit theoretical objects and the way in which we posit ordinary objects. Namely, 
neither theoretical nor ordinary objects are found directly in experience.213 Quine embraces 
this fact and uses it to explain how, via science, we eventually arrive at posits like sense-data. 
But phenomenalists, on the other hand, often react to this by looking for something more 
epistemologically primitive than ordinary objects, and so appeal to things like sense-data as 
 
208 ‘On Mental Entities’. p.225. See also Word and Object, p.3 
209 Word and Object, pp.1-2 
210 In more rigorous science, of course, one isn’t going to count ordinary objects as the values 
of their variables, but it is practically necessary to posit them earlier. See ‘The Growth of 
Mind and Language’, p.188 
211 From Stimulus to Science, p.24, p.35. ‘Facts of the Matter’, pp.275-76. ‘Identify, 
Ostension, and Hypostasis’, p.77. 
212 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.252. See also ‘On Mental Entities’, p.225. Word and Object, p.3 
213 See ‘On Mental Entities’, p.223 
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an epistemological foundation for those ordinary objects, or as a basis that science is to be 
reduced to. Quine’s point is that such a search is always going to fail. Any sense that we can 
make of such appeals will give us claims that take place within our ongoing scientific theory. 
 
Remarkably, Quine appears to have appreciated that sense-data are highly abstract as early as 
his graduate studies. We can see this in the perspective that Quine has on experience in a 
graduate paper. Quine writes: 
 
My experient career is not a simple matter of consciously taking odds and ends and 
amorphous bits of unidentified data and fitting them into a system; what I see before 
me is a chair, not an array of varicolored quadrilaterals which I consciously assemble 
and classify as a chair. My immediate experience, rather than consisting of raw material 
to be interpreted, is already seething with interpretation; in peeling off the interpretation 
I am peeling off a goodly portion of the immediate datum . . . In a word, my thesis is 
that no analysis of a given experience can yield any other experience which is, in any 
full sense, the “bare datum” of the form of experience; any such analysis is, rather, 
merely a further interpretation.214 
 
As Isaac notes, on this picture, there’s “no kernel of preconceptual or uninterpreted 
experience to which we might appeal in constructing our theory of the world.”215 A 
phenomenalistic foundation, prior to science, is undermined by Quine in this early paper. 
Both here and in his much later work, Quine emphasises that experience is, as he puts it 
above, “seething with interpretation”, and so not pure and pre-conceptual. However, what’s 
missing in this very early argument is an emphasis that sense-data, in not being 
preconceptual, are part of our scientific theory itself and so can’t be prior to it. This is a 
further subtle step from the remarks above. Quine seems to have missed the force of this 
argument, and his tolerance for phenomenalism amongst alternatives takes precedence until 
Quine eventually rejects the view. He comes close, though. The sentence before the section 
quoted above shows that Quine appreciated how abstract sense-data are: “[w]hat are those 
“bare data”[…]? Certainly they are themselves a high refinement of abstraction.”216 What we 
can appreciate is that Quine’s later view is distinctive and more sophisticated in that it 
 
214 Sourced in Isaac, J. 2005. p.221 
215 Isaac, J. 2005. p.221 
216 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.26 
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stresses that sense-data are highly refined abstractions and they are internal parts of our 
ongoing scientific theory. 
 
Phenomenalism, then, is still viewed as making sense in Quine’s later work, providing that 
it’s understood as part of science. We’ve seen that Quine makes sense of the idea that we 
could posit sense-data scientifically. However, Quine stresses that this is something he won’t 
do: 
 
I shall not guess how useful the positing of sense data may be for psychological theory, 
or more specifically for a psychologically grounded theory of evidence, nor what 
detailed traits may profitably be postulated concerning them.217 
 
The reason for this is that, from Quine’s perspective, such posits won’t fare well. They will at 
best be “moot” and at worst impede theorising: 
 
…it is moot indeed whether the positing of additional objects of a mental kind is a help 
or a hindrance to science. Or perhaps not so moot. At any rate it is moot or else it is 
clear that they are a hindrance.218 
 
By “moot”, I take Quine to mean that they simply won’t play any theoretical role in 
epistemology. Viewing sense-data as either moot posits, or posits that impede epistemology, 
isn’t positive, but it’s not as problematic as viewing them as incoherent posits. Quine makes 
it clear that this claim is meant to be understood as one that is part of science when he 
explains that the idea that we don’t need to posit such entities in addition to physical ones is 
being “put forward in the spirit of a hypothesis of natural science”.219 
 
Quine also attempts to make sense of epistemological priority by construing it as an 
immanent notion of science in his later work. For example, we see this in ‘Epistemology 
Naturalized’, where Quine explicitly drops the requirement of epistemological priority. 220 In 
this paper, Quine stresses that, from his perspective, we simply no longer need to abide by 
 
217 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.252 
218 ‘On Mental Entities’, pp.226-27 
219 Ibid. p.227 
220 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.84 
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epistemological priority, i.e. it is a requirement that isn’t motivated. The reason that it’s not 
motivated is that epistemological priority is often posited to try and justify our knowledge of 
the external world by providing a way to support science. Someone who places value in 
epistemological priority, understood within science, will often be looking for what is 
epistemologically prior in terms of our awareness of experience. Quine writes: 
 
In the old epistemological context the conscious form had priority, for we were out to 
justify our knowledge of the external word by rational reconstruction, and that demands 
awareness. Awareness ceased to be demanded when we gave up trying to justify our 
knowledge of the external world.…What to count as observation now can be settled in 
terms of the stimulation of sensory receptors, let consciousness fall where it may.221 
 
The phenomenalist may be trying to justify science, using that which is epistemologically 
prior to science. But Quine is stressing that, if phenomenalism is understood as a theory 
within science, such motivation is lost. Attempting to use science to provide support for 
science would be circular. This means that our theorising is no longer constrained by the 
requirement of awareness, and hence, epistemological priority is not a motivated notion. 
Additionally, Quine’s response to the phenomenalist who is not trying to justify science 
but who still retains value in epistemological priority is, as I’ve explained above, to insist 
that at the conceptual level, there is nothing that is epistemologically more primitive than 
ordinary physical objects, i.e. posits that are part of our overall scientific worldview. It 
might be the case that our experience is more fundamental at an evidential level, but, given 
its conceptual shortcomings, it is unable to play a robust epistemological role in our 
theorising.  
 
In addition to the lack of motivation for epistemological priority when it comes to making 
sense of observation, Quine also stresses that the relative obscurity of epistemological 
priority compared to scientific phenomena, like the triggering of our sensory nerves, is 
further reason that we should be glad that we don’t need it.222 Epistemological priority, 
while not illegitimate, is either theoretically redundant, or obscure enough that it leads to 
unclarity in our theory of the world. 
 
221 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.84 
222 See ‘The Sensory Support of Science’. p.328. The Roots of Reference, p.3 
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In summary, then, Quine’s later perspective on phenomenalism sometimes interprets it as a 
theory that takes place immanently within our ongoing science. Accordingly, notions like 
sense-data and epistemological priority are seen to be an internal part of our scientific theory. 
While Quine doesn’t view this way of theorising as illegitimate, he does stress that the 
prospects for phenomenalism are bleak. Understood as internal to science, these notions are 
at best moot, and, at worst, get in the way of theorising.  
 
Having considered the first way that Quine interprets phenomenalism, let’s now look at the 
second. In his later work, Quine also views phenomenalism as a position that is illegitimate. 
Quine often writes that if sense-data, or their equivalents, are to play the role of a posit which 
has epistemological priority to science, then this is inherently mistaken. The reason that 
sense-data and epistemological priority, understood this way, are viewed as incoherent is 
Quine doesn’t think that we can’t make sense of theorising external or prior to science.  
 
More generally, Quine’s claim is that the project phenomenalism undertakes is itself 
inherently confused. That is, Quine has an objection in principle to the coherence of this 
view.223 To put this another way, traditional epistemologists distinguish between our sense-
data or experience on the one hand, and our scientific lore on the other. They then try and 
relate the former to the latter in an epistemologically robust way that requires the former to 
be distinct from science.224 Quine’s problem with this picture is that the way in which this 
relationship is conceived of by phenomenalists is completely mistaken. That is, the idea of an 
independent and autonomous way of thinking about experience is not coherent. This general 
claim about the incoherence of epistemological priority points to a fundamental flaw in 
traditional approaches to epistemology for Quine.225 This explains why Quine’s appreciation 
of this incoherence motivated a radical shift in his perspective on epistemology. 
 
223 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.15-35 
224 Note that this attempt to ‘relate’ experience to scientific lore admits of multiple 
interpretations according to which variant of phenomenalistic theorising one is considering. It 
may be an attempt to justify science on the basis of experience, or to merely reduce science to 
experience. For the purposes of elucidating Quine’s argument here, I set aside this 
complexity. I will touch on this at the end of this section, however. 
225 For the idea that Quine’s rejection of phenomenalism is not principled, see, for example, 
Maddy, P. 2007. p.85. Gibson, R. 1992. p.17. Hacker, P.M.S. 2006. pp.236-40. Roth, P. 
1990. §2. Fogelin, R.J. 2004. pp.19-27. Siegel, H. 1995. p.54. For a rejection of this idea, see 
also Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.15-35 
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To appreciate the strength of Quine’s rejection of phenomenalism understood in this way, 
consider how bleak the following claims are. Quine writes that “[t]here happens actually to 
be no hope for phenomenalism.”226 Quine describes the poor prospects of the project of 
phenomenalistic reductionism in the strongest of terms: “[e]pistemology, so conceived, 
continues to probe the sensory evidence for discourse about the world; but it no longer seeks 
to relate such discourse somehow to an imaginary and impossible sense-datum language.”227  
 
To clarify, Quine does not always present his problem with phenomenalism in this principled 
way. This can give a misleading picture of his later perspective on the view. For example, in 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine identifies the Aufbau project as aiming at a 
phenomenalistic reduction of science into experience, logic, and set theory. Quine then 
claims that this project failed to provide a true translation, and so a proper reduction, of 
science. Crucially, however, Quine also claims that Carnap’s views after the Aufbau (e.g. his 
use of reduction forms), where something weaker than definition is appealed to, should be 
dismissed because they are not sufficient to provide an elimination of science via reduction. 
Reduction forms do not, Quine stresses, provide equivalences between the sentences of 
science and the sentences of the phenomenalistic language. In this way, Carnap’s projects 
after the Aufbau are viewed as only able to accomplish something much weaker than a proper 
phenomenalistic reduction. We see this clearly in the following passage: 
 
The fact is rather that the former and sterner kind of rational reconstruction [i.e. that 
involved in the Aufbau], where definition reigned…was nothing more nor less than a 
set of directions—or would have been, if successful—for accomplishing everything in 
terms of phenomena and set theory that we now accomplish in terms of bodies. It 
would have been a true reduction by translation, a legitimation by elimination. 
…Rational reconstruction by Carnap’s later and looser reduction forms does none of 
this.228  
 
Quine then claims that, in accepting a form of reductionism that doesn’t aim to define, and so 
that doesn’t aim to eliminate either, “it would seem more sensible to settle for 
 
226 ‘Vagaries of Definition’, pp.52-3 
227 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.253. Emphasis added 
228 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, pp.77-8 
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psychology.”229 That is, it would be better to focus on a project that reconstructs how science 
relates to its evidence that does not aim at an epistemological reduction. Now, this is a much 
weaker motivation for rejecting phenomenalistic reductionism than the claim that an 
autonomous phenomenalistic perspective is incoherent. Quine more often gives the stronger 
principled argument against the coherence of phenomenalism generally.230 
 
To summarise, then, on the interpretation that has been concerning us here, Quine rejects 
phenomenalism because it aims to achieve a perspective that is external to science and that 
bears on science. Quine does this because the idea of finding a science-transcendent 
perspective on science doesn’t make sense. In contrast to his earlier perspective that I 
presented in §1.4.1, Quine comes to realise that theorising from a perspective external to 
science, but that bears on science, is illegitimate. Putting all of this together, then, Quine’s 
later perspective on phenomenalism either interprets it, or at least the phenomenalistic 
apparatus, as making or involving claims internal to science, in which case the view is either 
moot or unmotivated, or interprets it as making claims outside of science in order to either 
support science or provide a basis for science to be reduced to, in which case the view is 
illegitimate. It should be obvious that both of these grounds for rejecting phenomenalism are 
indicative of an attitude that is naturalistic. The fact that Quine rejects the intelligibility of 
phenomenalist theorising outside of science, and, indeed, can only make sense of 
phenomenalism as making claims internal to science is precisely what we should expect from 
Quine’s naturalism.  
 
Finally, having presented and explained Quine’s later argument against phenomenalism, let 
me highlight some interesting complexities regarding Quine’s position with respect to the 
view. As we’ve seen, phenomenalistic theorising has different variants. In pursuit of such 
theorising, one can attempt to justify science on an experiential basis, or one can merely 
attempt to reduce scientific lore to a phenomenalistic basis. Moreover, recall that we’ve been 
interested in analysing Quine’s developing attitude towards phenomenalistic theorising 
around about the time of 1951, i.e. around about the time of the publication of ‘Two 
Dogmas’. What’s worth noting is that Quine’s position on phenomenalism in ‘Two Dogmas’ 
 
229 Ibid. p.78 
230 Indeed, later in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine presents a stronger argument against 
the coherence of phenomenalistic reductionism. See p.82. See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.15-
35 
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appears to be fairly idiosyncratic. In Quine’s work before ‘Two Dogmas’, as I’ve explained, 
he is open to a form of phenomenalistic reductionism. In (the original version of) ‘Two 
Dogmas’, Quine appears to be insisting that experience is real in a special way when 
compared to the objects that science posits. However, Quine is also arguing against the 
tenability of reductionism and putting forward a holistic picture of how science relates to its 
evidence. Therefore, the variant of phenomenalism that Quine entertains at this time does not 
seem capable of being reductive. This might appear to be a strange view for Quine to 
consider, but, as I explained above, Quine soon gives up on phenomenalism. Quine, then, 
appears to undergo a transition from an openness to reductive phenomenalism, to an 
openness to something like holistic phenomenalism, to finally jettisoning phenomenalism 
completely. It looks like 1951 marks a substantive step towards a naturalistic perspective 
insofar as it involves a decisive step away from reductive phenomenalism. Chapter 2 will 
provide a more thorough analysis of Quine’s general philosophical development leading up 
to this time (and highlight the ways in which these development bear on the emergence of 
naturalism), but, for now, it’s sufficient to note that while Quine’s attitude towards 
phenomenalism becomes more complicated in 1951, his door to phenomenalism isn’t closed 
until slightly later.  
 
So, from the arguments contained in this section, we can see that Quine shifts from a 
perspective that cannot be felicitously described as naturalistic to one that seems to be 
naturalistic. Of course, the fact that we eventually find Quine to be a naturalist should not be 
surprising. Rather, what is surprising is how late in Quine’s development he is naturalistic. 
As I explained earlier, Quine describes his position in Word and Object as being “utterly 
naturalistic” and I have established that Quine was not a naturalist as late as 1951.231 It is in 
this gap, between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object, that Quine claims to have become 
“more consciously and explicitly naturalistic”.232 I have established that the change in 
Quine’s attitude towards phenomenalism is indicative of a change to an outlook that is 
naturalistic. It is significant that it is in this gap between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object 
that we see Quine’s attitude change. As Verhaegh points out, Quine seems to have acquired 
his naturalistic perspective on phenomenalism in 1952.233 In ‘The Place of a Theory of 
 
231 Quine, sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.158 f32 
232 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.398 
233 Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.100-01 
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Evidence’, a lecture at Yale, Quine’s view displays the attitude I’ve characterised above. 
Quine writes: 
 
…it is not an instructive over-simplification but a basic falsification, to represent 
cognition as a discernment of regularities in an unadulterated stream of experience. 
Better to conceive of the stream itself as polluted, at each succeeding point of its 
course, by every prior cognition […] We would do well to recognize that in seeking to 
isolate sense data we are not plumbing the depths of reality…234 
 
Quine makes the same point, almost verbatim in print, the same year in ‘On Mental Entities’. 
Moreover, on the run up to Word and Object, Quine’s discussion of his rejection of 
phenomenalism proliferates.235 The evidence that this is the crucial period where naturalism 
emerges, then, is very strong. 
 
So, to conclude this chapter, let me briefly summarise the key points that have been 
established. §1.2 began by motivating the idea that philosophers often consider Quine’s 
naturalism to extend far into his early work. In §1.3, I provided a detailed characterisation of 
naturalism as a nuanced and restrictive approach to philosophy, i.e. as the idea that we always 
and only work within science. §1.4 then established that, in opposition to the interpretations 
considered in §1.2, Quine’s early work was, in fact, not naturalistic. This was established by 
demonstrating that, until at least 1951, Quine was open to a form of first philosophical 
theorising prohibited by naturalism. Finally, by analysing Quine’s later argument against 
phenomenalism, I provided reasons for believing that the emergence of Quine’s naturalism 
takes place between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object.  
  
 
234 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.100 
235 ‘On Mental Entities’, see especially pp.224-26. See also ‘Posits and Reality’ 
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Chapter 2 
Unpacking Quine’s Evolving Attitude Towards Analyticity 
 
2.1  Chapter Introduction 
 
So far, it has been established that, before 1951, Quine cannot be felicitously described as a 
naturalist, and that, just after 1951, we can see Quine’s naturalistic perspective operating in 
his rejection of phenomenalism. This is informative and interesting by itself, but, as of yet, 
we have not fully considered the relationship that these claims have with respect to Quine’s 
‘Two Dogmas’. This is important because it is often stressed that ‘Two Dogmas’ is a vital 
paper on Quine’s road to naturalism. In particular, the reason that it’s significant for his 
development is that, here, Quine decisively rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
Importantly for our purposes, Quine’s rejection of this distinction and the emergence of his 
naturalism are commonly viewed as having a close relationship with one another, i.e. the 
former is commonly viewed as constituting a decisive step in the direction of naturalism. This 
idea makes chronological sense with what I’ve argued for so far.  
 
Now, for it to be true that ‘Two Dogmas’ constitutes a significant step forward in Quine’s 
move to naturalism, it must be the case that Quine’s position undergoes some substantial 
change at this time. That is, before 1951, there must be some obstacle standing in the way of 
the emergence of Quine’s naturalism which is then cleared away in the paper. However, what 
undermines this picture of Quine’s development is a further idea particularly prevalent in the 
literature, namely, that Quine’s doubts about analyticity aren’t new. On this reading, Quine 
has been wary of the analytic/synthetic distinction for a long time, and he merely expresses 
this doubt with strong conviction in 1951. Indeed, as we’ll see, Quine’s own attitude towards 
the paper suggests that it lacks significance, as well. These points, therefore, seem to weaken 
the plausibility of attributing to ‘Two Dogmas’ a substantial change in attitude which leads 
Quine to a naturalistic outlook.  
 
In light of these considerations, then, there are two related areas in which further clarity is 
required for a clearer and more nuanced understanding of Quine. First, there seems to be a 
tension between the idea that ‘Two Dogmas’ constitutes a substantial landmark on Quine’s 
path to naturalism and the idea that Quine’s dissatisfaction with the notion of analyticity 
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extends much further back into his earlier work. That is, it would be strange to identify ‘Two 
Dogmas’ as being so significant if the content of the paper wasn’t, in fact, novel. Second, to 
link this to the arguments made in Chapter 1, if Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas’ doesn’t constitute a 
significant step towards naturalism, then it looks like this is at odds with the idea that Quine’s 
naturalism emerges around the time of 1952. That is, if there’s no substantive sense in which 
‘Two Dogmas’ involves a change in Quine’s attitude, then whatever was meant to be 
significant in the paper for the emergence of naturalism was already available in Quine’s 
earlier work. Thus, the chronological picture of the development of Quine’s naturalism 
becomes tangled and opaque.  
 
These considerations, then, make it urgent to carefully understand the development of 
Quine’s attitude towards analyticity. This includes working out precisely what, if anything, is 
distinctive about his view in ‘Two Dogmas’ with respect to the development of his 
naturalism. Not only would such an investigation shed light on Quine’s developing attitude 
towards analyticity, but it would also illuminate how this development relates to the 
emergence of Quine’s naturalism, thereby clarifying both of the issues above. The purpose of 
this chapter is to carry out such an investigation.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In §2.2.1, I motivate the search into Quine’s 
evolving attitude towards analyticity. I begin by explaining why Quine’s problems with 
analyticity seem to be vital for the development of naturalism, and, therefore, why ‘Two 
Dogmas’ seems to be a crucial paper in Quine’s development. I then present and explain two 
reasons for doubting that ‘Two Dogmas’ constitutes such a significant milestone in Quine’s 
development, i.e. doubts concerning the novelty of Quine’s arguments against analyticity, 
and Quine’s own negativity towards the significance of the paper. The tension, then, between 
the initial considerations which point towards ‘Two Dogmas’ being significant, and these two 
reasons which speak against its significance, I take it, motivates the forthcoming discussion. 
In §2.2.2, I then provide a framework to orient this discussion by identifying four important 
and distinctive features of Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’. I contend that these are the 
features that we ought to look for in Quine’s earlier work. 
 
§2.3 then provides the detailed examination of Quine’s attitude towards analyticity. I 
demonstrate that there is a gradual evolution in Quine’s view from the beginning of his career 
to the position that he reaches in ‘Two Dogmas’. I establish that Quine’s views towards 
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analyticity are not always as negative as they’re often thought to be, and that they develop 
subtly but continuously in a critical direction. Accordingly, I argue that one can only view 
Quine’s doubts about analyticity in 1951 as having been present for a long time in a 
cautiously qualified sense. Moreover, I argue that Quine lacks a vital part of in his 
perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’, i.e. holism, until right before the paper emerges. Having 
explained the development of Quine’s attitude towards analyticity and the significance of his 
view by the time of ‘Two Dogmas’, I end this chapter in §2.4 by relating this development to 
naturalism. 
 
 
2.2.1 Motivating the Investigation 
 
Exactly how ‘Two Dogmas’ fits into the labyrinth of Quine’s evolving philosophy is, to put it 
mildly, controversial. However, the idea that it plays a crucial role in Quine’s development, 
especially in the emergence of naturalism, is common; it’s over specifics where disagreement 
arises. In ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine comes to reject the tenability of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction and moves away from Carnap decisively. As Richardson emphasises, the debate 
between Quine and Carnap on the analytic/synthetic distinction: “…has received attention as 
the principal argumentative motor for Quine’s move to naturalism and, thus, as a place where 
contemporary naturalists find a framework to motivate their own projects.”236 Philosophers 
often think that Quine’s problems with the analytic/synthetic distinction are vital for the 
development of naturalism, and we see these problems emerge famously and resolutely in 
‘Two Dogmas’. For anyone looking to understand Quine’s development towards naturalism, 
or his overall philosophy more generally, ‘Two Dogmas’ appears to be a vital paper.  
 
If this is the case, then it seems plausible that the views contained in ‘Two Dogmas’ represent 
a substantial development in Quine’s attitude. Or, to think about this another way, if this is 
the case, then it seems plausible that something in Quine’s earlier outlook is blocking the 
route to naturalism until approximately 1951, when ‘Two Dogmas’ is published. However, 
there is another prevalent view in the literature which undermines this idea. Namely, that 
 
236 Richardson, A. 1997. p.145. Richardson gives a number of examples of philosophers who 
have such a reading. See p.145 f2. See also Kemp’s view discussed in Chapter 1. Kemp, G. 
2010. p.284. And Morris, S. 2018a. p.403 
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Quine’s worries about analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ are not new after all.237 The idea, 
roughly, is that Quine has worries about analyticity much earlier, and he merely becomes 
more confident and troubled by them by 1951. In numerous places, Quine presents us with a 
similar picture. For example, in reflecting on the paper in his autobiography, Quine stresses 
that his worries about analyticity had been building for a while.238 Additionally, as we’ll see 
in §2.3, Quine’s retrospective remarks on his view in ‘Two Dogmas’ often take him back far 
earlier than 1951. The fact that Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’ does not appear to be a 
novel development raises the question of what significance, if any, there is in Quine’s most 
famous paper. Moreover, if this is true, i.e. if ‘Two Dogmas’ is not significant with respect to 
the development of Quine’s naturalism, then what made ‘Two Dogmas’ significant in this 
respect was already present in Quine’s earlier work. This is difficult to make sense of given 
Chapter 1’s argument that Quine was not a naturalist before 1951.  
 
Indeed, Quine’s own view of ‘Two Dogmas’ suggests that it is not significant for his 
development. Quine did not have a positive view of the paper. This is especially strange 
because ‘Two Dogmas’ is both his most famous work, and one that received almost 
immediate attention.239 To help understand why Quine was so negative about something that 
seems to clearly have been a success, Verhaegh has highlighted notes of Quine’s that show 
that he didn’t think that it added “a new idea to philosophy” and got “disproportionate 
attention”.240 The main reason for Quine’s dissatisfaction seems to be that it is almost a 
wholly negative paper. Quine’s positive suggestions for an alternative epistemology to 
reductionism in it are very brief and metaphorical. Quine even goes so far as to assert that his 
positive view in ‘Two Dogmas’ should not be debated about because of how thinly sketched 
it is.241 Indeed, Quine only gives a few lines of his autobiography to ‘Two Dogmas’, strongly 
suggesting that he didn’t think that it was very important. What he says there is brief and 
descriptive; there’s nothing in his retrospective remarks that suggests Quine saw the paper as 
a great achievement.242 When Quine reflects on the paper much later, he makes a similar 
claim: “I had not thought to look on my strictures over analyticity as the stuff of revolution. It 
 
237 See, for example, Kemp, G. 2010. p.284, Isaac, J. 2005. Lugg, A. 2012. I consider many 
specific examples of this particular idea in §2.3.  
238 Time of My Life, p.226, p.150 
239 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.96-7 for more detail on the response to ‘Two Dogmas’. 
240 ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, p.180. Verhaegh, S. 2018, p.6 f14 
241 Letter to Schwartzmann sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.98 f44 
242 Time of My Life, p.226, p.150. This point and the next come from Lugg, A. 2012. p.231 
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was mere criticism, a negative point with no suggestion of a bright replacement.”243 And that 
because of this negativity, it “was nothing I [Quine] felt impelled to write about”.244  
 
We can fit these somber reflections into a more general trend in Quine’s attitude towards 
what he takes to be philosophically valuable work. That is, Quine prefers to present 
constructive views rather than merely critical ones, and so ‘Two Dogmas’ just doesn’t 
align with the sort of work that Quine sees as valuable and urgent, hence his negativity 
and reluctance to publish earlier. This can be seen in a letter to Joseph T. Clark. Quine 
writes: 
 
I […] feel much less content at criticism than at construction. This is why the ideas of 
‘Two dogmas,’ reiterated for years in my course on Philosophy of Language and in 
private disputation, were so slow in getting into print.245 
 
So, while ‘Two Dogmas’ seems like it should be vital to Quine’s development, since it 
contains his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction which is commonly thought to 
be vital for the development of naturalism, the idea that Quine undergoes a significant and 
substantial change in attitude at this time is undermined by two factors. First, it is 
undermined by the fact that it’s often accepted, and even claimed by Quine, that his doubts 
about analyticity aren’t new by the time of ‘Two Dogmas’, and, second, by Quine’s 
unfavourable attitude towards the paper. These points support the idea that Quine’s most 
famous paper lacks significance, and, therefore, that the views contained within it are 
unlikely to play any substantial role in the development of his thought. More positively, 
however, these points make it urgent to patiently clarify the development of Quine’s views 
on analyticity and their significance for naturalism.  
 
 
2.2.2 Quine’s Position in ‘Two Dogmas’ 
 
 
243 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.393. 
244 ‘Autobiography of W.V. Quine’, p.19 
245 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.97 f43 
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Before investigating the development of Quine’s views on analyticity in §2.3, it is vital to 
understand what position Quine is in when he writes ‘Two Dogmas’. This will allow us to 
appreciate ways in which his early attitude relates to his perspective in 1951. In what follows, 
I will not attempt to delve into the fine-grained detail of Quine’s argument in the paper. This 
has been done extensively in the literature, and, more importantly, such a level of depth isn’t 
required for the purpose of my argument. My aim is to isolate what is crucial to Quine’s 
perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’, i.e. what the nature of his problem with analyticity is and who 
the targets of his worries are, in order to isolate, what, exactly, it is that we’re looking for in 
our investigation into Quine’s earlier work and attitude. 
 
Let me start by providing a very general characterisation of Quine’s argument in the paper. In 
‘Two Dogmas’, Quine provides the argument that he is best known for by rejecting the 
tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction. To do this, Quine considers ways of 
explicating analyticity either directly or by focussing on notions that analyticity can be 
defined or understood in terms of, e.g. synonymy, meaning, and definition. In each case, 
Quine claims, the empiricist fails to satisfactorily shed light on analyticity and, so, we find 
that such notions are “in exactly the same need of clarification as…the notion of analyticity 
itself”.246 Analyticity is, in this way, a dogma of empiricism. Quine then presents a challenge 
to reductionism, and in turn, to the consequent forms of empiricism which place value on 
analyticity, by claiming that reductionism is wrong about the way in which theory relates to 
evidence. According to Quine, it is holism, not reductionism, that provides the correct way to 
conceive of this important relationship. In establishing this, Quine thereby challenges the 
second dogma of empiricism.  
 
There are four important things to note about Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’. First, it’s 
important to stress that Quine’s claim that analyticity and related notions are unclear or 
lacking criteria is a challenge to their empirical and scientific respectability. We see evidence 
of this when Quine reflects on his argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ and claims that “the point” of 
his challenge to the analytic/synthetic distinction “is insistence on empirical criteria for 
semantic concepts”.247 This also makes sense of Quine’s conclusion in ‘Two Dogmas’, where 
he stresses that the analytic/synthetic distinction is “a metaphysical article of faith”.248 As 
 
246 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.20 
247 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.397. See also The Roots of Reference, p.78 
248 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.37 
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Lugg notes, it seems like Quine means something like “empirically unjustified” by 
“metaphysical”.249 This seems right, for Quine claims that it’s an “unempirical dogma” in the 
very same sentence. In other words, Quine argues that semantic notions like analyticity, or 
those notions that are inter-defined with analyticity, are not in satisfactory empirical standing. 
 
To establish this, Quine appeals to empirical scientists to justify his view. For example, 
Quine appeals to scientific practice to warn against the postulation of meanings as entities, 
which could then be used to explicate analyticity. Quine argues that clarifying the actual tasks 
involved in scientific practice warns against the reification of meanings. As he puts it, 
scientific practice tells us that “meanings themselves, as obscure intermediary entities, may 
well be abandoned.”250 Slightly later in the paper, Quine appeals to the lexicographer’s use of 
definitions in the same general way to argue that we ought not to see the use of definitions as 
a way of explicating synonymy (and so analyticity in turn).251 
 
The scientific nature of Quine’s challenge to the dogma of analyticity hasn’t gone unnoticed 
in the literature. For example, Kemp likens Quine’s general argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ to an 
argument used in natural science.252 This is because the nature of Quine’s argument is similar 
to hypothesising in science that a particular force doesn’t exist because we can’t explain its 
existence in non-circular terms. Similarly, Lugg compares Quine’s criticism of analyticity 
with Einstein’s criticism of simultaneity. Lugg explains that, in both cases, the worry is about 
the consistency of an important notion with the position that that notion is advanced in (i.e. 
empiricism in the case of analyticity, and physics in the case of simultaneity). An important 
part of scientific theorising is to hold that notions or posits which are not definitively shown 
to not exist, or not shown to be completely senseless, like the ether, can nevertheless be 
discounted as scientific. In this way, both Einstein and Quine are reacting to “the uncritical 
acceptance” of the respective notions, and their failure to meet scientific standards.253  
 
This brings us to the second important thing to note about Quine’s position in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. While it’s true that Quine’s claims in ‘Two Dogmas’ don’t definitively show that 
 
249 Lugg, A. 2012. p.235 
250 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.22 
251 Quine describes lexicographers as empirical scientists. Ibid. pp.24-5 
252 Kemp, G. 2006. pp.19-20 
253 Lugg, A. 2012. pp.238-39 
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analyticity can never be rendered acceptable, at the same time, his claims are not merely 
expressions of doubt about the possibility of explicating analyticity clearly. Rather, they 
come from the perspective of someone who has both a strong grasp on the ramified nature of 
analyticity within empiricism, and conviction that progress on this avenue is not to be 
expected. Quine considers many possible ways of explicating analyticity, each of which is 
rejected as unsatisfactory. In ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine is not at all hopeful for the prospects of 
analyticity, nor is he issuing a call to empiricists to keep working on explicating the notion. 
This brings out the force in his summary of what he’s shown by considering multiple ways of 
understanding analyticity when he writes “[t]hat there is such a distinction to be drawn at all 
[between the analytic and the synthetic] is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a 
metaphysical article of faith.”254 
 
This style of argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ appears to give Quine a target that is very general in 
its scope in the sense that Quine seems to be targeting a broad range of views. This brings us 
to the third aspect of the paper that I want to highlight. Namely, I contend that to properly 
understand Quine’s position in the paper, one needs to appreciate that his argument is not 
narrowly or primarily focussed on Carnap’s use of the distinction, as it is often interpreted to 
be. Rather, Quine’s views come from the perspective of someone that understands how 
widespread a commitment the analytic/synthetic distinction is in empiricism, and who is 
attempting to challenge the tenability of this view to a wide range of empiricist philosophers. 
In this way, if one wants to understand what motivates Quine to provide his argument in 
‘Two Dogmas’, then it is misleading to focus on ‘Two Dogmas’ as being significant in the 
sense that it marks Quine’s decisive break from Carnap over analyticity. 
 
Reading Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’ as primarily targeted at Carnap (and, in 
particular, as marking the point in which Quine’s growing discontent with Carnap’s use of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction reaches its limit) is common in the literature.255 Indeed, 
Quine’s own remarks lend support to this idea. Quine often stresses that while Carnap is a 
significant influence on him, the nature of this changes in his later work. For example, he 
writes: 
 
254 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.37 
255 See, for example, Creath, R. 1990b. p.35. Against this narrow reading, see Hylton, P. 
2007. p.51. Hylton stresses the importance of C.I. Lewis as well. See also Frost-Arnold, G. 
2008. p.312 
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In later years his [Carnap’s] views went on evolving and so did mine, in divergent 
ways. But even where we disagreed he was still setting the theme; the line of my 
thought was largely determined by problems that I felt his position presented.256 
 
Quine identifies the place of analyticity within this divergence in a paper from the same year 
as ‘Two Dogmas’, writing: “[t]hough no one has influenced my philosophical thought more 
than Carnap, an issue has persisted between us for years over questions of ontology and 
analyticity.”257 Nowhere is this contrast clearer, so it seems, than in their divergence over 
analyticity, and ‘Two Dogmas’ marks the key occasion of this divergence.  
 
Now, I don’t want to argue that this picture is completely false, for there is good reason to 
take Carnap as an intended recipient of much of what is said in ‘Two Dogmas’, as well as this 
point marking a significant parting of ways between Quine and Carnap. What I want to 
suggest, however, is that this way of viewing the paper misses an important and more general 
development in Quine’s view that motivates the position he puts forward in ‘Two Dogmas’. 
My point is one of emphasis; we should avoid viewing ‘Two Dogmas’ as primarily involving 
an internal debate between Quine and Carnap, and instead view it as involving Quine both 
coming to terms with analyticity’s role in empiricism more generally and presenting his 
discontent with analyticity to a broad group of philosophers. In other words, we have to take 
very seriously the fact that the object of Quine’s lament in the paper are those holding 
dogmas of empiricism.  
 
In order to show why we should minimise the weight that we place on the idea that Quine is 
targeting Carnap’s view in the paper, let me first consider ways in which Carnap does seem 
to be the intended recipient of Quine’s criticism. By balancing these points against ways in 
which it would be problematic to view Carnap as the sole or main target of the paper, I will 
establish that it is important to appreciate that the argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ is directed at a 
notion of analyticity that is playing a vital role within empiricism generally.  
 
 
256 ‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, p.41 
257 ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’, p.203 
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One way in which Carnap’s views are crucial to the argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ is in relation 
to the development of Quine’s ontological views, and how he sees these as bearing on 
Carnap’s position. While these are thoughts that Quine had held about Carnap’s philosophy 
for a while, they come into much sharper focus by 1951. A significant factor here is the 
publication of Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’ in 1950, in which Carnap is 
very clear about how ontology and analyticity relate (Quine is sent a copy of this in 1949, 
right before ‘Two Dogmas’).258 Quine focusses on this issue narrowly soon after ‘Two 
Dogmas’ in ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’.259 
 
It’s true that some of Carnap’s specific attempts at explicating the notion of analyticity (and 
his championing of explication generally) are considered in ‘Two Dogmas’, e.g. his use of 
state-descriptions or semantical rules.260 Additionally, Quine’s attack on the interrelated 
nature of analyticity with notions like truth in virtue of meaning also seems to fit with 
Carnap’s informal characterisations of analyticity.261 However, in many of these cases, it 
seems wrong to see these as direct criticisms of Carnap’s view. For example, the problem that 
Quine raises for state-descriptions is something that Quine notes, as he raises it, that Carnap 
is aware of. Additionally, as I’ll explain in §2.3.6, Quine challenges Carnap’s appeal to 
semantical rules in the early 1940s, and so it’s hardly a new worry. Quine’s problem in ‘Two 
Dogmas’, rather, is more generally with the idea that definition can help shed light on 
analyticity. Such an approach is more general than Carnap’s use of semantical rules.262 
 
While I want to stress that Quine had empiricists generally in mind in 1951, especially those 
who are Quine’s contemporaries, Carnap does occupy a special role in this extended family. 
Namely, Carnap is the contemporary empiricist in Quine’s eyes, and Carnap’s views have 
been gradually falling out of Quine’s favour. We can see this clearly in the second section of 
‘Two Dogmas’, i.e. the section outlining Quine’s problems with reductionism and his 
positive proposal in its place. Carnap’s Aufbau project is presented as the empiricist project 
 
258 Carnap in Creath, R. 1990b. p.416 
259 See esp. p.203 
260 ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.23-5 
261 See Richardson, A. 1997. pp.147-48 
262 This is clear in ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’. Quine first explains the use of 
definitions are a popular approach in recent philosophy, argues against this, and then claims 
that what he’s said about the former “applies equally…to Carnap’s more recent appeal to 
semantical rules.” pp.32-3 
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that takes reductionism most seriously.263 It is, Quine claims, “[r]eductionism at its most 
sanguine”.264  
 
Let me explain this point in more detail. Quine views Carnap as taking the next step forward 
from Russell. Quine writes: “Russell had talked of deriving the world from experience by 
logical construction. Carnap, in his Aufbau, undertook the task in earnest.”265 Russell had 
outlined the blueprints for the project Carnap would undertake, but Quine thinks that 
Russell’s own view was lacking in detail and that Russell himself was lacking in 
confidence.266 In particular, there are two important respects in which Carnap is taking the 
helm from Russell that help show why Quine thinks of Carnap as carrying out the next step in 
constructive empiricism. First, Carnap attempts the phenomenalistic project that Russell 
suggests (and then deals with the consequences of this project not working). Second, the 
logic that Carnap uses builds upon the Principia system that Russell and Whitehead 
developed, and that Quine was enamoured with.267 Quine continually discusses the structural 
parallel between the projects in Principia and the Aufbau, viewing the latter as a more 
general and therefore ambitious project.268 The Aufbau, then, is viewed by Quine as “[t]he 
dazzling sequel to Our Knowledge of the External World”.269 These points establish the fact 
that Quine views Carnap as championing this crucial empiricist project and introducing the 
logistic method into epistemology.270 Indeed, Quine views Carnap as an empiricist that takes 
seriously the idea that philosophy should be approached with a scientific frame of mind. 
Quine writes that Carnap provides: “for the first time an example of what a scientific 
philosopher might aspire to in the ways of rigor and explicitness.”271 The Aufbau, for 
 
263 Quine writes that Carnap “was the first empiricist who, not content with asserting the 
reducibility of science to terms of experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the 
reduction.” ‘Two Dogmas’, p.39 
264 ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, pp.39-40 
265 ‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, p.40. See also Hacker, P.M.S. 2006. p.240 
266 “In Our Knowledge of the External World Russell expressed no confidence that the plan 
he sketched could be fully realized. In his sketch, as he remarked, he took other minds for 
granted; moreover, he broached none of the vast detail that would be needed for the further 
constructions, except for a few illustrative steps.” ‘Russell’s Ontological Development’, p.84 
267 See ‘Carnap’s Positivistic Travail’, p.120. From Stimulus to Science, pp.13-4 
268 For example, See Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. p.204: “The program of the Aufbau bears the 
same relation to science in general that the program of Principia Mathematica bears to 
mathematics; and the former program is more ambitious…” 
269 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.74 
270 See Quine sourced in Creath, R. 1990b. p.204 
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example, demonstrates to Quine an approach to philosophy that involves a strong 
understanding of physics and psychology. 
 
Let me now offer some reasons to minimise the emphasis that we should place on the idea 
that Carnap’s views are of primary importance for understanding Quine’s perspective in 
‘Two Dogmas’. If Quine was primarily reacting to Carnap’s use of analyticity in ‘Two 
Dogmas’, then it’s simply unclear what explains Quine’s decision to view this as an 
important target. This is because Carnap has rejected many of the views that are discussed by 
the time ‘Two Dogmas’ is published and so it’s unclear, then, why Quine would want to 
evaluate them. Quine’s evaluation of the view that Carnap held in the Aufbau is a good 
example of this. While the project of the Aufbau appears to be an important target in ‘Two 
Dogmas’, one good reason which speaks against the idea that Quine is targeting it directly is 
that Quine is clearly aware that this isn’t a view that Carnap is defending anymore. Even as 
early as Quine’s Carnap lectures in 1934, we find Quine stressing that he won’t be focussing 
on the Aufbau because Carnap’s work by then is so different that any discussion of it 
wouldn’t be indicative of Carnap’s view.272 Additionally, and more generally, Quine stresses 
much earlier than ‘Two Dogmas’ that the strict reductive aims of the Aufbau are aims that 
empiricists generally have moved away from.273 Indeed, the specific criticisms that Quine 
raises towards the Aufbau in ‘Two Dogmas’ are not new worries. Some are conceded by 
Carnap, and all are very plausibly well-known to him by then. All of these points make it 
clear that the focus of ‘Two Dogmas’ is not on undermining Carnap’s project in the Aufbau, 
as this would be somewhat of a straw person. 
 
So, it seems implausible that Quine’s target in ‘Two Dogmas’ is directly Carnap’s position in 
the Aufbau. However, what is significant about the placement of the Aufbau project in the 
paper is that it can help us appreciate the generality of Quine’s target. While the reductionism 
of the Aufbau may be a thing of the past, Quine stresses that “the dogma of reduction has, in 
subtler and more tenuous form, continued to influence the thought of empiricists.”274 In ‘Two 
Dogmas’, Quine briefly explains Carnap’s view in the Aufbau and then moves his focus away 
from Carnap’s specific project, and onto the way in which reductionist tendencies have 
remained in verificationism, specifically focussing on the following view: “[t]he dogma of 
 
272 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.47 
273 See, for example, ‘The Importance of Logic for Philosophy’, p.141 
274 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.40 
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reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its 
fellows, can admit of confirmation or disconfirmation at all.”275 This lessens the importance 
of Carnap specifically, while still keeping him within the relevant set of views that ‘Two 
Dogmas’ is concerned with.  
 
To elaborate on this point, Carnap’s epistemological projects after the Aufbau, which accept 
that outright reduction is untenable (and so something weaker than elimination via reduction 
is sought), fit into this group of views. Carnap’s reduction forms, for example, don’t afford us 
proper definitions, and so don’t provide us with elimination via definition when one 
translates scientific language into the language of sense-data, logic, and set theory.276 In other 
words, reduction forms don’t allow us to view the more cumbersome scientific language as 
superfluous for the logico-empirical language. Quine’s problem with this view is that it still 
puts too much emphasis on empiricism being reductive. Quine makes this clear when, in the 
same year as ‘Two Dogmas’, he writes: 
 
In Carnap’s current phase, his confirmation-theory phase, we find reductionism at its 
least assertive. At this stage, reductionism has been so watered down that all that needs 
to be accounted for any longer is a relation of confirmation between a scientific 
statement and the relevant observations. 
 
But reductionism even thus diluted is not dilute enough to suit my tender palate.277 
 
This establishes that Carnap is a member of the set of empiricists that Quine is targeting in 
the second part of ‘Two Dogmas’. Carnap’s reductionism may have gotten weaker over time, 
but it is not weak enough in Quine’s view.  
 
Indeed, Quine’s focus on verificationism in ‘Two Dogmas’ is explainable, in part, as being 
motivated by scientific considerations. It would, Quine stresses, “be very unscientific indeed 
not to look beneath it [verificationism] for a possible key to the problem of meaning and the 
 
275 Ibid. p.41 
276 See ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, pp.76-7. For Quine’s problems with Carnap’s later more 
general notion of meaning postulates see ‘Carnap’s Positivistic Travails’, pp.124-25 
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associated problems.”278 The reason for this, Quine explains, is that verificationism “has 
established itself so firmly as a catchword of empiricism”.279 This reason, plus the fact that 
Quine is never really concerned with rationalism, means that verificationism is the most 
salient scientific option available, and so Quine focusses considerable attention on it. 
 
A further way to appreciate the generality inherent in Quine’s worries in ‘Two Dogmas’ is to 
consider how wide the range of positions there are for accepting reductionism. This is a point 
that Quine stresses when he writes: 
 
Actually this [reductionism] is not a doctrine, but a two-dimensional space of doctrines. 
One of the two independent variables is our standard of what is to qualify as protocol 
language, and the other independent variable is our standard of what is to pass for 
reduction.280 
 
What unites this wide “two-dimensional space of doctrines” is individualism about empirical 
content. Quine makes this clear when he writes the following: 
 
But there remains, throughout even these more moderate forms of reductionism, a 
common trait: there remains the doctrine that each significant statement has its own 
separate and peculiar empirical content, its own separate and peculiar connections with 
immediate experience…281 
 
It is this, i.e. individualism about empirical content, that remains in Carnap’s epistemology in 
spite of his ambitions for reduction being relaxed significantly in his use of confirmation, 
according to Quine. It is this that is spread more generally throughout empiricism when 
Quine writes ‘Two Dogmas’. Quine says this much in ‘Two Dogmas’ when he claims that 
“[t]he dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in 
isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or disconfirmation at all.”282 
 
 
278 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.37 
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Quine makes a similar point in 1953, just after ‘Two Dogmas’. He notes that one way to raise 
worries for the analytic/synthetic distinction is to say that the boundary is vague or that the 
ways in which it’s defined involve notions that are themselves as unclear as analyticity. This 
seems to capture Quine’s strategy in the first part of ‘Two Dogmas’. However, Quine stresses 
that “[t]his is an easy level of polemic in philosophy, and no serious philosophical effort is 
proof against it.”283 Quine then explains that a deeper way of criticising the distinction is to 
try and work out where it arises from, i.e. what commitments would underlie one’s 
acceptance of it. On this point, Quine speculates that commitment to the analytic/synthetic 
distinction comes from “a more or less attenuated holdover of phenomenalistic 
reductionism.”284 This shows that Quine is stressing the importance of putting the 
analytic/synthetic distinction into its historical and general empiricist context in order to 
evaluate it properly. Quine is not merely concerned with the question of what the distinction 
does for someone like Carnap, but, rather, with the deeper question of where the distinction 
takes root in the tradition of empiricism and why it still lingers.  
 
Having this point in mind allows us to appreciate the nature of Quine’s problem with the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in ‘Two Dogmas’. Quine writes that the second dogma, 
reductionism, is “the real villain in the piece” and so should have been stressed more.285 The 
reason for this is that reductionism is the dominant then-contemporary view that leads to the 
need for an analytic/synthetic distinction within empiricism. This is what Quine means when 
he describes the second dogma as “the more basic of the two”.286 The strategy in the first part 
of the paper, where Quine raises problems for the clarity of analyticity and related notions, is, 
as the quote above states, “an easy level of polemic in philosophy”. The deeper way to 
criticise it, however, is to work out where the distinction arises from, which is what Quine 
does in the second section when he addresses verificationism.  
 
On this point, an important aspect of Quine’s more general perspective on analyticity is that 
Quine appreciates the deep historical roots which underlie the wide acceptance of analyticity 
amongst his contemporaries. ‘Two Dogmas’ includes a number of references to philosophers 
from the wider history of philosophy which allows Quine to contextualise his discussion by 
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providing reasons as to why acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction is prevalent at the 
time. Hume gets a handful of mentions, both as a precursor to Kant’s distinction, as well as 
being a naïve reductionist. Quine also sees Hume’s copy principle, which plays a constructive 
role in Hume’s empiricism, as being something like a proto-version of the verification 
principle.287 Leibniz also gets a mention, with his kindred account of analyticity in terms of 
possible worlds being linked directly to Carnap’s use of state-descriptions. In these parallels, 
we see that Quine isn’t merely providing the historical background of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. He is, moreover, linking contemporary empiricist accounts with their historical 
antecedents.  
 
Further good evidence that this is the case is found if we consider the way in which ‘Two 
Dogmas’ was requested. ‘Two Dogmas’ was written with the request that Quine discuss 
“what questions and issues remain still to be settled in the light of programs and 
achievements of the previous half century’s work”.288 This is not a request to write a paper 
specifically about Carnap’s philosophy, for example. We see more evidence for this in the 
fact that Quine was initially hesitant to meet the request because he didn’t think that he was 
good at giving historical surveys.289 This suggests that Quine saw the paper as having 
relevance for a broad audience, and it gives us a picture of ‘Two Dogmas’ that’s historically 
oriented, but not merely a historical survey.  
 
Moreover, consider again the negativity that Quine had about the paper (discussed in §2.2.1). 
Quine is displeased about the value of ‘Two Dogmas’ because the paper is almost wholly 
negative, with the positive alternative offered in it stated in bare metaphorical terms. 
Crucially, though, this attitude reveals the generality of Quine’s target. Quine writes: “[t]he 
paper is negative: an expression of distrust of two doctrines which have come to assume a 
central position in current empiricism.”290 Quine makes a similar claim in a letter to Paul 
Weiss, writing that part of what ‘Two Dogmas’ shows is: “[t]he observation that the analytic-
synthetic distinction has never been adequately def’nd though all too widely taken 
granted.”291 These reflections indicate a perspective that overlooks a broad horizon. Indeed, 
 
287 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.38. Quine makes this semantic reading of the copy principle clear in a 
number of places. See, for example, ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.68 
288 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.96 
289 See Ibid 
290 ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, p.180 
291 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.97 
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this focus is made clear in the very first sentence of ‘Two Dogmas’: “[m]odern empiricism 
has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas.”292 
 
Appreciating that Quine is concerned with how the analytic/synthetic distinction has taken 
root in empiricism also helps us to understand the strength of Quine’s argument against it. 
This is the fourth point that I want to highlight as vital for appreciating Quine’s perspective in 
‘Two Dogmas’. On this point, Quine stresses that his “misgivings over analyticity and related 
notions are not just cavilling over fuzzy boundaries.”293 Rather, Quine’s misgivings are 
meant for someone whose reaction to giving up on strict reductionism is to still hold that 
sentences can have their empirical significance individually, rather than this only making 
sense with sentences collectively. This difference between Quine and his target is one of 
principle. Quine makes this clear when he writes: 
 
My misgivings over the notion of analyticity are thus misgivings in principle. But those 
also who espouse the notion espouse it mainly in principle, granting freely that the 
boundary between the analytic and synthetic can be troublesome and indecisive in 
application.294 
 
In ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine is not merely negative about the ways in which philosophers try to 
understand the analytic/synthetic distinction, i.e. Quine doesn’t just have strong doubts about 
the possibility of an adequate explication or clarification of the distinction. In addition to 
these doubts, Quine presents a perspective from which pursuing an epistemologically 
significant notion of analyticity isn’t even a task that is motivated, i.e. holism. The strength of 
this approach is that it leads to a clean rejection of the distinction. In other words, Quine is 
not presenting something like a gradualist picture of analyticity, where some statements will 
end up as being more or less analytic than others. Rather, Quine claiming that from the 
perspective of holism, trying to make sense of an analytic/synthetic distinction is neither 
motivated nor coherent.  
 
Against the idea that the empirical content of statements can be understood in an 
individualistic way, Quine stresses the truth of the holistic nature of empirical content. Quine 
 
292 ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.20-3. See also Word and Object, p.67 f7 
293 ‘Mr Strawson on Logical Theory’, p.138 
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writes that “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense 
experience…only as a corporate body.”295 The reductionist, then, has too restrictive a picture 
about the nature of empirical content, and is wrong to think that we have to conceive of 
things like mathematics and logic as being epistemologically significant in a different way 
from the other claims in science. This significantly weakens the motivation for substantiating 
and clarifying the analytic/synthetic distinction. Moreover, as long as it seems to make sense 
that statements possess empirical content individualistically, it seems, as Quine puts it, 
“significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed…and 
such a statement is analytic.”296 However, on Quine’s alternative picture, the idea that there is 
a significant class of statements that are “vacuously confirmed”, i.e. analytic, is shown to be 
vacuous itself because “[a]ny statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic 
enough adjustments”.297 
 
This alternative picture that Quine puts forward against reductionism in ‘Two Dogmas’ is 
also said to come from Carnap. If this is the case, then it’s very confusing as to how ‘Two 
Dogmas’ could be at all hostile to Carnap.298 We see evidence for this when Quine claims 
that his holism issues “essentially from Carnap’s doctrine of the physical world in the 
Aufbau”.299 And, Quine writes, more specifically, that “the Duhem effect [i.e. holism] is 
strikingly and imaginatively depicted” in Carnap’s use of the principle of least action.300  
 
However, we can explain why Quine describes his holism as being influenced by Carnap 
without it undermining the idea that Quine is pushing a substantial contrast in attitude 
between himself and Carnap (as well as empiricists generally). As Lugg has emphasised, it’s 
not a problem that Carnap accepted holism because Quine thinks that he is extending his 
holism further than Carnap would allow.301 In particular, Carnap sees holism as applying to 
 
295 Ibid 
296 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.41 
297 Ibid. p.43 
298 Some philosophers attempt to defend Carnap’s position from Quine’s argument in ‘Two 
Dogmas’ by emphasising Carnap’s holism. See, for example, Hacker, P.M.S. 2006. p.241 
f10. Creath, R. 1995. pp.292-93 
299 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.41 
300 ‘Carnap’s Positivistic Travail’, p.125. Quine also claims that we find holism in 
Carnap’s Scheinprobleme from the same year as the Aufbau. See also Carnap, R. 1937a. 
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our theory after we’ve introduced an analytic/synthetic distinction, whereas Quine thinks that 
holism applies more generally to our whole theory. Hence, Carnap’s analyticity/synthetic 
distinction, and the priority of that distinction over other aspects of Carnap’s empiricism, 
keeps Quine and Carnap at a considerable distance. In this way, the label ‘holism’ is 
deceptive.  
 
This reading fits with the way that Quine writes about his and Carnap’s respective holisms. 
Quine often writes that Carnap, as well as other empiricists, didn’t see the significance of a 
holistic outlook to anywhere near the same extent that Quine did.302 In this way, Carnap 
didn’t emphasise his holism strongly enough, nor did he follow holistic considerations to 
their logical conclusion. Appreciating this point makes sense of the fact that Quine often 
presents his holism as something that isn’t radical. Rather, Quine’s point is that people like 
Carnap don’t take holism seriously enough, and so fail to appreciate the radical results a 
holistic view leads us to. We see this clearly when Quine compares his holistic view with 
Carnap’s and writes: 
 
It was a strange one, too, not only because Duhem’s point seems so evident, but 
because Carnap himself recognized it and failed to appreciate its significance….in 
the Aufbau the very mechanism of the Duhem effect is strikingly and imaginatively 
depicted. …The guiding principle is the principle of least action: so choose the 
distances as to minimize the differences of color within short intervals of space and 
time. This is a very perceptive caricature of the role of simplicity considerations in 
scientific theory, and it is holistic. It is one of Carnap’s deepest insights, and we can 
only regret that it did not play a fundamental role in his subsequent philosophy.303 
 
Crucially, Quine thinks that the consequence of taking holism more seriously is that it blurs 
boundaries that are often taken to play important philosophical roles. Carnap, in not taking 
his holism as seriously as Quine, still has sharp boundaries in place. As Quite puts it: 
 
 
302 Quine claims that other members of the Vienna Circle, in addition to Carnap, didn’t take 
holism seriously enough. See ‘Twentieth-Century Logic’, p.65. Perhaps surprisingly, Quine 
also thinks that Duhem’s holism was insufficient. See Pursuit of Truth, p.14 
303 ‘Carnap’s Positivistic Travail’, pp.125-126. See also ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, 
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Sharp boundaries were Carnap’s style early and late: a boundary between scientific 
sense and metaphysical nonsense, and a boundary between what is true by linguistic 
convention and what is true as a matter of fact. Dubious boundaries, I came to think.304 
 
The analytic/synthetic distinction, crucially, is a prime example of this. This shows that 
Quine is taking holism seriously by the time of ‘Two Dogmas’ since it is this picture of 
the nature of empirical content that Quine presents to show that the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is a dogma that empiricists no longer need to cling to. In other words, Quine is 
not merely presenting an alternative picture of the nature of empirical content to 
reductionism. Quine is, rather, presenting what he takes to be an accurate picture of that 
relationship, even if that picture is lacking in many details.  
 
Putting these points together, then, Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’ is distinctive in at 
least four vital ways. First, Quine is challenging the empirical and scientific respectability 
of analyticity and related semantic notions. Second, Quine’s claims are not merely 
expressions of doubt about the possibility of explicating analyticity clearly, rather, they 
come from the perspective of someone with conviction that progress on this point is not to 
be expected. Third, Quine’s doubts come from the perspective of someone who has both a 
strong grasp on the ramified nature of analyticity within empiricism, as well as someone 
who appreciates both the roots of such a distinction and the fact that these roots explain 
why it lingers. Fourth, Quine has sufficient faith in an alternative conception of 
empiricism that he feels confident enough to challenge this general basis for the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. This shows both that the analytic/synthetic distinction isn’t 
motivated, and that a strict distinction between two classes of sentences should not be 
strived for. Relating this back to the overall project of the chapter, then, if we’re interested 
in investigating how far back Quine’s distinctive position in ‘Two Dogmas’ extends into 
his early work, then these are the features that we ought to keep in mind as our targets.  
 
 
2.3 Quine’s Early Evolving Attitude Towards Analyticity 
 
 
304 ‘Carnap’, p.144 
 
 
99 
In this section, I undertake a careful and extensive investigation into Quine’s early 
engagement with analyticity on the path to ‘Two Dogmas’. In §2.3.1-§2.3.8 I chronologically 
examine important eras where Quine engages with the analytic/synthetic distinction in his 
work before 1951. Throughout this process, I assess the extent of Quine’s worries, and relate 
them to his position in ‘Two Dogmas’ (as set out in §2.2.2). I end this section, in §2.3.9, by 
summarising my findings. Overall, I argue that Quine’s relationship with analyticity is 
extremely complex but, importantly, not so bleak in the early days such that we can trace his 
later perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’ too far back into his work. There is, rather, a natural 
progression from relatively small worries about the notion and optimism about progress 
being forthcoming, to substantial worries and pessimism about the prospect of clarifying it. 
Crucially, it is not until very late in Quine’s development that the pieces align properly in 
order for Quine to accurately be described as ready to occupy the perspective he has in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. 
 
 
2.3.1 Graduate School 
 
Perhaps we can find traces of Quine’s problems with analyticity as early as his graduate 
work. In retrospecting ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine finds himself going back not to 1951, but to 
his earliest work on Principia Mathematica, i.e. to his graduate work. The reason for this, 
Quine explains, is that both works are reacting to his “distrust of mentalistic semantics”.305 
Analyticity is just “another elusive notion of intuitive philosophical semantics”, and so 
needs to be vetted.306 This appears to give us a link between Quine’s worries about 
analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ and his worries much earlier. 
 
However, exactly what is driving this distrust is complicated to work out precisely. Quine 
first links these common worries about Principia Mathematica and ‘Two Dogmas’ to his 
preference for behaviourism, and to Watson, specifically. Given the close relationship 
between Quine’s behaviourism and his empiricism, it might seem that Quine’s distrust of 
mentalistic semantics, and of analyticity in particular, is a constraint which arises from his 
empiricism. This is largely true, however, this doesn’t seem to be the parallel that Quine is 
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drawing between his distrust of analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ and in his work as a graduate 
student. After drawing this connection, Quine links his worries with mentalistic semantics 
not to empiricism, but to extensionalism. 
 
This might seem confusing, but we shouldn’t see Quine’s behaviourism and his 
extensionalism as completely separate commitments. Quine links these two theses in the 
following way: 
 
…when we think of examples of what’s not extensional, they are pretty much of the 
introspective kind. “Necessity” in this sense of conviction is what we have until 
“necessity” is spelled out in a way that we can extensionalize, namely in terms of say 
“logical necessity,” which we can formulate by semantic ascent in talking about the 
sentences and their structure.307 
 
Quine’s claim appears to be that there is a parallel between his preference for extensionalism 
and distaste for intensionalism on the one hand, and his preference for behavioural 
intersubjective evidence and distaste for introspective evidence on the other. In both cases 
where Quine has a favourable attitude, there’s an emphasis on being clear about the identity 
criteria of the notions involved, which allows us to put forward something scientifically 
objective. This seems to give us a link between what drives Quine’s worries about analyticity 
in ‘Two Dogmas’, and his attempt to clean up the Principia by extensionalizing it as a 
graduate student. But it doesn’t provide us with actual doubts about analyticity specifically in 
Quine’s graduate work.308 
 
Isaac has presented more direct reasons for thinking that Quine’s graduate work is tied to 
‘Two Dogmas’. Isaac stresses that Quine’s graduate work demonstrates important aspects of 
his developing, though rudimentary, empiricism. We can see this in the tensions that Quine 
identifies in the sorts of distinctions he was presented with from people like C.I. Lewis, 
where the empirical is distinct from the conceptual.309 Isaac notes that, when Quine was in 
graduate school, the use of analyticity was widespread in empiricists, and connected with a 
lot of problems that philosophers of Quine’s generation would need to deal with, e.g. 
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convention, meaning, epistemology, and the nature of science. In graduate school and in 
‘Two Dogmas’, Quine is both engaging with analyticity, through his engagement with 
empiricism, and is critical of important distinctions within empiricism. 
 
There’s another important sense in which Quine’s worries about Lewis’ distinction between 
the given and the pragmatic a priori are significant for understanding Quine’s development. 
Quine is influenced by Lewis’ distinction, before he’s aware of Carnap’s distinction between 
the analytic and the synthetic. However, Quine’s problem with Lewis’ distinction is with the 
idea of there being a sharp distinction between the conceptual and the empirical.310 Quine’s 
worries with Lewis mirror Quine’s later problems with Carnap’s work, and empiricism 
generally, at a very basic level. Engaging with Lewis’ epistemology, then, seems to give 
Quine the seeds of an isomorphic worry to his later worry about the analytic/synthetic 
distinction.311 
 
While Quine seems to have concerns about the idea that there is a strict analytic/synthetic 
distinction in his graduate work, Isaac claims that Quine: “was not yet compelled to make his 
dissatisfaction an issue of much importance.”312 However, on the face of it, these tensions 
seem significant. In one paper, Quine treats analyticity as an empirical notion, and, therefore 
thinks that analytic truths are able to be changed based on empirical considerations. Already, 
this view is different to Carnap’s.313 In later work, Quine stresses the empirical nature of his 
appraisals of analyticity: “I have protested more than once that no empirical meaning has 
been given to the notion of meaning, nor, consequently, to this linguistic theory of logic.”314 
The linguistic theory of logic being the idea that logical laws are analytic, and so true in 
virtue of the meaning of their words.  
 
The reason for this seems to be that Quine presents views that are suggestive of something 
like a rudimentary form of holism. Indeed, philosophers often emphasise that Quine has a 
holistic view of scientific theories and their relation to experience much earlier than ‘Two 
 
310 See also Ibid. pp.222-23 
311 See also Sinclair, R. 2012. p.337. 2016. p.77 
312 Ibid. pp.218-20 
313 It’s unclear whether Quine was aware of Carnap’s view at this time. Quine became aware 
of the Aufbau in 1931 from John Cooley. Herbert Feigl then recommends that Quine goes to 
Carnap if he gets a travelling fellowship. See ‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, p.41 
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Dogmas’.315 This is one of the ways in which Quine’s view in ‘Two Dogmas’ is not meant to 
be novel. Quine’s early work gives the appearance of being deeply holistic because of the 
way that he writes about modifying our theory of the world in light of unexpected 
observations. For example, Quine writes about the “latitude” one has “as to where he may 
make his readjustments in the event of an experience recalcitrant to his system”.316 Even as 
early as 1927, in a college paper, Quine describes our system of the world metaphorically as 
a “web”.317 This is the metaphor that is often associated with Quine’s later holistic approach. 
These claims are certainly telling but, for reasons I’ll explain throughout this chapter, 
viewing the early Quine as holding anything as strong as a robust holistic view seems too 
optimistic. Quine’s epistemological views in his early work are fairly naïve, often fluctuate, 
and aren’t developed and definitive until much later. 
 
Indeed, in the same graduate paper, Quine presents himself as accepting Kant’s formulation 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction.318 Thus, there’s no real sense in which Quine has 
understood the consequences of the former view. In later work, Quine presents his critical 
view of analyticity, and alternative holistic conception of epistemology, in sharp contrast 
with Kant. So, while Quine certainly seemed to be having some suggestive thoughts, he 
cannot be said to have had a robust, substantial, and consistent epistemology in his graduate 
work that challenges, or provides an alternative to, the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
Moreover, as I demonstrated, the parallel Quine draws between his graduate work and ‘Two 
Dogmas’ is due to his push for scientific objectivity generally, rather than there being 
common worries specifically about analyticity. 
  
 
2.3.2 1933 
 
The following year, when Quine travels to Europe in 1933, we find more evidence of 
discontent with the distinction. Tennant has uncovered the following in Carnap’s notes about 
 
315 See, for example, Isaac, J. 2005. pp.212-20. Lugg, A. 2012. p.239. Verhaegh, S. 2018. 
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Quine’s view of the distinction between logical and empirical statements being a matter of 
degree: 
 
Quine, 31.3.33 
He says after some reading of my “Syntax” MS: 
1. Is there a difference in principle between logical axioms and empirical sentences? He 
thinks not. Perhaps I seek a distinction just for its utility, but it seems he is right: 
gradual difference: they are the sentences we want to hold fast.319 
 
Quine points to this as an antecedent to his view in ‘Two Dogmas’.320 Perhaps, then, we can 
put Quine’s graduate work to one side (given that it alternates between mild worries about 
analyticity and acquiescence in the analytic/synthetic distinction), and gesture to this very 
early point in the first year of Quine’s career as evidence that his view in ‘Two Dogmas’ is 
found in some form earlier.  
 
Of course, this is merely a short note, and one that is not even written by Quine. It hardly 
indicates a substantial argument against analyticity, nor a developed conception of 
epistemology that differs from Carnap’s. As a further reason for exercising caution when 
evaluating the significance of this note, consider the following. While Quine has linked the 
doubt expressed in this note to his misgivings about analyticity in ‘Truth by Convention’ two 
years later, it is important to bear in mind that Quine had forgotten that this doubt had been 
raised until Tennant uncovered the note significantly later than 1933.321 This should lessen 
the emphasis that we place on the note. 
 
Moreover, there’s good reason to doubt that analyticity is really in trouble for Quine at this 
time. Quine writes in 1934, i.e. the year after the note is written, that meeting Carnap allowed 
him to get over his epistemological worries about mathematics and logic: 
 
I gained by the end of my five and a half weeks in Prague what I deemed to be a fair 
command of Carnap’s philosophical and logistical theories […] it has answered to my 
 
319 Sourced in ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.391. 
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satisfaction the question of the epistemological status of mathematics and logic, a 
question formerly perplexing to me…322 
 
This does not sound like someone who is having doubts about a crucial epistemological 
notion in Carnap’s philosophy. As Verhaegh argues, this gives us a picture of Quine that is 
fairly Carnapian in his lack of hostility towards analyticity. Again, Quine’s thoughts about 
analyticity in this period are suggestive, but he doesn’t appear to have any developed worries 
about the notion. 
 
 
2.3.3  1934 
 
In 1934, Quine gave three lectures on Carnap’s philosophy to the Harvard Society of 
Fellows. On the face of it, these lectures seem significant given that Carnap is an important 
influence on Quine, if not the most important influence, and Quine’s worries about 
analyticity are often presented directly against Carnap. It’s important, therefore, to see how 
much of Quine’s lectures are sympathetic, critical, and neutral towards Carnap’s views on 
analyticity, and whether Quine has moved away from the seemingly friendly attitude outlined 
in the previous section. 
 
A number of philosophers have taken Quine’s early views to be Carnapian, especially his 
work before ‘Two Dogmas’, where the break with Carnap is supposed to have occurred.323 
Accordingly, philosophers interpret Quine’s views in the Carnap lectures in this way. For 
example, Creath and Isaacson read Quine as advocating Carnap’s view in the lectures, and 
Isaac sees Quine as merely outlining the virtues of Carnap’s view.324 Against the idea that the 
lectures are critical, Isaac stresses that the purpose of the lectures isolate them from Quine’s 
own views. The lectures are meant to showcase an exciting new approach to philosophy, but 
one that isn’t Quine’s. Even if Quine had worries, he would have seen it as inappropriate to 
air these in the context of the lectures. 
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Quine has described the lectures, retrospectively, in ways that fit with this reading. Quine 
describes them as “uncritical” and “abjectly sequacious”, and, more positively describes 
himself as being “very much [Carnap’s] disciple for six years.”325 Quine writes to Carnap just 
after the lectures stressing that he “is in complete agreement with the ideas of your book”.326 
Quine even seems shocked to have discovered this. In re-reading the lectures, he writes: “I 
am startled to see how abjectly I was hawing Carnap’s line”.327 
 
All of these points suggest that Quine has an uncritical perspective on analyticity in the 
lectures. Whatever the exact nature of Quine’s relation to Carnap, it would be extremely 
surprising for him, in 1934, to have worries comparable to those in ‘Two Dogmas’ about 
analyticity, given the importance of that notion in Carnap’s philosophy.328 Quine’s closing 
remarks of the lectures appears to fit with this uncritical picture: 
 
Views will differ as to the success of Carnap's total thesis that all philosophy is syntax. 
Carnap has made a very strong case for this thesis; but it must be admitted that there are 
difficulties to be ironed out. We cannot be sure that we have found the key to the 
universe. Still Carnap has provided us, at the worst, with a key to an enormous part of 
the universe. He has…shown conclusively that the bulk of what we relegate to 
philosophy can be handled rigorously and clearly within syntax.329 
 
This gives us a picture where, although there are minor reservations about how universal 
Carnap’s success is, Quine thinks that the bulk of Carnap’s view is successful, and that 
Carnap’s general syntactic treatment of philosophy works. The way in which it’s critical is 
also presented as something that doesn’t seem out of bounds with what Carnap would accept. 
As Hylton puts it: “[i]f there is such a thing as damning with faint praise, this may surely be 
described as a case of endorsing with very faint qualification.”330 
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Quine’s attitude towards Carnap’s general syntactic method in the lectures is positive. Quine 
sees Carnap as having taken notions that, ordinarily in philosophy and common language, are 
handled vaguely, and given them a technical and precise treatment. This is especially notable 
when Quine discusses notions that typically would be handled intensionally, e.g. synonymy 
and content. Quine describes synonymy understood in terms of meaning as giving us “a more 
difficult notion…than synonymity itself”. 331 Carnap defines the latter syntactically. On 
analyticity specifically, Quine explains that Carnap’s syntactic treatment of content allows us 
to understand what it means to call an analytic sentence devoid of content; analytic sentences 
only have analytic consequences on Carnap’s view. Quine’s view of Carnap’s treatment of 
analyticity seems positive: “…here with Carnap, for the first time, the phrase receives a 
definite technical meaning.”332 Or, as Quine puts it more generally: 
 
These samples are already sufficient to suggest the gain afforded by rigorous methods 
in syntax. Such concepts as “content” and “synonymity” are usually couched in 
hopelessly vague terms…The problems associated with these notions are vaguely 
handled in epistemological logic or intensional logic or theory of meaning. Such 
matters here become sharply formulated for the first time and put on a basis where we 
have full command of what we are talking about…333 
 
This outlook generally, as well as specifically in relation to analyticity, all seems highly 
positive, and it differs drastically to Quine’s perspective on such notions in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. 
 
However, against this picture, Hylton argues that the lectures, while appearing uncritical, 
display the seed of tension: “they reveal fundamental assumptions that are at odds with the 
views they espouse – especially about analyticity.”334 The root of the tension that Hylton 
highlights is more or less the same worry that Quine gives the next year in ‘Truth By 
Convention’. Namely, Quine worries that the process we provide for giving implicit 
definitions, and so creating analytic truths, can be carried out indefinitely, and so any 
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sentence can be counted as analytic. That is, analyticity expands too widely, and thus 
becomes trivial. 
 
One way that we could draw a line between the analytic and the synthetic is by exploiting the 
pre-existing a priori/a posteriori distinction. We carry out definitions until all of the truths 
that are a priori are captured, stopping short of empirical truths, and hence the process 
doesn’t continue to the point of triviality. However, Hylton doesn’t think that this option is 
open to Quine because he doesn’t think that Quine sees there being a strict distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori truth, even at this early stage. Hylton writes: “[a]lthough 
Quine uses the expressions “a priori” and “empirical,” his uses seem to be loose, and more or 
less for the sake of argument.”335 Hylton justifies this claim by noting Quine’s attitude 
towards the a priori in ‘Truth by Convention’ and the Carnap lectures. Quine explicitly 
claims that: “[t]he distinction between a priori and empirical does not concern me here”.336 
And Quine often speaks of logical, mathematical, and empirical vocabulary as ‘so-called 
logical’, etc., vocabulary.337 Hylton claims that this illustrates that Quine “pointedly refrains 
from endorsing the existence of such distinctions at the outset.”338 The consequence of this 
view for analyticity is that attaching the label ‘analytic’ to some class of truths simply isn’t 
going to give them a significant trait, and it isn’t going to constrain what counts eventually as 
analytic. 
 
Hylton’s point isn’t merely that what’s analytic on Quine’s account will end up being trivial, 
as his argument is often read. The problem is deeper: whatever analyticity turns out to be, it’s 
going to be built upon a set of sentences that are already accepted as true. If we pick out a 
sentence that we’re going to view as being analytic, this sentence will already be taken to be 
true before we refine our truths to settle on this truth as an analytic one. Implicit definitions, 
which carry out this refining process, can’t be the means by which these sentences are made 
true, and so analyticity can’t account for why these beliefs end up being true. Analyticity is 
supplementary to the truth of a sentence. What this suggests is that Quine is already 
 
335 Ibid. p.262 
336 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.49 
337 Ibid. pp.52-3, p.61. ‘Truth by Convention’, p.100. Quine also describes the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction as an “apparent contrast”. p.102 
338 Hylton, P. 2001. p.262 
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questioning the explanatory role of analyticity very early. Namely, Quine is questioning any 
epistemological role it can have in explaining the truth of a sentence that we already accept. 
 
What’s especially significant here, as Hylton emphasizes, is that Quine is starting with 
ordinary language in focusing on the class of truths that we already accept. Quine is not 
starting with a detached artificial or formal language. He starts with “our accepted 
sentences”, and these aren’t neatly divided into kinds.339 Quine, in 1934, is taking “the 
starting point of philosophy to be our actual language, and our actual system of knowledge, 
as going concerns.”340  
 
On this significant point, Hylton seems to be right.341 For example, when Quine dismisses the 
relevance of “the distinction between a priori and empirical”, he is considering true sentences 
in which some word occurs; the word can be “mathematical, logical, or otherwise”, and he 
focusses not on distinguishing between these as true empirically or true a priori, but merely 
as “true according to the given stage in the process of science” we’re working from.342 
 
Moreover, on the seemingly little weight that Quine places on calling things ‘empirical’, 
‘logical’, etc., not only does Quine use qualifiers like ‘so-called’, but also he notes that while 
we opt to define so-called logico-mathematical words before empirical ones, this is due to the 
simplicity that this seems likely to lead to. Quine stresses that this is a “conventional and 
arbitrary” decision, and hence only has pragmatical value.343 What is needed is merely a 
distinction between vocabulary that is logico-mathematical and that isn’t. But, crucially, this 
doesn’t give you an a priori/a posteriori distinction. Moreover, even within the logico-
mathematical definitions, we’ll need to make arbitrary choices about which of those terms to 
define before others, and this again will be pragmatic, with our choices leading to “alternative 
systematizations of logics and mathematics”.344 Quine stresses that: “the distinction between 
these categories is somewhat vague and corresponds to no sharp structural cleavage”.345 
 
339 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.63 
340 Hylton, P. 2001. p.264 
341 In §2.3.6, I’ll explain that Quine eventually becomes aware that this approach contrasts 
with Carnap’s. 
342 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.49 
343 Ibid. p.52 
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Hylton’s main points are crucial, and they highlight distinctly Quinean views that are on 
display early. This helps to illustrate just how suggestive Quine’s thoughts towards 
analyticity are this early. However, I want to suggest some considerations that caution how 
strongly we ought to read these suggestive thoughts. Indeed, Hylton also stresses that we 
shouldn’t read them too strongly. As I explain shortly, he thinks it’s a mistake to attribute 
substantial epistemological views to Quine at the time. My method, however, is to highlight 
ways in which Quine’s views in the lectures appear to show him also wanting to place some 
theoretical weight on the a priori. This helps to show that, while the attitude Quine displays 
here is suggestive when one looks at it with Quine’s later, robust attitude towards analyticity 
in mind, we shouldn’t put too much emphasis on how developed Quine’s worries about 
analyticity are at this time. Hylton seems right to view this as a period where Quine’s view 
contains tensions, and these further points support the idea that these tensions are strong.  
 
We can see that Quine places some weight on the a priori in his presentation of the notion at 
the start of the first lecture. Quine writes: 
 
Analytic judgements are consequences of definitions, conventions as to the uses of 
words. They are consequences of linguistic fiat. Clearly they are a priori; their truth 
does not depend upon experience, but upon vocabulary. Among analytic judgements 
are to be reckoned logic and the bulk, at least, of mathematics.346 
 
While Quine often uses categories like the a priori loosely, as explained above, Quine’s 
claim here seems firm and uncritical; Quine is saying that analyticity judgements are 
clearly a priori. 
 
On the other hand, one might think that the a priori would threaten Quine’s commitment to 
empiricism. Empiricism is often contrasted with rationalism in so far as the former rejects a 
priori knowledge or truths, while the latter accepts the existence of these. Hence, Quine, a 
life-long empiricist, can’t be amenable to the a priori. Yet, this needn’t be the case. Carnap 
doesn’t see acceptance of the a priori as violating empiricism because it can be viewed as 
analytic. Quine explains this view in the lecture, and so one might think that Quine simply 
 
346 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, pp.47-8. The first emphasis is mine. 
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accepts a Carnapian view of a priori synthetic truths, rather than holding his later view, or a 
firm version of the view that Hylton attributes to him earlier, where these sorts of distinctions 
don’t hold weight. Consider the way that Quine presents Carnap’s view: 
 
…the development of foundational studies in mathematics during the past century has 
made it clear that none of mathematics, not even geometry, need rest on anything but 
linguistic conventions of a definitional kind. In this way it becomes possible to relegate 
geometry to the analytic realm, along with the rest of mathematics.347 
 
What’s significant in Quine’s presentation of this view is that it’s a rejection of Kant’s 
position that the analytic and the a priori aren’t co-extensive, because things like geometry 
are a priori but not analytic, and so must be synthetic (yet not empirical, so not a posteriori). 
What allows Carnap to arrive at this view is the developments in modern logic that Quine 
sees himself and Carnap as integrating into philosophy; a result achieved through “the 
development of foundational studies in mathematics during the past century”.348 We can view 
geometry in terms of linguistic convention, thus making it analytic: “[t]his empties out the a 
priori synthetic”.349 While Carnap makes a syntactic decision to get this result, Quine doesn’t 
see this as devaluing it. If one didn’t make such a decision, Quine stresses, it would lead us to 
metaphysical problems about the validity of the a priori, and this would be an “ill-advised 
syntactic” decision.350 Hence, Carnap’s treatment of the a priori, explained in the Carnap 
lectures, is something that Quine admires, exemplifying the method that he and Carnap 
champion. The fact that there is good evidence for both Hylton’s claim that Quine rejects a 
sharp distinction between the a priori and the empirical, and for Quine’s positive attitude of 
Carnap’s treatment of the a priori illustrates how deep these tensions run in Quine’s view at 
the time. 
 
To return to Hylton’s point more directly, he argues that this specific tension about 
analyticity in 1934 is further suggested by a more general and fundamental tension that seems 
to exist in the lectures. Quine seems to entertain the strongly anti-Carnapian view that there 
 
347 Ibid. p.48 
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are genuine philosophical problems that we should try to solve, rather than merely showing 
them to be illusions.351 Quine claims: 
 
In all our general thinking, whether within metaphysics itself or in the natural sciences 
or in mathematics, we seem invariably to come up finally against some philosophic, 
non-empirical problem which cannot be permanently swept aside…352 
 
Quine claims that we can’t reject these problems completely as meaningless. Instead, we 
have to deal with them as syntactic issues. This shows that Quine is caught between wanting 
to be a devout Carnapian disciple and wanting to view philosophy as something more robust 
than Carnap would allow. According to Hylton, Quine’s struggling attitude towards 
analyticity is further indication of this more fundamental tension. This is because analyticity 
is what plays this role of demarcating legitimate philosophy from illegitimate metaphysics. 
 
However, I think that we can soften the strength of this apparent tension. Quine makes this 
claim as a challenge to Carnap’s picture: philosophy as syntax will either reject such issues as 
meaningless or deal with them using syntactic methods. If Carnap’s project handles them 
mainly using the former option, it’s a negative view, and if mainly the latter, it’s a 
constructive view. Quine’s aim is to show “the constructive quality and importance of 
Carnap’s method.”353 It’s true that there’s a difference of emphasis between Quine and 
Carnap; Carnap seems unlikely to word the prospect of metaphysics so openly as Quine. 
However, Quine is also, on this specific point, defending Carnap’s view to a considerable 
extent. Quine then goes on to explain how one can use the syntactic method to avoid 
metaphysical treatment of a whole range of philosophical issues, like talk of modality and 
meaning. 
 
Let’s return to the prospects of analyticity in the Carnap lectures more directly. We’ve seen 
that there are significant tensions in Quine’s attitude towards analyticity. But we need to 
know how deep these tensions run. Given the state of play in the lectures, Hylton writes: 
 
 
351 Hylton, P. 2001. pp.266-67 
352 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.88 
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We wait for the conclusion the mature Quine was to draw: that calling sentences “a 
priori,” or “analytic,” adds nothing to calling them “firmly accepted” – adds, that is, 
nothing by way of explanation to the bare behavioral fact that these are sentences about 
which we will change our minds only under the most extreme circumstances, if at all.354 
 
However, Hylton doesn’t think that Quine sees analyticity as negatively here. We saw above 
that Quine has doubts about analyticity’s explanatory worth in some contexts. But, crucially, 
Hylton claims that Quine doesn’t see analyticity as unexplanatory in every context. Unlike in 
Quine’s later work, Quine thinks that the sentences that we firmly accept themselves give us 
something that needs to be explained. Quine writes: 
 
…it is convenient so to frame our definitions as to make all these sentences [the most 
firmly accepted ones] analytic…[W]e are equally free to leave some of our firmly 
accepted sentences outside the analytic realm, and yet to continue to hold to them by 
what we may call deliberate dogma, or mystic intuition, or divine revelation: but what's 
the use, since suitable definition can be made to do the trick without any such 
troublesome assumptions? If we disapprove of the gratuitous creation of metaphysical 
problems, we will provide for such firmly accepted sentences within our definitions, or 
else cease to accept them so firmly.355 
 
This shows that Quine thinks that the fact that we firmly accept some sentence demands 
an explanation, and if that explanation isn’t that the sentence is analytic, then we have to 
worry about “gratuitous metaphysical problems”, or else stop holding them so firmly. 
 
This decision, for Carnap, is a syntactic one, but Quine views it as scientifically significant 
because of the economy it gives to our theory: “it has the importance of enabling us to 
pursue foundations of mathematics and the logic of science without encountering extra-
logical questions as to the source of the validity of our a priori judgements.”356 Here we 
have, as Hylton emphasises, a further contrast from Carnap. While Carnap claims that no 
belief is unrevisable, the fact that it is such a belief doesn’t need explained. This is because 
for certain beliefs, revision amounts to changing the language itself, and there’s not 
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something left that needs to be explained. For Quine, however, the fact that a belief is held 
fixed does need to be explained.357 
 
Additionally, Hylton notes that this brings out a change in attitude between the later and 
earlier Quine. In particular, Quine’s behaviouristic account of a sentence as being 
unrevisable, or firmly accepted, isn’t as liberated from philosophical presuppositions as it 
is in his later work. In the Carnap lectures, Quine is focussed on a narrower set of 
sentences that we hold fixed than he does in his later work; he’s focussing on sentences 
that, when it comes to their justification, could be seen to raise metaphysical worries, like 
‘2+2=5’, rather than sentences that we hold fixed, but that we can account for empirically, 
like ‘there have been white dogs’.  
 
Quine’s problem at this stage is that it doesn’t look like this narrower class of sentences can 
be picked out using the behavioural notion of analyticity. What underlies this problem is that 
the metaphysical, non-empirical, way in which we could justify these sentences, i.e. viewing 
them as a priori, is undermined for Quine because he doesn’t think that language is divided 
sharply in this way. Quine’s empirical outlook, even at this stage, doesn’t seem to be 
restricted to only apply to some of the sentences in our overall theory of the world. Yet the 
role that analyticity is meant to play for Quine at this time does require this discriminatory 
form of empiricism. Hence, we’re brought back to the fact that there is a strong tension in 
Quine’s view at this stage.  
 
One might be tempted to make sense of the existence of the tension in Quine’s view by 
attributing a developed epistemological view to him. Hylton seems right to reject this idea. 
He writes: “…the young Quine was first and foremost a logician…he did not, at this point, 
hold any definite views about matters epistemological.”358 Nor does Hylton think that Quine 
clearly sees the link between epistemology and analyticity at this time. One way in which 
someone might read Quine as having a developed epistemology in the Carnap lectures to 
account for logic and mathematical truth is because we might read his holism into his view. 
This would explain what motivates Quine’s empirical outlook as not being restricted to only 
some sentences. But Hylton doesn’t think that Quine has a holistic view here: “there is no 
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sign [of it] at all in the lectures.”359 At best, Quine starts from within language, with the 
sentences we accept as true, and doesn’t split those into a priori and a posteriori sentences, 
but this isn’t substantial enough to be called a holistic view. Moreover, even if Quine’s views 
were suggestive of something like holism in the Carnap lectures, it is certainly not the case 
that Quine presents them as leading to a developed perspective that directly opposes an 
epistemological outlook that places value in the analytic/synthetic distinction. In §2.3.1, I 
emphasised that while Quine’s early work includes views that are suggestive of something 
like a rudimentary form of holism, Quine’s early epistemological views are fairly naïve, in 
flux, and aren’t developed and definitive until much later. Hylton seems right, then, to 
dismiss this explanation of the tension in Quine’s view.  
 
To summarise, I began this section by examining how Quine’s position in the Carnap lectures 
is usually interpreted. This suggested that Quine’s perspective on analyticity in the lectures is 
uncritical. Quine’s more general statements about Carnap’s view are very positive, and while 
Quine may have minor reservations about the total success of Carnap’s project, he thinks that 
the bulk of the view is successful. Quine is also very positive about Carnap’s treatment of 
notions that are ordinarily handled vaguely, including analyticity. Beneath the surface, 
however, there are tensions that are significant when retrospectively looking back from the 
perspective of the later Quine. Perhaps Carnap, if looking closely at the content of these 
lectures, should have grown suspicious of his disciple’s true allegiance. Quine can be seen to 
question the explanatory role of analyticity very early by questioning what epistemological 
role analyticity can have in explaining the truth of a sentence. But, at the same time, Quine 
doesn’t seem to have doubts about the explanatory worth of analyticity in every context. The 
fact that sentences are firmly held is a phenomenon that Quine thinks needs to be explained. 
These points, combined with Quine’s relative naivety about epistemology, make it highly 
likely that tracing the view in ‘Two Dogmas’ back as early as 1934 is far too strong an 
interpretation of Quine. 
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Quine also points to ‘Truth by Convention’ as an antecedent of ‘Two Dogmas’.360 This paper 
is both a substantial piece of philosophy, and, importantly, it is Quine’s own published work 
as opposed to a note written about Quine or a lecture given by Quine on the work of another 
philosopher. Assessing the status of Quine’s view of analyticity in this paper is intimately 
connected to the topic of §2.3.3. Not only is there very little time between the first Carnap 
lecture and ‘Truth by Convention’, but there’s also an interesting structural parallel between 
them. Namely, in both places, Quine begins by focussing on definition, then looks at the idea 
that convention can account for logical truths, and then considers the extent of conventional 
truth.361 ‘Truth by Convention’, then, can only differ in its hostility to analyticity in the ways 
that it differs from the first lecture.  
 
We seem to find evidence of negativity about analyticity at the beginning of the paper: 
 
…developments of the past few decades have led to a widespread conviction that logic 
and mathematical are purely analytical or conventional. It is less the purpose of the 
present inquiry to question the validity of this contrast than to question its sense.362 
 
This seems notably negative. Creath, however, claims that it’s open to interpretation: “[t]his 
could be interpreted as a slyly phrased assertion that analyticity is without sense or as a 
request for further clarification or as anything in between.”363 While it tends to be read as the 
former, Creath thinks that the paper doesn’t provide an argument for this; in fact, the paper 
“is not at all hostile to Carnap”, and hence to Carnap’s view of analyticity.364 
 
On this point specifically, there’s good reason to think that Creath is right, but this is in light 
of different evidence that is much less open to interpretation. The point that Quine is making 
at this point in the paper is not that it’s problematic to view mathematics and logic as 
analytic. Rather, the problem is in drawing a contrast between the claim that mathematics and 
logic are analytic with the claim that physical science differs from these areas because it’s not 
wholly conventional. It is this specific contrast, rather than the more general one between the 
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analytic and the synthetic, that Quine is drawing, and hence this is what the paper appears to 
be trying to undermine. This claim lacks the strength to topple analyticity generally as 
something unintelligible. 
 
Now, Quine’s position here isn’t wholly new. In the first Carnap lecture, Quine also stresses 
that we can make any truth, via contextual definition, end up being true by convention, and so 
analytic. This undermines the contrast, then, between logico-mathematical truths and other 
truths, including those in science. This process seems to have the effect of continuing to such 
an extent that it trivialises analyticity.365 But Quine doesn’t see himself as claiming 
something negative when he makes this point in the lectures. Rather, Quine’s point is that we 
could do this for all sentences, but that we won’t do it for most sentences. Importantly, this 
isn’t a principled point: “…we simply would not bother to render [certain sentences] analytic 
by deliberate definition.”366 
 
Likewise, our decision to view certain sentences as synthetic is seen as pragmatic and tied to 
the fact that, if we’re faced with an unexpected observation, or failed prediction, we want 
those sentences to be the ones that we revise first. Quine explains this in terms that sound 
very much like the principle of minimum mutilation: 
 
In general we can choose, to some extent, where to revise, what principle to dislodge. 
Our choice is guided largely by the tendency to dislodge as little of previous doctrine as 
we can compatibly with the ideal of unity and simplicity in the resulting doctrine. 
Hence we may propose, by and large, to disturb first only such principles as support or 
underly, in a logical way, a minimum of other principles. It is therefore convenient to 
maintain a merely provisional, non-analytic status for such principles as we shall be 
most willing to sacrifice when need of revision at one point or another arises.367 
 
If we didn’t do this, Quine stresses, it would greatly impede the progress of science; we’d 
constantly be redefining our terms, and we’d be at a loss about how to make changes when 
we’re faced with a failed prediction since all changes are on a par.368 
 
365 ‘Lectures on Carnap’, p.62 
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But reflecting on this attitude shows a way in which Quine is in fact friendly to analyticity in 
the Carnap lectures and ‘Truth by Convention’. Quine’s picture of how we make revisions to 
scientific theory involves definitions, and re-defining, and Quine sees definitions as leading 
to analytic truths. So, while what’s counted as analytic will be arbitrary and pragmatic, it’s 
still classed as analytic: 
 
Yet we must define—and we must define sufficiently to make verbal usage specific in 
matters at least which are subject to rigorous treatment, as in the rigorous sciences. And 
we cannot define without making some of our accepted sentences analytic; it is a matter 
merely of choosing which.369 
 
By this pragmatic standard, we will end up classifying the logico-mathematical truths as 
analytic: "...we may as well make the accepted sentences of mathematics and logic 
analytic."370 Although, these won’t be the only truths on our list. We’ll also want some 
physical truths as analytic, and so not sought after for revision. Similarly, Quine describes our 
choice of sentences as synthetic as something "we may as well" keep, describing them as 
having a "provisional status" as synthetic.371 
 
Quine’s perspective on analyticity both in the Carnap lectures and in ‘Truth By Convention’ 
is intended to match up with the practice of science; it’s not a purely philosophical notion, but 
one grounded in scientific practice. Quine explains how it fits not just with logico-
mathematical truths, but also with some truths of physics, and gives Einstein’s definition of 
simultaneity as an example. This example fits with Quine’s characterisation of the analytic 
because he sees Einstein’s choice to define simultaneity in the way that he did as aiming to 
enhance “the rigor of physics”.372 By this, Quine means that Einstein’s definition of 
simultaneity fits with the more general picture that he gives of our use of analytic 
conventional truths. Namely, they are those that we don’t want to revise. Quine’s attitude to 
analyticity, in this respect, seems friendly. 
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In ‘Truth By Convention’, analyticity is first approached in detail at end of the first section. 
Quine notes that if we grant the success of Principia Mathematica and accept that 
mathematics can be defined in terms of logic, such that we can view it as true by convention 
into logic via definition, this isn’t enough to ground the truth of mathematics in convention. 
For this to happen, logic, in turn, would need to be seen as true by convention. Analyticity 
fits in here because: “an analytic statement is commonly explained merely as one which 
proceeds from logic and definitions, or as one which, on replacement of definienda by 
definientia, becomes a truth of logic.”373 Quine relates this view to Carnap, as well as Frege 
and Behmann, noting that Carnap’s use of analyticity stands out in being more “subtle and 
rigorous”.374 At this point, Quine notes that this might be all we mean in calling mathematics 
true by convention, or analytic; we’re not trying to claim that convention has the power to 
make something like mathematics true. 
 
The problem, though, is that, given this process can’t ground the truth of mathematics 
because logic in turn needs to be true by convention, this impoverishes the “fundamental 
simplification for philosophy” that analyticity is meant to provide.375 This use of definition is 
merely the transformation of truths, mathematics into logic, rather than the founding of 
something as true.376 Postulates are often noted for their ability to generate, rather than 
transform, truths, and so the second section looks at this way of making sense of truth by 
convention. 
 
So far, then, nothing notably negative has been raised against analyticity; Quine has merely 
motivated the direction of the paper for narrowing its focus onto postulates. The second 
section of the paper is notably non-critical and optimistic. Quine outlines a system of 
conventions that generate all the statements we want to count as true which involve logical 
expressions essentially. This is explicitly intended to capture the infinitude of logical truths. 
 
Quine then opens the third section by explaining how we can extend these methods to count 
mathematics as also true by convention, even if we take issue with the sort of Principia 
reduction of mathematics to logic, and hence don’t see the fact that logic is true by 
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convention as sufficient for also capturing mathematics as true by convention. But the 
problem here is that this method can be extended “into the so-called empirical sciences”, thus 
making these scientific truths also true by convention in the same way as the mathematical 
truths.377 Quine stresses that this is part of what makes them empirical. If they were defined 
in terms of logic and mathematics, then they’d be assigned to pure mathematics. Here we 
have the argument that Quine also outlines in the Carnap lectures, and hence it is nothing 
new. However, against the looser classification of language in the Carnap lecture, where 
Quine talks of the ‘so-called’ empirical truths, Quine seems to have a more in principled 
distinction at the point of ‘Truth by Convention’ between the empirical and the a priori. That 
is, defining the empirical in terms of logic and mathematics is explained by Quine as an 
“impossibility”.378 The tension that was present in Quine’s view in the Carnap lectures that I 
explained in the previous section can still be felt in ‘Truth by Convention’. 
 
We could carry out this method in such a way that we reduce our overall body of empirical 
expressions, defining them in terms of logic, mathematics, and other empirical expressions, 
until we’re left with a minimum collection of primitive empirical expressions. Carnap fits in 
here because, in the Aufbau, this is exactly the task that he attempted. But Quine distances 
himself from taking this view seriously at this time. He stresses: “[b]ut for the present cursory 
considerations no such spectacular reducibility need be presupposed.”379 Hence, Quine’s 
argument here might bear on the Aufbau project, but it’s in no way specifically focussed on 
it. Moreover, Carnap has moved on from the Aufbau view by this time, as Quine is aware. 
 
On such a general approach, any statement would be viewed as an abbreviation of statements 
which contain only logico-mathematical, and the limited empirical, primitives, and we can 
circumscribe each primitive such that it now renders all of our truths as true by convention in 
the way that the logico-mathematical truths are so viewed. Quine outlines this approach both 
in ‘Truth by Convention’ and the Carnap lectures. However, an important difference in 
‘Truth by Convention’ is Quine’s assertion that if what this picture intends to show is that 
what it means for logic and mathematics to be conventionally true is merely that we can set 
up conventions which make all of the truths of these fields generated as true, then this is an 
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empty claim. This is because it extends to “any other body of doctrine as well.”380 In viewing 
it as an empty claim, Quine pushes this problem in more explicitly critical terms here than in 
the Carnap lectures. 
 
Quine also outlines some other options of what the significance of this approach could be. 
For example, perhaps it’s meant to show merely that speakers adopt these conventions for 
logic and mathematics but not for other fields, but then it’s “uninteresting”, at least 
philosophically.381 Alternatively, if the claim is that it’s an actual practice that we explicitly 
adopt such conventions only in logic and mathematics, then it’s simply “false”.382 Again, we 
see Quine pushing the problem in more explicitly critical terms than in the Carnap lectures. 
 
With these three options undermined, Quine then turns his attention to the idea that there’s an 
a priori/a posteriori distinction operating which explains the respective difference between 
logical and mathematical claims and empirical claims. Quine’s language at this point of the 
paper is notably cautious, which is in line with Hylton’s claim about Quine’s view of the 
distinction between the empirical and the a priori in the Carnap lectures. This is an “apparent 
contrast”, but Quine immediately puts it in behavioural terms to make sure it’s not 
characterised in terms of a “metaphysical system”.383 Again, we have Quine emphasising a 
behavioural way to make sense of analyticity, but it’s not put forward as a substantial account 
in its own right. Rather, a behavioural characterisation of analyticity appears to be a minimal 
constraint on what would legitimise the notion of analyticity for Quine. According to such an 
account, the difference between the a priori and the a posteriori is “a contrast between more 
and less firmly accepted statements”.384  
 
This brings us to one consideration which speaks against the idea that Quine is rejecting a 
significant analytic/synthetic distinction in ‘Truth by Convention’. In terms of this 
behavioural distinction, Quine separates logical and mathematical truths from other scientific 
truths in claiming that: “these statements are destined to be maintained independently of our 
observations of the world”.385 Such statements are too “basic…to our whole conceptual 
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scheme.”386 This is a point that holds “regardless of what further we may have to say of their 
status in the course of a subsequent sophisticated philosophy.”387 And it’s because of this 
behavioural fact that Quine claims that “we may as well make use…of our technique of 
conventional truth assignment and thereby forestall awkward metaphysical questions as to 
our a priori insight into necessary truths.”388 So, despite the bareness of this behavioural 
characterisation, the fact that there is this difference between logico-mathematical statements 
and empirical ones is sufficient such that we can dodge problematic metaphysics for the 
conventional approach. Quine’s language towards supposedly sharp distinctions might be 
loose, but, at the same time, Quine is allowing a lot to ride on this difference in kind between 
two types of statements. As is the case with his view in the Carnap lectures, Quine’s attitude 
appears to contain significant tensions that are visible when looking closely at his perspective 
on analyticity.  
 
Moreover, because of this difference between logico-mathematical and empirical claims, 
Quine claims that there’s no corresponding worry that awkward metaphysical questions will 
arise for empirical statements, and so there’s no need to extend the conventional approach to 
those claims. It’s only “philosophically important” to do it in the case of the logico-
mathematical claims.389 This is a substantially more nuanced position than the one outlined in 
the Carnap lectures, and Quine avoids giving the pragmatic approach to deciding where we 
end our use of convention. There’s a principled reason, grounded in the behavioural 
difference between the a priori and the a posteriori, for only using convention to deal with 
logic and mathematics. 
 
Let us pause to reflect on this attempted behavioural emphasis of analyticity and related 
notions. There seems to be a notable shift from Quine’s perspective in 1933 and 1936. As we 
saw in §2.3.2, Quine’s focus on analyticity, as the letter Quine wrote in 1934 shows, is 
epistemological, in the sense that he’s concerned with analyticity’s role in justifying 
mathematics and logic. However, in ‘Truth by Convention’ Quine is often interpreted not as 
presenting the notion from a distinctly epistemological point of view. Creath and Verhaegh, 
for example, have characterized Quine’s treatment of analyticity as being presented in a 
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distinctly psychological, rather than normative, sense.390 This explains the behavioural 
presentation that Quine gives of analyticity; analyticity explains our psychological reaction to 
choose not to revise certain statements. Moreover, it’s sometimes stressed that Quine doesn’t 
appreciate that this is a different conception of the role of analyticity than Carnap’s, where 
analyticity has an important epistemic function in justifying logico-mathematical statements. 
As evidence for this interpretation, we might focus on Quine’s claim that “the apparent 
contrast between the a priori and a posteriori truths (and thus the analytic and the synthetic) 
retains reality “behavioristically […] as a contrast between more and less firmly accepted 
sentences””.391 
 
But we have to be careful about how powerful this behavioural way of thinking about 
analyticity is taken to be. It is not offered as a substantial explication of analyticity, but nor is 
it purely psychological. Rather, it is a suggestion for the basis of an explication that would 
make sense by Quine’s own standards, and a basis that is compatible with, though not tied to, 
more substantial ways of making sense of analyticity that Quine considers, e.g. convention.392 
Quine speaks of the behavioural distinction being stripped of a metaphysical system, but the 
idea would be that we take, as minimum, the behavioural distinction, and then supplement 
this with more distinctly philosophical ideas to illuminate the nature of analyticity, including 
its epistemological function. In the first lecture, Quine stresses that: “[t]he analytic depends 
upon nothing more than definition, or conventions as to the uses of words.”393 Hence, this 
explains the main focus being on this particular way of understanding analyticity the 
following year. The behavioural way of understanding analyticity, rather than providing the 
key to analyticity, constitutes a minimal condition for what would count as an acceptable 
explication by Quine’s standards. It’s also minimal in an importantly impoverished way. 
Quine stresses that it’s “barer” than the “bare statement” that logico-mathematical truths are a 
priori.394 
 
It would also be especially surprising if Quine’s treatment of analyticity was not epistemic, at 
least at times, given that Quine emphasizes the epistemic role that analyticity is brought in to 
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serve for empiricists, especially when he discusses Carnap.395 This is especially clear in 
Quine’s discussion of the role of reductionism in empiricism, and the contrast that his later 
holistic picture has with this view.396 Moreover, Quine’s reflections on his grapples with 
analyticity place it right in the centre of epistemology. He writes about it being involved in: 
“a sweeping epistemological dichotomy”.397 Recall that the previous section emphasised the 
relative naivety of Quine’s epistemological outlook. In doing so, I explained that Hylton 
thinks that, in the Carnap lectures, Quine doesn’t yet appreciate the relation of analyticity to 
epistemology. Such an outlook would fit with the idea that Quine views analyticity purely 
behaviourally, rather than epistemologically, in ‘Truth by Convention’. However, for the 
reasons provided above (including Quine’s motivation for focussing on convention 
specifically), I think it’s plausible that Quine has at least some grasp on the role that 
analyticity is meant to play widely in epistemology by ‘Truth by Convention’, even if his 
own positive views are fairly undeveloped. Moreover, recall Isaac’s point, discussed in 
§2.3.1, that Quine’s graduate work involved him engaging with the use of analyticity in 
empiricism. The use of analyticity in this context is epistemological, and so it’s unlikely that 
Quine didn’t see this carrying over into Carnap’s use of the notion. Indeed, in §2.3.2, I 
stressed that Quine wrote that meeting Carnap cleared up questions about the epistemological 
status of logic and mathematics. All of this makes it likely that Quine both had at least some 
grasp on the fact that analyticity was vital to epistemology, and intended his own view to 
have epistemological significance. 
 
Let’s return to the argument in ‘Truth by Convention’. Quine next outlines a further and 
deeper worry; one that isn’t present in the Carnap lectures. This is the problem that an infinite 
regress is involved in the idea that logic is true by convention: “the difficulty is that if logic is 
to proceed mediately from conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the 
conventions.”398  
 
It’s in relation to this worry that the paper is often read as being negative.399 Indeed, Lugg 
claims that this marks a difference between Quine in the Carnap lectures and Quine a year or 
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so later; Quine doesn’t have a substantial problem with analyticity in 1934, but by ‘Truth By 
Convention’, he rejects the view that he held in the lectures for understanding analyticity.400 
Lugg thinks that Quine realises that the process given for showing logical truths to be 
analytic requires logic itself, and so won’t work. This means that Quine can’t distinguish 
between conventional and non-conventional truth, and so claiming that a statement is analytic 
doesn’t add anything to it beyond the behavioural characterisation of it as “firmly accepted”. 
This gives Quine the beginning of his worries that will, according to Lugg, intensify as he 
approaches ‘Two Dogmas’. 
 
That this point is critical appears to be confirmed by Quine’s later discussion of it. In reply 
to Hellman, Quine discusses the objection.401 He considers Hellman’s reply on behalf of 
Carnap, where conventions stipulate the logical truths, and then responds to this by 
pointing out that without prior logic, this simply won’t allow us to infer from all of the 
logical truths, or to generalise on the basis of some, to all logical truths with the same 
form. This is presented as decidedly critical. It might leave open the possibility that some 
truths are conventional, but the truths of logic cannot all be conventional. 
 
After raising the regress worry, Quine then criticises the idea of there being implicit 
conventions that we can detect by examining our behaviour before we explicitly formulate 
them. The problem here is that it’s hard to make sense of this notion; it’s hard to distinguish 
between behaviour that involves antecedently adopted conventions and behaviour that 
doesn’t. Because of this, Quine does explicitly stress that this is an explanatorily poor option: 
“[i]n dropping the attributes of deliberateness and explicitness from the notion of linguistic 
convention we risk depriving the latter of any explanatory force and reducing it to an idle 
label.”402 And, in particular, it’s not clearly adding anything explanatory beyond the idea that 
such truths are a priori, or those we won’t revise (where this is understood in terms of the 
bare behavioural account). But this is only one way of explicating analyticity via convention, 
and it’s one that Quine barely dedicates any time to. 
 
What seems distinctly negative and general, though, is Quine’s closing remark: “…as to the 
larger thesis that mathematics and logic proceed wholly from linguistic conventions, only 
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further clarification can assure us that this asserts anything at all.”403 We’ve seen that Quine 
raises two worries towards the end of the paper that undermine the idea that we can 
understand analyticity via convention, and this closing remark suggests that these problems 
undermine any hope of illuminating analyticity via a conventionalist approach. 
 
However, as Creath emphasises, soon after ‘Truth by Convention’, Quine gave some 
arguments in favour of treating logical truth as a matter of convention. 404 Creath is referring 
to a paper Quine gave in 1937, ‘Is Logic a Matter of Words’, which remains unpublished. 
Therein, Quine doesn’t seem to worry about the fact that we need logic to express 
convention. Quine also gives arguments in favour of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth, 
and so his position in 1937 still seems friendly to Carnap. This undermines the force that the 
regress worry seems to have in affecting Quine’s attitude towards analyticity at this time, 
including his attitude specifically towards the conventional route of explicating analyticity. 
 
Moreover, just like the opening of the paper, Quine’s closing remarks are open to 
interpretation. For example, Morris stresses that despite seeming negative, this doesn’t 
amount to a rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction; it’s a call to keep working on the 
distinction, something that Quine himself does in later work.405 In addition to the point above 
about Quine giving arguments in favour of the linguistic doctrine of logical truth in 1937, in 
the next few sections, we’ll see in more detail that Quine continues to attempt to explicate 
analyticity, despite having increasing doubts about it. Quine clearly hasn’t reached so drastic 
a position as the one that he has by the time of ‘Two Dogmas’.  
 
To summarise, in ‘Truth by Convention, Quine’s view is notably negative in the sense that 
he’s beginning to question more seriously, armed with a further doubt about a possible way 
of explicating analyticity, the explanatory role that analyticity is meant to play. But, here, his 
view is far more optimistic that such a route can be found than he is the closer he gets to 
‘Two Dogmas’. While we see further evidence that Quine wants to understand analyticity 
behaviouristically, we should understand this as Quine providing a minimal behavioural basis 
from which an explication of analyticity could be put forward. Such a basis could be 
supplemented with a more distinctly philosophical conception of analyticity. This explains 
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Quine’s focus on convention, since appealing to convention would be one way of building 
upon this minimal foundation. Quine raises a worry for analyticity that is not found in the 
Carnap lectures, namely, that an infinite regress arises if logic is to be true by convention, and 
Quine rejects the plausibility of a view that appeals to implicit conventions. However, this 
latter view is of relatively minor significance, and concerning the broader conventionalist 
approach, Quine doesn’t seem sufficiently troubled by the regress worry such that he feels the 
need to reject conventionalism. Indeed, a further reason for not taking these views on 
analyticity explicated through convention to be particularly critical is that Quine and Carnap 
don’t really discuss these worries in their correspondence (at least the published 
correspondence) around and after ‘Truth By Convention’. They don’t talk as if there’s some 
big objection between them about convention and analyticity, and tensions aren’t clear until 
Carnap’s intensionalism starts to surface in 1938. Carnap mentions Quine’s view on 
convention as something they might discuss at a proposed conference, but it’s not presented 
as something they need to debate as such.406 The tensions in Quine’s view that we saw in the 
Carnap lectures appear to be growing, but Quine is still considering attempts to explicate the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 
 
2.3.5 1940-41 
 
Quine has also traced his problems with analyticity to a series of discussions at the Harvard 
Logic group from 1940-41. Quine writes: 
 
The critique of analyticity to which “Two dogmas” is in large part devoted is an 
outcome of informal discussions…from 1939 onward with Professors Carnap, Alonzo 
Church, Nelson Goodman, Alfred Tarski, and Morton White…407 
 
These discussions start after the six-year period in which Quine has claimed to be a disciple 
to Carnap. Hence, they seem to mark the place to look for Quine’s departure from Carnap, 
and Carnap’s notion of analyticity. Indeed, Quine says this much himself. On this note, he 
writes: “[i]n 1939 Carnap came to Harvard as visiting professor….Then it was that Tarski 
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and I argued along with Carnap against his idea of analyticity.”408 It seems, then, that these 
discussions are a good place to look for the development of Quine’s attitude towards 
analyticity. 
 
One way in which these discussions could have helped develop Quine’s worries about 
analyticity is through their focus on nominalism. The group were considering a nominalist 
language in which parts of arithmetic would end up being synthetic, therefore showing Quine 
that the class of analytic truths could be smaller than the whole of mathematics.409 Quine’s 
views in the Carnap lectures and in ‘Truth by Convention’ don’t consider this possibility. 
 
Indeed, Frost-Arnold notes that this gives us the opposite possibility to the one considered in 
‘Truth By Convention’. Quine’s worry there, if we even want to call it a worry, is that in 
using convention to make sense of analyticity and so conferring a special epistemological 
status on sets of sentences, i.e. those true by convention, one can too easily expand this to 
include truths that we don’t think of as analytic with no natural stopping point. Scientific 
truths, and even ordinary common-sense truths, could be counted as true by convention in the 
same way. On this picture, analyticity is still shielding logic and mathematics; it’s not called 
into question that these truths will count as analytic. But, in the Harvard discussions, the 
nominalist position that Tarski outlines raises the possibility that what counts as synthetic 
could extend into the truths that, even on the conventional approach, were safely counted as 
analytic, e.g. the truths of arithmetic. So, the significance of this possibility, combined with 
both Quine’s earlier worries from 1935 and his temporary drive for nominalism to be 
rendered acceptable, conjures the perfect storm for Quine to jettison himself from the 
Carnapian ship. It “shows him concretely that the boundary between the analytic and the 
synthetic can be considered porous in both directions.”410 
 
Quine’s specific move away from Carnap can also be felt strongly in their disagreements  
about analyticity during these discussions. Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics is a prominent 
point of discussion. It’s highly significant that Carnap’s defence of analyticity, by the 1940s, 
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had seen him shift from extensionalism to intensionalism. Quine gives these discussions an 
important place in his retrospection about the inception of his doubts about Carnap’s 
semantics, and analyticity specifically. Quine writes: 
 
My misgivings over meaning had by this time issued in explicit doubts about the 
notion, crucial to Carnap’s philosophy, of an analytic, sentence…I voiced these doubts, 
joined by Tarski, before Carnap had finished reading us his first page. The controversy 
continued through subsequent sessions without resolution…411 
 
Quine felt like he’d found an ally in his fight for extensionalism in Carnap. The 
extensionalism prevalent in Europe, but lacking at Harvard by the time Quine travelled to 
Europe in 1933, was championed by Carnap in Quine’s eyes. Carnap’s Logical Syntax, for 
example, aimed to be extensional with analyticity treated syntactically, and Quine was 
witness to this emerging directly out of the typewriter.412 We can even see the extensionality 
of Carnap’s approach being emphasised by Quine in his Carnap lectures, when Quine notes 
intensional notions that “we must be on our guard” about, as well as through Quine’s praise 
for Carnap’s syntactic method generally, as explained in §2.3.3.413 
 
Following Tarski’s work on truth, especially ‘On the Concept of Truth in Formalized 
Languages’ (1933), Carnap realizes semantics is no less acceptable than syntax, even within 
the constraints of a more scientific approach to philosophy. And Gödel taught him that there 
is a need for semantics over and above syntax. While Quine is also strongly on Tarski’s side, 
the problem of fitting these three figures together is that Tarski and Quine’s approach to 
semantics is austere, whereas Carnap is less strict, bringing in modal logic as a way of 
characterising matters of meaning from matters of fact; only the former are true in all models. 
Retreat to semantics for Quine doesn’t mean that we give up the commitment to 
extensionalism in any form, but, for Carnap, it appears to have relaxed this demand. Carnap’s 
commitment to extensionality, despite Quine’s hopes, was “insufficiently austere”.414 We see 
good evidence of this in print slightly before the Harvard meetings. For example, in 1938, 
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Quine writes to Carnap in dismay about his move to modal logic.415 And Quine aligns his 
approach to semantics with Tarski, and against Carnap: “[t]he great Tarski […] is one whom, 
unlike Carnap and Russell and Reichenbach, I consider genuinely sound and undeluded in his 
semantics and his philosophical orientation toward logic”.416 Carnap’s retreat to semantics 
may not have been sufficient to motivate Quine to be more wary of analyticity by itself, but 
the manner of Carnap’s retreat seems to locate him at a considerable distance from Quine.  
 
Tarski is also ideally placed to have sparked further doubt in Quine’s mind about analyticity. 
While Quine’s worries take time to gain traction, Tarski was voicing similar worries to the 
later Quine about the lack of a sharp distinction between the analytic and the synthetic much 
earlier. Mancosu has provided strong evidence that Tarski raised these worries. For example, 
in a diary entry from Carnap in 1930, he writes: 
 
…with Tarski at a Café. About monomorphism, tautology, he will not grant that it says 
nothing about the world; he claims that between tautological and empirical statements 
there is only a mere gradual and subjective distinction.417 
 
And this view is also found in 1935 in Neurath’s summary of a discussion from a Congress in 
Paris: 
 
In the discussions the “analytic” vs. “synthetic” opposition came to the fore repeatedly. 
In reply to comments by Tarski to the effect that one could not formulate the distinction 
sharply, Carnap explained…418 
 
Tarski connects this view to the idea that logical statements are not going to be true come 
what may, or that non-logical statements can end up as unrevisable if we make 
adjustments to our overall theory. On both of these points, Mancosu takes the evidence of 
Tarski holding these views as early as 1930 to show that Tarski’s position predates 
Quine’s, and so could have been a clear influence on Quine’s development. The fact that 
Tarski had these distinctive views, and had been raising them against Carnap repeatedly, 
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make it highly likely that Tarski put forward points like this to Carnap in front of Quine 
during the meetings at Harvard. 
 
Indeed, what appears to explain why Tarski was critical of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is that he also held views indicative of the sort of holism that we find Quine 
expressing in ‘Two Dogmas’. Accordingly, Verhaegh and Frost-Arnold have both 
suggested that it’s plausible to think that Tarski influenced the development of Quine’s 
holism in the 1940-41 meetings.419 To this end, Verhaegh uses the following from a letter 
from Tarski to Morton White to demonstrate Tarski’s holism: 
 
[W]e reject certain hypotheses or scientific theories if we notice either their inner 
inconsistency, or their disagreement with experience, or rather with individual 
statements obtained as results of certain experiences. No such experience can logically 
compel us to reject the theory: too many additional hypotheses [...] are always 
involved. [...] Axioms of logic are of so general a nature that they are rarely affected by 
such experiences in special domains. However, I don’t see here any difference ‘of 
principle’; I can imagine that certain new experiences of a very fundamental nature 
may make us inclined to change just some axioms of logic. And certain new 
developments in quantum mechanics seem clearly to indicate this possibility.420 
 
As Frost-Arnold stresses, “it seems unlikely that Tarski never voiced these views about 
logic in Quine’s presence during their year together at Harvard”.421 Indeed, it seems 
especially unlikely given that Quine and Tarski were clearly discussing the tenability of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction at the time. Moreover, the case that Tarski gives to 
illustrate his holism is the very case that Quine gives in ‘Two Dogmas’ to show that “no 
statement is immune from revision”: 
 
Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means 
of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between 
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such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or 
Darwin Aristotle?422 
 
In support of the idea that Quine was influenced by Tarski’s view at this time, Quine 
writes to Marja Tarski after Alfred Tarski’s death emphasizing the latter’s influence on 
him. In particular, Quine emphasizes how strongly he agreed with Tarski’s view during 
the Harvard meetings. Quine writes: 
 
…Alfred was a kindred spirit philosophically. Invariably when issues arose in the 
philosophy of logic, whether privately or in a group or at a logic convention, we found 
ourselves in full agreement. One notable case was our joint effort against Carnap on 
analytic and synthetic judgements, when we were all three together at Harvard in 
1941.423 
 
However, again, the strength of these worries from the Harvard discussions for developing 
Quine’s view on analyticity have to be weighed carefully. If Tarski’s holism did influence 
Quine’s thought, then it takes a lot of time for this influence to gain sufficient traction. Quine 
does not present his own holistic view until long after these meetings, as I’ll explain in 
§2.3.8. Indeed, as I’ll explain in the next few sections, Quine’s perspective in the years 
following the meetings often involves him stressing that while analyticity appears to be an 
unsatisfactory notion, he is at a loss as to what empiricism would look like without it. If 
Quine had a sufficient grasp of holism, it would be extremely unlikely that he would feel so 
torn. Quine certainly doesn’t feel this conflict in ‘Two Dogmas’.  
 
Moreover, to return to Quine’s criticisms of Carnap during the meetings, it’s true that Carnap 
presenting analyticity in an intensional way could have made it easier for Quine to be 
suspicious about the notion of analyticity generally, given that it was no longer being 
presented as wrapped up in the comforting blanket of extensionalism.424 But Quine’s specific 
worries are also directed at Carnap’s idiosyncratic and then-current version of analyticity. 
Quine’s worries are that using modality to explicate analyticity is unclear, and that we 
shouldn’t view a sentence of the form ‘S is analytic’ as analytic itself. This gives Quine good 
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cause to turn his back on Carnap, their perspectives being much further apart than in times 
gone by, but it doesn’t give Quine an argument against analyticity generally, as he has in 
‘Two Dogmas’.425 Quine’s worries are also focused specifically and self-consciously on 
Carnap’s views about semantics, further narrowing their focus.426 
 
Though, Quine’s worries are also focussed on who he takes to be the prominent 
epistemologist of the time, and, as Frost-Arnold speculates, this may: “have further inclined 
Quine to think that no scientifically acceptable characterization [of analyticity] could be 
found.”427 Seeing Carnap’s move away from an extensional approach to analyticity, mixed 
with Quine’s doubts about having a respectable notion of analyticity generally, surely didn’t 
do much to give Quine further confidence that the notion could be made respectable. Indeed, 
Quine’s specific problems with Carnap’s account in the Harvard discussions are strongly 
opposed to that position. There’s no real sense in which Quine’s views could ever be 
reconciled with the intensional, modal brand of analyticity that Carnap offered at this time.  
 
And yet, ‘Two Dogmas’ doesn’t appear for around a decade after Carnap and Quine appear 
to have parted ways significantly over analyticity. It’s strange to think, in particular, that 
Quine would feel compelled to write more about analyticity, ten years later, if his focus was 
still primarily on Carnap. A couple of points are worth stressing to further soften how 
strongly we take these worries at this earlier stage in Quine’s development. 
 
First, Quine’s worries about Carnap’s intensional approach aren’t always presented as if they 
come from the perspective of someone strongly opposed to those views. For example, in the 
letter where Quine stresses that his worries are narrowly on semantics in 1943, Quine’s 
overall summary of Introduction to Semantics is positive, though not excessively fulsome in 
its praise: “I’m impressed with it as a masterly job of organization and presentation, and 
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much of the theory is decidedly to my liking despite my dissension on certain points.”428 
What we see here is a generally positive response to Carnap’s view, but a response that 
differs drastically from the strongly positive comments Quine gives on the Logical Syntax 
and Aufbau. Such comments on Carnap’s later work also aren’t particularly present in 
Quine’s later work, work in which Quine is still notably positive about Carnap’s earlier work. 
Quine is also involved in proofreading and trying to get Harvard to subsidise the costs of 
Carnap’s books on semantics, and so he writes positively about it to these ends. But this isn’t 
mere praise for the sake of helping a respected friend. Quine stresses that as a work on 
semantics, Carnap’s view is important both to appreciate his shift away from his syntactic 
view, as well as providing a more serious and responsible treatment of semantics than was 
often being given at the time. He stresses, in particular, that Carnap’s treatment of semantics 
differs from that offered by the Institute for General Semantics and Stuart Chase, namely, in 
treating semantics as being science, rather than pseudo-science.429 
 
Second, much of the correspondence between Quine and Carnap at this time isn’t presented 
so much as if they are arguing about opposing views, but, rather, it’s presented as if they are 
trying to clarify their views to determine how much they have in common. It takes a lot of 
time, then, for Quine and Carnap to appreciate that they are in a very different position to 
each other, thus, the split between the two is more gradual than it might seem. Creath has a 
similar reading to mine about the correspondence: 
 
Those letters are…between philosophers who believe that they are in fundamental 
agreement who are slowly and unwillingly discovering that what they thought was a 
minor disagreement is turning out to be more fundamental than either had supposed.430 
 
This is further shown by the fact that those letters during their attempt at clarification are 
numerous, and then sharply decline afterwards. 
 
Quine has characterised this eventual breaking point with Carnap in a way that bears on this 
point: 
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In later years his views went on evolving and so did mine, in divergent ways. But even 
where we disagreed he was still setting the theme; the line of my thought was largely 
determined by problems that I felt his position presented.431 
 
This is most clearly appreciable if we consider Quine’s later views that obviously parallel 
Carnap’s. Namely, Quine’s persistent return to the issue of analyticity and his naturalized 
epistemology being presented as a rational reconstruction of our knowledge of the world. 
But, interestingly, it also bears on this gradual split between the two over intensionality. 
For example, Quine emphasises Carnap’s influence over his developing views on modality 
in ‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’.432 It also bears directly, and interrelatedly, 
on their views on metaphysics.433 While Carnap’s philosophy changes in notable stages, 
from the Aufbau, to the Logical Syntax, to his intensional turn, it’s not the case that Quine 
sees him giving up the scientifically rigorous approach to philosophy that inspired him, 
even if Carnap has slipped in abiding by those standards.434 
 
In this section, I have examined the extent of Quine’s doubts about analyticity during the 
early 1940s. I have shown that Quine was exposed to a number of views that plausibly had 
some influence in leading him to question more seriously the plausibility of a strict 
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. For example, Quine considered a 
nominalist project where arithmetic would end up being synthetic, and so the scope of 
what is analytic contracts. It’s also likely that Quine was made aware of Tarski’s views on 
analyticity and holism, both of which have strong parallels to Quine’s later position. 
Perhaps the most significant factor in shaping Quine’s outlook is Quine’s confrontation 
with Carnap’s intensional perspective on analyticity. Carnap, the preeminent 
epistemologist for Quine, ends up with a position on analyticity that is strongly opposed to 
Quine’s attitude. All of this suggests that the stars are falling quickly from Quine’s eyes 
when it comes to the tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction. The split between 
Quine and Carnap over analyticity during this period is decisive. However, their 
awareness of the significance of this divergence appears to have been gradual. Moreover, 
 
431 ‘Homage to Rudolf Carnap’, p.41. Quine also talks about this divergence much earlier 
when he presents ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.160. See also ‘On 
Carnap’s Views on Ontology’, p.203 
432 ‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’, p.48 f9 
433 ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’. p.203 
434 ‘Replies to Professor Riska’s Eight Questions’, p.214 
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Quine still appears to lack a general argument to use against the analytic/synthetic 
distinction within empiricism broadly construed. This is the position that Quine presents in 
‘Two Dogmas’. Quine’s worries in this period are focussed directly on Carnap and not the 
dogma that was widespread in empiricism.  
   
 
2.3.6 1943-45 
 
Shortly after the Harvard Logic Group meetings, Quine starts to appreciate the inter-defined 
nature of analyticity more seriously. This is an important development because, as I 
explained in §2.2.2, a substantial part of Quine’s argument in ‘Two Dogmas’ concerns 
elucidating the inter-defined nature of analyticity and stressing the same need for clarity with 
respect to the other notions related to it. For example, Quine realizes that analyticity might be 
definable in terms of synonymy and logical truth. He also stresses that meaning is tied into 
these interrelated notions, and so is in the same need of clarification.435 This realization takes 
place around 1943. In support of this, note, for example, that Quine doesn’t talk about 
synonymy in papers like ‘Truth by Convention’. 
 
This development is also significant because, as Verhaegh stresses, it shows that Quine is 
becoming clearer about what would count as an acceptable notion of analyticity.436 We see 
evidence for this in a letter from Quine to Carnap: 
 
The definition of this relation of synonymity, within pragmatics, would make reference 
to criteria of behavioristic psychology and empirical linguistics. …I find it interesting 
to have reduced the notion of analytic to…synonymity because I feel this shows, more 
clearly than hitherto, the gap that has to be bridged.437 
 
Quine stresses that, while he hasn’t yet found a satisfactory definition of synonymity, he 
considers it as something “that it would be very useful to do…both for philosophy and for 
 
435 ‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’, p.44. Quine also links ‘Two Dogmas’ to this 
paper. Quine writes that: “a statement is analytic if it can be turned into a logical truth by 
putting synonyms for synonyms.” Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. p.297 
436 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.118 
437 Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. pp.294-300. See also p.357. ‘Notes on Existence and 
Necessity’, p.120 
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empirical linguistics”.438 This shows, crucially, that Quine has determination to try and 
clarify analyticity via synonymy. In ‘Two Dogmas’, the interdefined nature of analyticity is 
used to establish that the notion is in bad shape. But in 1943, the fact that analyticity can be 
seen to be defined in terms of other notions is a sign to be hopeful that one can make 
analyticity tenable. This is an important change in Quine’s attitude. Additionally, it’s notable 
that Quine’s tone is more optimistic about this route than in many of his discussions of 
explicating analyticity via convention, and certainly of viewing it intensionally. Quine’s 
attitude towards analyticity at this time, then, seems optimistic and positive. 
 
A second important development which takes place in this year is Quine’s discovery that 
there is a methodological contrast between what he and Carnap would count as an acceptable 
explication of analyticity. We see that Quine and Carnap become aware of this difference in 
correspondence relating to their debate about analyticity. For example, in a letter to Church 
from 1943, Quine writes: 
 
…my attitude toward ‘formal’ languages is very different from Carnap’s. Serious 
artificial notations, e.g. in mathematics or in your logic or mine, I consider 
supplementary but integral parts of natural language. […] Thus it is that I would 
consider an empirical criterion […] a solution of the problem of synonymy in general. 
And thus it is also that […] I am unmoved by constructions by Carnap in terms of so-
called ‘semantical rules of a language’.439 
 
The contrast is also visible in a letter from Carnap to Quine: 
 
Here is an important methodological point. I believe that we cannot construct an exact 
and workable theory of concepts like ‘true’, ‘analytic’, ‘meaning’, ‘synonymous’, 
‘compatible’ etc. if we refer merely to the actually used language of science. It seems to 
me that we can use those concepts only if we replace the given language by a system of 
rules; in other words, we have to go from pragmatics and descriptive semantics to pure 
 
438 Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. p.298. 
439 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.120. See also Quine and Carnap in Creath, R. 1990b. 
pp.435-39 
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semantics. …the pragmatical definition cannot be taken as the basis for the semantical 
theory.440 
 
Quine highlights this contrast in ‘Two Dogmas’.441 In that paper, Quine raises the point in the 
midst of his lament at the state of analyticity in empiricism. However, at this earlier stage of 
his development, this methodological point about Quine’s own view has a constructive 
purpose in trying to shed light on analyticity. Understanding this contrast can illuminate what 
Quine is asking of analyticity (as well as other related notions) in order for it to be 
acceptable. Quine views artificial languages as parts of natural language.442 Indeed, we saw 
hints of this attitude as early as the Carnap lectures. Accordingly, Quine claims that an 
artificial notion has to be made sense of first in terms of natural language, and that natural 
language itself has to be made sense of in empirical terms. This means that Quine requires 
that the notion of analyticity, even when used in an artificial language, be grounded in our 
natural language use of analyticity. 
 
Moreover, Quine explains, in a letter to Carnap from the same year, what would count as 
having given an empirical criterion for a notion like analyticity. Quine compares how we 
would handle the notion of analyticity with how an empirical linguist would handle the 
notion of a sentence: 
 
The empirical linguist who goes into the field to study and formulate a language 
unrelated to any languages hitherto formulated has a working idea, however vague…of 
sentence in general…Now when for theoretical discussion we specify an artificial 
language as object, we again specify…the class of expressions which are to be regarded 
as sentences for this language. The idea of “sentence” is the same in both cases; only 
the languages are different…It is only thus that we understand what is intended…when 
you tell us: “the following are to be the sentences of my new language”. Otherwise it 
would be as if you said “the following are to constitute, for my new language, what I 
shall call the class a”. This latter remark would be uninteresting, except insofar as 
possibly introducing an auxiliary concept whose purpose would be explained 
 
440 Carnap in Ibid. p.309. See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.119 
441 ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.32-7 
442 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.74, pp.116-20. pp.142-47 
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afterward…Now my view on the notion of “analytic”…is similar to my view on the 
notion of sentence…It is only by having some general, pragmatically grounded, 
essentially behavioristic explanation of what it means in general to say that a given 
sound- or script-pattern is analytic for a given individual, that we can understand what 
is intended when you tell us (via semantical rules, say) “the following are to be analytic 
in my new language”. Otherwise your specification of what is analytic for a given 
language dangles in midair…443 
 
So, for Quine, you can specify the particular sentences of a language syntactically, but the 
actual notion of a sentence has to come from an empirical, pragmatic theory based on 
actual language. And, of course, the same holds for the notion of an analytic sentence: 
 
The grammatical rules are artifices of the linguist to enable him to specify the class of 
expressions which are (by observation) in fact sentences for the people in question; and 
correspondingly for the semantical rules, in relation to “analytic”.444 
 
We saw in earlier sections that Quine emphasises behavioural criteria for making sense of 
analyticity very early on. The attitude that Quine expresses at this later stage certainly 
aligns generally with such a view. However, the behavioural demands that Quine now 
makes are more detailed and weighted when compared to his earlier, rather bare, request. 
As we saw above, Quine asks for “some general, pragmatically grounded, essentially 
behavioristic explanation of what it means in general to say that a given sound- or script-
pattern is analytic for a given individual”, and he stresses that, in doing so, we should 
bring in “behaviouristic psychology and empirical linguistics”. In his earlier work, Quine 
saw a behavioural classification of a sentence as providing the barest beginnings of an 
explication, but now Quine wants an understanding of behaviour to provide something 
more meticulous.   
 
Carnap’s view of artificial languages, however, is more artificial than this. Carnap doesn’t 
seek the same behavioural clarity for analyticity and related notions that Quine does, and, 
accordingly, Carnap thinks that semantic notions can be defined using semantical rules. 
 
443 Quine in Creath, R. 1990b.. pp.337-38 
444 Quine in Ibid. pp.337-38 
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Indeed, Carnap’s point is that such concepts are too unclear in natural language to be a robust 
or theoretical concept. Indeed, Carnap stresses that because of this unclarity, it’s only relative 
to a language system, with explicit semantic rules, that there is an analytic/synthetic 
distinction. This doesn’t apply, as Carnap puts it in his reply to ‘Two Dogmas’, “with respect 
to a historically given natural language.”445 It’s true that Quine also stresses that analyticity 
will be unclear in natural language, but Carnap is then happy to make the jump to pure 
semantics whereas Quine is not. This is a more artificial treatment of semantic notions than 
Quine allows.  
 
To return to Quine’s position on this methodological contrast in ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine is 
critical of Carnap’s use of semantical rules for explicating analyticity in the paper.446 While 
Quine’s own methodology is used constructively at this earlier time, in examining the 
contrast between Quine and Carnap’s methodology, we can see that Quine is already critical 
of this move in 1943. Quine is “unmoved by constructions by Carnap in terms of so-called 
‘semantical rules of a language’.447  
 
To summarise, I have established that there are two important developments in Quine’s 
attitude towards analyticity between 1943-45. First, Quine comes to appreciate more 
seriously the interdefined nature of analyticity. Quine sees the fact that analyticity can be 
defined in terms of notions like synonymy as providing hope for an explication of analyticity. 
This attitude contrasts sharply with his position in ‘Two Dogmas’ where the interrelated 
nature of analyticity is part of the problem. Second, Quine comes to realise that there is a 
methodological contrast between what he and Carnap would consider as an acceptable 
explication of analyticity. This shows that Quine requires that analyticity, even when used in 
an artificial language, be grounded in natural language. I demonstrated that this is especially 
significant because it shows that Quine wants an understanding of behaviour to play a more 
substantial role in explicating analyticity. In addition, Quine isn’t impressed by Carnap’s use 
of semantical rules to explicate analyticity. This is part of Quine’s criticism of the dogma of 
analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’. By this time, the pieces are starting to come together more 
visibly for Quine. However, Quine’s overall attitude is optimistic, rather than negative. 
 
 
445 Carnap in Creath, R. 1990b. p.432 
446 ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.32-7 
447 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.120 
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2.3.7 1946-48 
 
Let’s now examine Quine’s attitude to analyticity in the later part of the 1940s, starting with 
1946. In this year, Quine gives a lecture, ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’, which 
provides good evidence about the extent of his worries at this time. Quine claims that the aim 
of the lecture is to “convey some idea of the ramified character of the problem of defining 
analytic statements.”448 In the previous section, I explained that, by 1943, Quine appreciates 
seriously that analyticity is interdefined with other semantic notions. However, at that time 
Quine’s outlook was positive. In 1946, in contrast to this, Quine stresses that it is 
“remarkable” that such an important notion “is not even moderately clear in anybody’s 
mind.”449 Moreover, Quine emphasises how central the problem of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is for philosophy. We see this when he describes the issue of whether there are 
synthetic a priori truths as “one of the basic issue[s] of philosophy” and when he claims that 
the notion of analytic statements is a “key concept for philosophy”.450 The proposal that 
analyticity is both central to philosophy and not at all clear suggests that Quine is quickly 
losing his optimism for an adequate explication of analyticity. 
 
Let me explain the reasons that Quine gives at this time for thinking that analyticity is 
obscure. Quine’s evaluation of analyticity in the lecture is very similar to ‘Two Dogmas’, 
albeit briefer and sketchier. He begins by focussing on meaning, which leads him quickly to 
synonymy and logical truth. On synonymy, Quine argues against the idea that definitions can 
shed light on analyticity, appealing to the practice of lexicography to show that such an 
appeal is “a mirage”.451 Quine also relates this problem to Carnap’s use of semantical rules. 
This is a problem we saw that Quine appreciated in 1943. This problem with definition then 
directs Quine back to the notion of synonymy itself. Quine considers some behavioural ways 
of making sense of synonymy, but claims to “have no such definition to offer”, while 
 
448 ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’, p.25 
449 Ibid. p.24 
450 Ibid 
451 Ibid. p.32. Even if ‘bachelor’ turns out to fare okay here, Quine stresses that there are 
other cases where it’s just not clear at all, e.g. ‘Everything extended is coloured’. Quine is 
clearly, then, considering a wider class of analytic truths by this point than he does much 
earlier, e.g. in the Carnap lectures. 
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stressing that the idea that there is one “is constantly presupposed in all our glib discourse 
about analytic statements”.452  
 
Quine also raises a few issues not found in ‘Two Dogmas’. For example, he raises worries 
about the fact that homonyms can complicate synonymy, and that understanding synonymy 
behaviouristically might turn on the notion of belief. This, in turn, would require we make 
sense of dispositions, which Quine is not clear on at this time. Progress on either of these two 
fronts would help to shed light on analyticity, yet Quine stresses that we’ve not really begun 
to understand these notions yet. In light of this, Quine finally decides to consider a 
behavioural definition of analyticity directly, and to then derive synonymy from this. These 
points establish that Quine is starting to seriously appreciate that the interrelated nature of 
analyticity to other semantic notions is not the promising route to providing an understanding 
of analyticity that it once seemed. 
 
When considering a behavioural definition of analyticity, Quine gives a very short account of 
the fact that we don’t give up analytic statements in the face of observational evidence, 
despite our having a choice about which statements to revise. Quine is fairly brief and non-
committal on this point: “…through what channels…could we hope to get a criterion of 
analytic? Perhaps on the basis of relative reluctances in the face of contrary evidence, to 
discard a statement as false.”453 Analytic statements are viewed as “the ones which we choose 
to reject last.”454 We see Quine still trying to make behavioural sense directly of analyticity, 
instead of in terms of synonymy, and open to a gradualist picture of analyticity.  
 
Quine notes that analyticity, understood in terms of this rough behavioural characterisation, 
would end up admitting of degrees.455 This view is in contrast with his later attitude. Recall 
that, on Quine’s later view, statements should not be seen as more or less analytic. There’s no 
trace of a gradualist picture in ‘Two Dogmas’, and, as Verhaegh has uncovered, Quine did 
not intend a gradualism there. This is clear when Quine writes: “[m]y position on analyticity 
was flat rejection of the distinction, rather than gradualism.”.456 Quine must have reached this 
 
452 Ibid. p.34 
453 Ibid. p.35 
454 Ibid 
455 See also ‘Animadversions on the Notion of Meaning’, p.155 
456 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.111 f16 
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conclusion sometime between 1947 and writing ‘Two Dogmas’, as we still see that he’s 
reluctant but open to the gradualist picture in 1947. Quine describes the idea that the 
analytic/synthetic distinction could end up as a matter of degree as a “dismal possibility”.457 
Quine’s view at this time, then, isn’t as strong as it would be in ‘Two Dogmas’ since it 
doesn’t involve a “flat rejection of the distinction”. 
 
In §2.2.1, I explained that Quine viewed ‘Two Dogmas’ as constituting a wholly negative 
contribution to philosophy. Quine’s summary of this lecture in 1946 also presents his attitude 
in a negative way. He writes that the views he’s discussed: “have been mainly negative: the 
obscurity of our conception of analytic, and the difficulty of doing anything about it.”458 
However, Quine is in a subtly different position in these two points in his development. 
Quine’s attitude towards analyticity is certainly building in its hostility in 1946. However, 
Quine does not yet present an alternative form of empiricism to one that places value on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, i.e. holism. Quine is truly at a loss at this stage; he still has 
some drive to remedy the situation because he is not yet in a position where the 
analytic/synthetic distinction is irrelevant to his own epistemological outlook.  We see 
evidence of this when Quine writes that, while he lacks a behavioural characterisation of 
synonymy, he considers the problem of finding one not only difficult, but “one which 
demands solution”.459 
 
Quine ends the lecture on an optimistic tone, intentionally given to contrast with his negative 
summary that I explained above. Quine stresses that his view: 
 
…is not one of defeatism, nor one of dismissing problems as illusory….My feeling is 
that we philosophers, in connection at least with this complex of problems, haven’t 
been doing very well; and that we should recognize that we haven’t been doing very 
well, but not that we should give up trying.460 
 
However, from what has been said so far about Quine’s view in 1946 we can appreciate that, 
while Quine seemed optimistic about explicating analyticity via its related notions in 1943, 
 
457 ‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’, p.45 f4 
458 ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’. p.35 
459 Ibid. p.34 
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by 1946, Quine appears more frustrated than optimistic given his further doubts concerning 
the clarity of these notions. 
 
In §2.2.2, I explained that a vital aspect of Quine’s perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’ is his focus 
on analyticity as a prevalent notion within empiricism generally. It’s plausible that a 
significant factor in leading Quine to have this perspective is the preparation that he did for 
his 1946 Hume lectures.461 Within the lectures, Quine’s philosophy becomes saturated with a 
historically focussed and informed picture of empiricism, and after the lectures we see a 
continual stress on the relevance of analyticity to the wider empiricist movement. Quine’s 
Hume lectures help him to ground empiricism, including empiricism’s use of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, in its historical context. These lectures are not purely 
descriptive, neutral, or historically focussed. Within them, Quine not only evaluates Hume, 
but also contextualises Hume’s work within the development of modern empiricism, and 
highlights ways in which empiricists have advanced on Hume to reach the sort of views that 
people like Lewis and Carnap have. It’s plausible, then, that preparing these lectures allowed 
Quine to appreciate that his worries with analyticity had a much more general target.  
 
We see evidence of this when Quine ends the Hume lectures by explaining that the 
“Humean point of view” that remains in “modern empiricism” is a significant factor in 
leading to reductive and pragmatic projects in epistemology.462 Quine also relates Hume’s 
distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact to the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, and stresses that, while it’s not clear how meaning fits precisely into Hume’s 
distinction, the analytic/synthetic distinction still “fits his point of view.”463 Quine 
emphasises that what is certain on Hume’s view ends up either being “immediate 
experience” or analytic, and that this is “the creed likewise of the empiricists of today.”464 
 
An important development in Hume’s view, according to Quine, is his move away from 
the earlier distinction between internal and external relations to the distinction between 
relations of ideas and matters of fact. Quine explains that it’s not until the Enquiry that 
 
461 Quine started preparing the lectures in late-1945. Buickerood, J. in ‘Lectures on 
Hume’s Philosophy’, p.37 
462 ‘Lectures on David Hume’s Philosophy’, p.135 
463 Ibid. p.134 
464 Ibid 
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Hume grants that geometry, in addition to arithmetic and algebra, is certain, and Hume 
does this using the latter distinction in place of his earlier view, which excluded geometry 
from being certain. Quine then links Hume’s account to Leibniz’s, but stresses that 
Hume’s fits more with the contemporary analytic/synthetic distinction.465 Moreover, 
Quine stresses that if we then consider Hume’s empiricism as focussed on words, rather 
than ideas, then this leads us to the view of the Logical Positivists on logico-mathematical 
truth. What these points show is that Quine is engaging with the historical precursors of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction and relating these roots to empiricism as Quine found it. 
Analyticity, Quine appreciates, is deeply embedded in the tradition of empiricism.  
 
We see further evidence for this in the fact that in ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’, 
Quine also stresses the importance of analyticity generally for empiricism.466 Quine begins by 
stressing the relevance and importance of the analytic/synthetic distinction not to Carnap’s 
view specifically, but, rather, within the history of philosophy. The distinction is traced to its 
Kantian roots and even to the antecedents of such roots. Carnap’s view is mentioned only in 
relation to his use of semantical rules and in a discussion of dispositions. Quine more often 
talks about the Logical Positivists as a group. Quine then stresses the central importance of 
analyticity to philosophy, describing it as a “basic issue of philosophy”.467 It's within this 
context, of analyticity figuring as a central node in philosophy, that Quine introduces his 
worries about the notion: 
 
Since the notion of analytic statement…has become such a key concept for philosophy, 
it is remarkable if the notion is not even moderately clear in anybody’s mind. But I 
venture to say that it is not.468 
 
Moreover, the worries that Quine outlines for analyticity are explained as having very 
general consequences for philosophy, not just for Carnap’s project. Quine makes this clear 
 
465 Hume’s distinction “brings us closer to modern (Kant and successors) analytic vs. 
synthetic” Ibid. p.88. In the lectures, Quine provides more details on how Leibniz’s view 
relates to analyticity than he usually does. Importantly, Leibniz’s view is presented as being 
more sophisticated than Descartes in recognizing that the distinction between truths of 
reasons and truths of facts is not grounded in the world, but rather is grounded in the way that 
we gain knowledge. See p.57 
466 ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’, pp.24-5 
467 Ibid. p.24 
468 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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when he writes: “[t]he ramifications of the central problem have been such, moreover, as 
to request a pretty formidable segment of the field of philosophy.”469 
 
By 1947, Quine is stressing that analyticity is interrelated with necessity, properties, and 
attributes, as well as synonymy, etc.470 He relates Hume’s view to the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, and explains how Aristotle’s influence, with its emphasis on the notion of 
essential attributes, also explains the prevalence of analyticity in empiricism. In doing so, 
Quine stresses that this shows “how central the topic [of analyticity] is to philosophy.”471 
 
Quine reiterates his determination towards finding an adequate definition of synonymy, as 
well as stressing his lack of a current answer. Quine makes this clear in a letter to White: 
 
It’s bad that we have no criterion of intensional synonymy; still, this frankly and visibly 
defective basis of discussion offers far more hope of clarity and progress, far less 
danger of mediaeval futility, than does the appeal to attributes, propositions, and 
meanings.472 
 
Moreover, Quine makes use of analyticity in this year. Despite it lacking a clear definition, 
Quine stresses that: “the notion is clearer to many of us, and obscurer surely to none, than the 
notions of modal logic; so we are still well advised to explain the latter notions in terms of 
it.”473 Quine then provides an interpretation of (pre-quantificational) modal logic using 
analyticity. This might all seem quite positive. However, Quine is also doubtful about the 
notion of analyticity employed here because of its vagueness, describing the proposal as a 
“conjecture”.474 Note that while Quine seems optimistic about analyticity and synonymy at 
this time, his claim is comparative. Analyticity is presented as clearer than “attributes, 
propositions, and meanings” as well as “the notions of modal logic”. In other words, 
analyticity is clearer than things that Quine thinks are paradigmatic instances of unclear 
philosophical notions. This is hardly a positive sign for the status of analyticity. 
 
469 ‘On the Notion of an Analytic Statement’, p.35 
470 ‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’, pp.44-5. ‘The Importance of Logic for 
Philosophy’, p.143 
471 Ibid 
472 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.121 
473 Ibid, p.45 
474 Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. p.410 
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Additionally, in a lecture in 1947, Quine is even less committal about which avenue of 
explicating analyticity is most hopeful.475 Recall from Chapter 1 (§1.4.1) that Quine 
highlights the problem of confirmation as something that an empiricist has to either solve or 
realise is unsolvable, because outright reduction won’t work when it comes to reducing our 
theory to experience. In this way, he stresses that it is “an essential problem for 
empiricism.”476 Quine then mentions some people who are engaged in this problem, noting 
that he is: “far from content with the results to date”.477 Quine, then, is fairly pessimistic 
about formulating an adequate account of confirmation, leaving the door only very slightly 
open for analytic statements to be understood in terms of joint confirmation. This position is 
telling, but it’s not as strong as Quine’s position in ‘Two Dogmas’. 
 
Of course, confirmation is a crucial part of empiricist views in the Vienna Circle, as seen, for 
example, in the debates about protocol sentences; sentences are meaningful if they imply 
protocol sentences.478 The views that Quine is considering are responding to the realisation 
that strict reductionism won’t work, and so are the very same as those Quine is responding to 
in ‘Two Dogmas’. Indeed, the list of philosophers that Quine cites as holding this view is 
wide-ranging, and doesn’t include Carnap specifically. Quine writes that “[e]mpiricists and 
pragmatists from Pierce through Wittgenstein to Professors Lewis and Bridgman have 
agreed, in varying idioms, that the meaning of a statement consists in the methods of its 
empirical confirmation.”479 Quine, by this time, as Isaac nicely puts it, views empiricists 
generally as positing “the empirical plus”.480 That is, empiricism plus analyticity, or plus the 
relations of ideas, and so on. 
 
All of these developments seem to culminate in Quine’s realisation that he is caught between 
his drastic negativity towards the prospects of clarifying analyticity, and his not knowing 
 
475 ‘The Importance of Logic for Philosophy’ 
476 Ibid. p.142. In a few places, in work from before 1947, Quine seems more optimistic 
about making sense of confirmation. See, for example, Quine in Creath, R. 1990b. p.387. 
‘Logic, Mathematics, Science’, p.172 
477 ‘The Importance of Logic for Philosophy’, p.142 
478 ‘Carnap’s Positivistic Travail’, pp.123-24 
479 ‘The Importance of Logic for Philosophy’, p.143 
480 Isaac, J. 2005. pp.210-11 
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what else to do besides persevering in his quest to clarify it. We see clear evidence of this in a 
letter from Quine to Hugh Miller in 1948: 
 
I am with you in questioning the currently popular boundary between analytic and 
synthetic. I feel, indeed, that the distinction means virtually nothing, pending the 
devising of some behaviouristic criterion such as no semanticist to date has given us an 
inkling of. But, for the same reason, I don’t know what it would mean to say, with you, 
that arithmetic is not analytic.481 
 
To summarise, in this period Quine appears to be torn between optimism and frustration 
about the analytic/synthetic distinction, with his optimism fading noticeably from earlier in 
this decade. While Quine clearly appreciates the interrelated nature of analyticity, he comes 
to realise that this does not afford the promising route for understanding analyticity that he’d 
hoped it would. More positively, Quine attempts to characterise analyticity behaviourally, 
however, in doing so, he presents a gradualist picture of analyticity. This shows that Quine’s 
view is not as strong as it would be in ‘Two Dogmas’, as it doesn’t involve a straight 
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Moreover, Quine appreciates seriously that the 
problems he has with analyticity have significance for philosophy generally. I argued that a 
substantial factor that helps Quine to reach this perspective is that, by 1946, he understands 
the historical roots that analyticity has that then explain the prevalence of the distinction in 
philosophy as Quine found it. Crucially, however, at this time Quine’s attitude is not quite 
negative enough to match his outlook in ‘Two Dogmas’. Quine is caught between the serious 
doubts he has about analyticity, which undermine the idea that it can be a robust theoretical 
notion, and the lack of an alternative that he has to present in place of an epistemology that 
places value on the notion. The pieces of ‘Two Dogmas’ are visibly coming together, but 
perhaps the most important piece of all, Quine’s holism, is still missing. 
 
 
2.3.8 1949 
 
This brings us nicely to 1949. There is good evidence that Quine is thinking in holistic terms 
by this time, and so there is good evidence that Quine has found his alternative perspective to 
 
481 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.94 
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an epistemology that requires an analytic/synthetic distinction. First, I will provide support 
for the idea that Quine appreciates this plausible epistemological alternative by 1949, before 
returning to examine his increasingly bleak outlook on the prospects of analyticity.  
 
To support the idea that Quine has found his positive alternative epistemological outlook, 
Tennant has uncovered the following in Carnap’s notes from this year, where Carnap 
attributes to Quine a view a view of our conceptual scheme that is very similar to the holistic 
picture that Quine gives in ‘Two Dogmas’. Carnap writes: 
 
Main difference: Quine sees much in terms of differences in degree (with not even a 
crude boundary line through aggregations), where I want to draw a boundary line… 
 
‘Conceptual scheme’: This includes for him the structure of language, as well as the 
recognized laws and the recognized singular statements; empirical science, 
mathematics, logic, everything is together and inseparable. There is only the difference 
in degree of readiness to give something up as might be required by new experiences. 
At the center stand: logic of truth tables (this will be the most difficult to give up, and 
so, if one wished to put it that way, ‘analytic’ in the highest degree); near to that lower 
predicate logic; arithmetic; higher mathematics; laws of theoretical physics, etc; finally 
at the periphery singular observable facts.482 
 
On the view that Carnap is attributing to Quine, there’s still a gradualism about the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, which differs from Quine’s stronger rejection of it in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. However, Verhaegh has emphasised further evidence which provides a more 
definitive reason for thinking that Quine’s view is holistic by this year.483 In the first draft of 
Methods of Logic, we see Quine’s first written explanation of holism that is explicitly 
extended to logical and mathematical knowledge. Quine first presents a broadly holistic 
picture of inquiry, writing: 
 
Physical objects are known to us only as parts of a systematic conceptual structure 
which, taken as a whole, impinges at its edges upon experience. […] When […] 
 
482 Carnap, R. Tennant’s translation. In Tennant, N. 1994. p.215 
483 Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.109-11 
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predictions turn out wrong, the system has to be changed somehow. But we retain a 
wide latitude of choice as to what statements of the system to preserve and what ones to 
revise. […] Our statements about external reality face the tribunal of sense experience 
not individually but as a corporate body.484 
 
Next, Quine extends these holistic considerations to mathematics and logic, explaining why 
they seem to be necessary and so different from other truths.485 We see this when Quine 
writes: 
 
Mathematics and logic, central as they are to the conceptual scheme, tend to be 
accorded […] such immunity, in view of our conservative preference for revisions 
which disturb the system least; and herein, perhaps, lies the “necessity” which the laws 
of mathematics and logic are felt to enjoy.486 
 
Quine then claims that, in light of their holistic nature, mathematical and logical claims can 
be revised. Quine even uses the example of quantum mechanics affecting logic that, as I 
explained in §2.3.5, Tarski provided to illustrate his own holistic view. Tarski’s view, then, 
does seem to have influenced Quine, but it took time to gain traction in Quine’s thought. The 
following year, Quine presents this holistic view as an alternative to reductionism when 
Quine presents ‘Two Dogmas’. 
 
 
484 Methods of Logic, (1st draft). xii-xiv. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.109-10. Quine 
makes this link between his view in ‘Two Dogmas’ and Methods of Logic in ‘Reply to 
Geoffrey Hellman’, pp.207-08 
485 Quine’s extension of holistic considerations to logic and mathematics is vital to his 
position in ‘Two Dogmas’. Without making this claim, the epistemological status of 
logical and mathematical statements will require an explanation, and that explanation is 
likely to be that they are analytic. Some philosophers think that Quine had a commitment 
to a narrow-scoped version of holism in work before 1949, according to which logic and 
mathematics are not understood holistically. See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.106-11. For the 
reasons I’ve given elsewhere in this chapter, e.g. §2.3.1, I think that this reading puts too 
much emphasis on Quine having a positive and developed epistemological view in his 
earlier work. That being said, even if it is accurate to view Quine’s early work, at least at 
some point, as involving commitment to a narrow-scoped form of holism, for Quine to 
reach the position he has in ‘Two Dogmas’, he needs holism to be wide-scoped. 
Regardless of how developed or substantial his epistemological views are before 1949, 
Quine does not present this latter view until then. 
486 Methods of Logic, (1st draft). xiv. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.110.  
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In the previous section, we saw that Quine’s patience towards analyticity was wearing thin. 
Quine’s attitude in 1949, on the cusp of ‘Two Dogmas’, continues to follow this trend. For 
example, Quine criticises Lewis’ account of synonymy in terms of ‘having the same criterion 
in mind’ for being “too vague and unempirical.”487 In doing so, Quine is emphasising that 
empiricists, in appealing to unclear semantic notions, are not living up to their own empirical 
standards. 
 
Quine also considers the role of analyticity in a wide range of contexts, such as in the 
Positivistic idea that analytic statements lack a factual component, through the use of 
entailment in the Cambridge analysts, and in modal terms. He then raises Carnap’s use of 
semantical rules and singles this out as the “[m]ost confusing of all”.488 Importantly, 
however, Quine identifies all of these as being “repetitions at best”.489 This shows not only 
that Quine is appreciating that empiricists generally appeal to what I referred to in the 
previous section as the “empirical plus”, but, moreover, it shows that he identifies all of these 
appeals as, roughly, gesturing towards the same thing. In this way, it becomes increasingly 
clear to Quine that analyticity is a dogma in empiricism.  
 
Quine then raises a more general worry for the idea that we can separate the factual and 
linguistic component of a statement. Because of the level of doubt that Quine has about the 
interrelated notions that would make sense of such a distinction, such that he lacks a criterion 
for distinguishing them, he suggests “[m]aybe whole separation of linguistics from factual 
components is groundless metaphor.”490 This provides a picture of our theory of the world in 
which some of our beliefs will be less likely to be rejected, and, in this sense, are true in 
virtue of language. But, also, in this way, they are only seen as being more analytic, rather 
than analytic in a full-bloodied sense. Again, we have a gradualist picture. Quine’s view here 
is close to ‘Two Dogmas’, and the fact that this is the year that Quine’s holism started to 
emerge in his writing seems likely to be a major factor in this close proximity to the views he 
gives in ‘Two Dogmas’. This is also put forward as a proposal, rather than a commitment that 
Quine adopts, and so Quine doesn’t quite seem ready to explore the consequences of a 
holistic view and thereby press further against the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
 
487 ‘Animadversions on the Notion of Meaning’, p.153 
488 Ibid 
489 Ibid. p.154 
490 Ibid 
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Quine’s perspective on behavioural explications of analyticity also takes a more critical turn 
in 1949. Quine stresses, again, that the adequacy of a behavioural criterion for analyticity is 
comparable to: “the field linguist’s implicit behaviouristic criterion of sentencehood”.491 But 
his worry here isn’t merely that such a criterion is missing for analyticity. Quine’s worry is 
the more critical one that it’s missing and philosophers generally are often assuming 
analyticity without even worrying about providing such a clarification. Quine writes: 
 
Curiously, professedly scientific philosophers feel no need of such criterion and are 
even willing to assume absolute concept of analyticity and the rest. 
 
Challenged, they sometimes say: let’s hope for clarification, but meanwhile postulate 
these concepts subject to certain laws which we should require any ultimate 
clarification to realize. 
 
But scientific philosophy is notoriously at a standstill, and maybe the facile postulation 
of improbable concepts is to blame.492 
 
This appears to be an unforgiving passage directed generally towards philosophers who 
cling to analyticity. These are “professedly scientific philosophers” who are failing by 
their own scientific standards, hence ‘professedly’, and Quine stresses that this situation 
leaves “scientific philosophy…notoriously at a standstill”. This shows that Quine thinks 
that the problems that he is raising about analyticity in empiricism are indicative of a 
problem that is responsible for impeding the process of science, as well as a problem that 
isn’t likely to be solved. Quine, then, wants to move away from this standstill in reaction 
to the lack of hope he has about explicating analyticity because he sees it as unscientific to 
cling to a notion like this without such a criterion. 
 
Indeed, Quine’s pessimism is especially notable in the following passage: 
 
 
491 Ibid. p.156 
492 Ibid 
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As a novel experiment in logical empiricism and scientific philosophy, I propose 
talking sense: adhering to terms for which we can fashion at least rough criteria on the 
occasion of using them. Maybe this policy will lead to a clarification of analyticity and 
cognitive synonymy, at least, in terms of degree. Or better, maybe it will steer us away 
from such notions altogether, away from the last vestiges of Aristotelian essentialism. 
 
Maybe there are more fruitful ways of anatomizing the behavior of talking animals, the 
methodology of science. Our chances of falling into such ways could be improved by 
freeing ourselves from the dead hand of entailment, analyticity, and meaning.493 
 
Quine’s view here seems about as negative as it can get. However, he is still partially on the 
fence (he writes: “maybe it will steer us away”, “maybe there are more fruitful ways”, “[o]ur 
chances…could be improved”).  His language is much more definitive in ‘Two Dogmas’. It’s 
not the case, for example, that Quine thinks there that our chances to provide a better picture 
of human behaviour ‘could’ plausibly be improved by avoiding talk of analyticity there. 
Quine’s point in ‘Two Dogmas’ is stronger; we have substantial reasons to avoid such an 
appeal. Once Quine’s holism is presented directly as an alternative to reductionism, even his 
behavioural way of thinking about analyticity will lack the power to cut out a class of truths 
to call analytic; any truth can be unrevisable, and any truth revisable. What this shows is that, 
while it seems clear that Quine appreciates holism in 1949, he doesn’t yet place holism in 
direct opposition to reductionism, and, thereby, stress the irrelevance of pursuing the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. This move is soon to follow. 1949 is a significant year in 
Quine’s development because it is only now, at this relatively late stage, that the pieces of the 
puzzle are properly aligning, even if Quine is still one move away from finishing it. 
 
 
2.3.9 Taking Stock 
 
Let me bring my investigation to a close by summarising my findings. We’ve seen that 
Quine’s appraisal of analyticity both before and within ‘Two Dogmas’ is extensive. More 
specifically, we’ve seen that, while Quine’s overall relationship with analyticity is 
complicated, there is a fairly natural transition from his harbouring doubts concerning the 
 
493 Ibid 
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analytic/synthetic distinction, but with a cautious optimism for the prospect of progress, to his 
dire frustration and pessimism about the outlook of analyticity. Recall from §2.2.2 that I 
identified four vital aspects of Quine’s perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’ in order to guide our 
investigation in §2.3. Here, I will distil the results of the investigation with respect to these 
four markers to help clearly relate his development to the perspective that he has in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. 
 
Let’s start by summarising how the points raised in §2.3 bear on the first aspect of Quine’s 
perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’, i.e. the fact that Quine has the outlook of someone who has 
both a thorough grasp on just how ramified the nature of analyticity is within empiricism, as 
well as confidence that things will not improve on this front. Quine’s earliest work, i.e. as a 
graduate student through to ‘Truth by Convention’, expresses both suggestive thoughts 
concerning the tenability of analyticity, and concerns about its prospects. Fairly early into his 
career, Quine questions the explanatory role of analyticity in some, though not all, contexts. 
For example, we saw this in §2.3.3 in relation to Quine’s claims in the Carnap lectures. Here 
we saw visible tensions between the lack of significance Quine appears to place on 
classifying something as a priori and his admiration for Carnap’s treatment of the a priori. 
Overall, however, I argued that Quine’s attitude is fairly friendly towards analyticity in this 
early period, and it is certainly more optimistic than it is the closer we get to ‘Two Dogmas’. 
Indeed, as I argued in §2.3.2, Quine wrote that meeting Carnap in 1934 satisfied his worries 
about the epistemological status of logic and mathematics. In §2.3.3, I emphasised that Quine 
praises Carnap’s treatment of notions like analyticity and synonymy. Moreover, as I argued 
in §2.3.4, Quine doesn’t even appear to think that his worries against conventionalism are 
sufficient to reject that route of understanding analyticity, at least by 1937, let alone sufficient 
to reject the tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction generally. Quine, throughout the 
1930s, continues to try to explicate analyticity, despite having increasing doubts about 
possible ways of understanding it. 
 
In §2.3.5, I established that, as we move into the 1940s, there are a number of significant 
factors which suggest that Quine was more seriously questioning the plausibility of a strict 
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Plausibly, the most significant of these 
factors is Quine’s strong opposition to Carnap’s switch to an intensional perspective on 
analyticity. Here we find a decisive split between Quine and Carnap, where the prospects of 
reconciliation are bleak. In Quine’s eyes, Carnap’s appeals to analyticity are strongly 
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undermined at this time, however, Quine still lacks a general argument to use against the 
analytic/synthetic distinction within empiricism.  
 
Continuing into this decade, §2.3.6 then established that two important developments in 
Quine’s thought take place by 1945. First, Quine begins to take seriously the idea that 
analyticity can be inter-defined with other semantic notions, e.g. synonymy. As I explained in 
§2.2.2, this is an important part of Quine’s negative attitude towards analyticity in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. Second, Quine realises that, when it comes to analyticity, his methodology differs 
sharply from Carnap’s. I explained that understanding the significance of this contrast helps 
us to see that Quine requires behaviour to have a more robust role in explicating analyticity at 
this time. On both of these points, however, Quine is optimistic about the possibility of 
explicating analyticity, and appears determined to take steps towards an understanding of the 
notion. 
 
By 1946, we see a noticeable dip in Quine’s optimism. In particular, he realises that the 
interrelated nature of analyticity is not a plausible way in which we can understand the 
notion. Here, Quine’s arguments which demonstrate the lack of clarity in the interrelated 
notions are very similar to the ones that he provides in ‘Two Dogmas’. We also see Quine as 
being open to a gradualist account of analyticity until very close to the paper, which contrasts 
with the sharp rejection he has of the distinction there. Quine’s position, then, though 
strongly negative, is not as negative as it would be in ‘Two Dogmas’. Moreover, at this time, 
Quine does not present an alternative form of empiricism. This means that Quine still has 
motivation to fix the notion of analyticity, albeit with an increasingly frustrated outlook. This 
attitude typifies Quine’s perspective until 1949, when Quine’s frustration is close to boiling 
point. By this point, Quine is certainly reacting negatively to a dogma that is prevalent in 
empiricism, but he has a shred of determination to overcome the problem; determination that 
he would soon lose.  
 
Let us now move on to the second important aspect of Quine’s perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’, 
i.e. his desire to be scientific when it comes to philosophical notions. Throughout §2.3, we’ve 
seen that an important part of Quine’s appraisal of analyticity and its associated notions is 
that attempts to clarify them are either sharpened scientifically or rejected for scientific 
reasons. Quine is trying to be more scientifically rigorous than other empiricists in providing 
an empirically adequate perspective on analyticity. For example, in §2.3.1, I explained that, 
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as early as Quine’s graduate work, he claimed to be reacting to suspicions about semantics 
understood in mentalistic terms. While I argued that the parallel that Quine draws doesn’t 
show that he had worries about analyticity in his graduate work, it does show that, in both 
cases, Quine is emphasising the need to be scientifically objective by being clear about the 
identity criteria of the notions involved. This link between extensionality and analyticity 
becomes much more direct when, as discussed in §2.3.5, Quine despairs at Carnap’s move 
towards an intensional treatment of analyticity. 
 
Moreover, a fairly consistent way in which we saw Quine emphasising the importance of 
empirical criteria for semantic notions was in his insistence for behavioural characterisations 
of the analytic. This appears early in Quine’s work. For example, we see it in ‘Truth By 
Convention’, where Quine focusses on a bare characterisation of the set of sentences that we 
firmly accept. I argued that, in his early work, this behavioural characterisation constitutes a 
minimal standard for Quine to make sense of analyticity, from which more substantial ways 
of explicating the notion could be added. This behavioural perspective then appears to 
develop into something more substantial when Quine stresses that he views artificial 
languages as parts of natural language, which, ultimately, have to be made sense of in 
empirical terms. In this way, Quine’s emphasis on an understanding of behaviour becomes 
more demanding and weighted. Additionally, in §2.3.8, we clearly see Quine’s worries about 
the unscientific nature of the empiricist’s appeal to analyticity when he emphasises that such 
appeals have halted the progress of philosophy. In such a way, it becomes increasingly clear 
to Quine that empiricists are generally appealing to analyticity without a clear understanding 
of what it amounts to by those very standards that empiricists are meant to employ. In other 
words, it becomes increasingly clear to Quine that the analytic/synthetic distinction is a 
dogma of modern empiricism; it is “a metaphysical article of faith”.494 
   
Let us now move to the third facet of Quine’s perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’. In §2.2.2, I 
stressed that to understand Quine’s perspective here, it is misleading to focus on the paper as 
being significant because it marks Quine’s decisive break from Carnap. Rather, Quine really 
is reacting generally to what he thinks are fairly dogmatic views within empiricism.495 What 
 
494 ‘Two Dogmas’, p.37 
495 Lugg has also emphasised that ‘Two Dogmas’ is more generally about the place of 
analyticity within empiricism, but he doesn’t present this as a way of softening reading the 
paper as being about Carnap. Lugg claims that seeing ‘Two Dogmas’ as being focussed on 
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we’ve seen in §2.3 strongly supports this idea, and it shows that this is a perspective that 
Quine gradually builds towards. The picture of Quine’s development that I’ve provided 
shows that Quine moves from his more narrowly focussed evaluation of analyticity in 
Carnap’s work towards an evaluation of analyticity more generally. From the moment that 
Quine travels to Europe to meet Carnap, as discussed in §2.3.2, until slightly into the 1940s, 
Quine’s engagement with analyticity is primarily engagement with Carnapian variants of the 
notion. However, the further into the 1940s we get, the less Quine’s focus is on Carnap’s 
views specifically, and the more it is focussed on the notion of analyticity at work in 
empiricism generally. 
 
Indeed, by 1946, Quine comes to continually stress that analyticity is a prevalent notion in 
empiricism generally, and he engages with the notion as used in a wide range of views. 
Aided by the preparation for his Hume lectures, he also develops a historically informed 
perspective on empiricism. That is, he appreciates the historical context of the distinction 
which then leads to analyticity taking root amongst the philosophers that he is engaging 
with. Quine’s own worries with analyticity are then pushed against this general and deeply 
entrenched target. By this point, Quine is not merely concerned with the question of what 
analyticity does for someone like Carnap, but, rather, he is concerned with the more 
fundamental question of where the distinction takes root in the tradition of empiricism and 
why it still lingers. It becomes increasingly clear to Quine, through these considerations, 
that analyticity is a prevalent dogma in empiricism.  
 
Finally, concerning holism, I stressed that, from a remarkably early stage, Quine presents 
views that are indicative of understanding inquiry holistically. Crucially, however, I argued 
that there are important limits on how seriously we should interpret these signs. In particular, 
Quine’s relatively naïve and underdeveloped positive views on epistemology make it highly 
unlikely that analyticity is in too much trouble at many stages of his earlier development. 
Moreover, in §2.3.5, I stressed that despite it being very plausible that Quine became aware 
of Tarski’s holistic views in the early 1940s, which bear close parallels to Quine’s view in 
‘Two Dogmas’, such influence takes time to gain sufficient traction in Quine’s thought.  
 
 
empiricism generally is important because it therefore shouldn’t be surprising that rationalists 
aren’t persuaded by its arguments. Lugg, A. 2012. p.234 
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Indeed, it is certainly not the case that Quine presents an alternative holistic conception of 
epistemology in his own work until relatively late. Even if Quine’s views are suggestive of 
holistic thoughts, Quine doesn’t embrace these thoughts and present them as directly opposed 
to an epistemological outlook that places value in the analytic/synthetic distinction. Rather, 
Quine is approaching epistemology from the other side, where the need for such a distinction 
is felt, despite Quine’s increasing doubts. This seems to characterise Quine’s position from 
approximately the Carnap lectures right up until 1948. If Quine had sufficient appreciation of 
holism during this early period, it would be extremely unlikely that he would feel so torn 
about the prospects of analyticity. As I discussed in §2.3.8, we finally see Quine’s holistic 
outlook appear in 1949, and he uses it to explain away the seeming necessity of logic and 
mathematics. Quine’s view at this time is very close to that in ‘Two Dogmas’, but he doesn’t 
quite seem ready to acquiesce in a holistic view and present it in direct conflict with the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. Quine needs confidence in holism to challenge the “more 
basic” dogma, i.e. reductionism.496 Attacking where the analytic/synthetic distinction takes 
root is a deeper way to challenge the distinction, and it’s an attack that Quine doesn’t seem to 
make until ‘Two Dogmas’. That being said, it appears that the parts of Quine’s position in 
‘Two Dogmas’ are all there, they merely need time to coalesce.  
 
Quine stresses that the second dogma, reductionism, is “the real villain in the piece”.497 The 
reason for this, as I explained in §2.2.2, is that reductionism is the dominant then-
contemporary view that leads to the need for an analytic/synthetic distinction within 
empiricism. Quine’s challenge to this general position in ‘Two Dogmas’ is to stress that the 
way in which it conceives of the relation between evidence and theory is incorrect. 
Appreciating holism shows reductionism to be wrong and this then also removes the drive for 
an analytic/synthetic distinction in the first place, given that we can explain the seemingly 
special features of logical and mathematical truths without needing analyticity. As Quine puts 
it shortly after ‘Two Dogmas’, from his perspective “to legitimize an analyticity concept is 
not even an agendum”.498 
 
I’ve argued that Quine is not in a position to issue this specific challenge to this general set of 
views until near the end of his journey towards ‘Two Dogmas’. This makes sense of the fact 
 
496 ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, p.180 
497 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.104 f3 
498 Quine to Goodman, 1953. Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.106 f7 
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that Quine’s reflections on ‘Two Dogmas’ suggest that he only seems to have appreciated 
that analyticity “is not even an agendum” after giving explication a decent shot. Quine writes: 
“I now perceive that the philosophically important question about analyticity and the 
linguistic doctrine of logical truth is not how to explicate them; it is the question rather of 
their relevance to epistemology”.499 As we’ve seen throughout this chapter, much of Quine’s 
early work lacks this perspective; legitimizing analyticity is a major agendum in Quine’s 
early work, even while his doubts about the respectability of the notion grow and his 
optimism fades. The absence of holism is felt in Quine’s push for analyticity to be rendered 
acceptable. 
 
That being said, recall that, in 1949, Quine writes that “[c]uriously, professedly scientific 
philosophers feel no need of such criterion [for analyticity] and are even willing to assume 
[the] absolute concept of analyticity and the rest.”500 Such an approach does not seem to fit 
Quine’s overall attitude to analyticity, even from very early on, and this makes his position 
distinctive. Quine does not postulate analyticity freely and put it to use on the assumption 
that its details can be filled out later. Even in his more optimistic days, Quine is always 
cautious when it comes to the notion. 
 
Putting all of this together, the investigation into the evolution of Quine’s attitude towards 
analyticity shows that the claim that Quine’s doubts about analyticity had existed in some 
form for a long time before ‘Two Dogmas’ is misleading. Understanding the true nature of 
Quine’s challenge to an epistemology that places value on the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
as well as the nature of Quine’s development, requires cautious analysis. The multifaceted 
nature of Quine’s challenge to analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’, and the complexity of his 
development towards the perspective that he occupies when he makes this challenge, shows 
that, while it’s true in some sense that Quine’s doubts about analyticity were present very 
early in his work, this claim requires careful qualification. How we make sense of these 
considerations in relation to the emergence of Quine’s naturalism will be the focus of the next 
section. 
 
 
 
499 ‘Reply to Geoffrey Hellman’, p.207. See also Lugg, A. 2012. p.233 
500 ‘Animadversions on the Notion of Meaning’, p.153 
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2.4 ‘Two Dogmas’ and Naturalism 
 
Let us return to the problem which motivated the investigation in §2.3. Recall that the issue 
was that, while ‘Two Dogmas’ is often seen as important for Quine’s development towards 
naturalism, there were reasons for thinking that the paper did not represent a substantial 
change in Quine’s attitude. More specifically, there were reasons for thinking that Quine’s 
attitude towards analyticity in the paper wasn’t new. If Quine’s attitude doesn’t go through a 
substantial change in ‘Two Dogmas’, then it seemed unlikely that it could represent an 
important step in the direction of naturalism. In §2.3, however, I argued that the idea that 
Quine’s doubts towards analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ were not new is only true if understood 
in a heavily qualified way.  
 
So far, then, I’ve established that the idea that ‘Two Dogmas’ could be important for the 
development of naturalism is not undermined. The paper involves Quine’s decisive rejection 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction, a perspective that Quine hasn’t adopted until ‘Two 
Dogmas’, and it is this specifically that is often thought to be vital to Quine’s move to 
naturalism. This means that the chronological picture that I’ve established in Chapter 1 no 
longer seems muddled or murky. To return to that picture, recall that Chapter 1 established 
that Quine is not a naturalist before 1951, and that, shortly after this point, we find Quine’s 
naturalistic outlook in operation when he rejects phenomenalism. This leaves just enough 
room for ‘Two Dogmas’ to play a crucial role in the emergence of naturalism. Let me end 
this chapter, then, by offering some suggestions about the significance that ‘Two Dogmas’ 
has for the emergence of naturalism to add further details to the picture that has been 
provided.501 
 
501 In viewing Quine’s rejection of the epistemological significance of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction as important for his development towards naturalism, one might worry that this 
claim sits uneasily with the fact that, in later work, Quine includes a notion of analyticity in 
his positive epistemology. See, for example, The Roots of Reference, pp.78-80, Pursuit of 
Truth, p.55, Word and Object, p.66. In particular, this development might appear to threaten 
pushing Quine back to a less sophisticated stage in his development, before naturalism 
emerges. However, while Quine thinks his later account of analyticity does justice to certain 
intuitions that we have about why some truths are true, he is also clear that his point of 
contention in ‘Two Dogmas’ still stands. He writes: “…my reservations over analyticity are 
the same as ever, and they concern the tracing of any demarcation, even a vague and 
approximate one, across the domain of sentences in general.” (‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, 
p.396) Quine’s naturalistic notion of analyticity doesn’t lead to a sharp analytic/synthetic 
distinction, nor does it uncover a significant difference in kind between two types of 
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In §2.2.1, I explained that Quine’s own negativity about ‘Two Dogmas’ was largely down to 
the paper’s negative contribution to knowledge. That is to say, Quine thinks that the 
argument in the paper is substantially negative, rather than constructive, and that what it does 
offer as a positive replacement for an epistemology with an analytic/synthetic distinction is 
very bare. Quine stresses this very strongly. For example, we see this in a letter from Quine 
to Paul Weiss, where he describes his positive contribution in ‘Two Dogmas’ as: “[t]he 
tentative conjecture that epistemology might develop more fruitfully under some very 
different sort of conceptualization, which I do not provide.”502 Moreover, in papers just after 
‘Two Dogmas’, Quine stresses the vagueness and metaphorical nature of his view, and his 
hope to sharpen it.503 
 
While the details of Quine’s positive outlook may be lacking in ‘Two Dogmas’, this should 
not downgrade the significance that the views expressed in this paper have for Quine’s 
development. As I made clear in §2.3, Quine’s perspective does undergo a substantial change 
in the paper. Namely, Quine is setting out, albeit briefly and metaphorically, an alternative 
conception of epistemology which both rids him of the pull towards analyticity, after his long 
struggle with trying to accommodate the notion satisfactorily, and sets him at odds with a 
wide group of empiricists. This, in itself, is a significant development.  
 
The important question, then, is whether this substantial development is a substantial 
development in relation to the emergence of naturalism.504 Good evidence that this is the case 
can be seen if we reflect on the way that Quine characterises the important changes that have 
occurred within empiricism that lead to naturalism. In later work, Quine often orients 
 
statements. In this way, Quine’s naturalistic variant of analyticity is not an epistemologically 
substantial notion, and it does not resurrect the dogma of the empiricists that Quine was 
reacting to in ‘Two Dogmas’. 
502 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.97. Emphasis added.  
503 ‘The Present State of Empiricism’, pp.184-85. ‘Mr. Strawson and Logical Theory’, p.139. 
It’s worth stressing that Quine does begin to unpack the metaphorical view that he provides 
near the end of ‘Two Dogmas’. In addition to briefly outlining the holistic nature of the 
evidential relation, Quine explains the necessity that we feel about certain truths in terms of 
their germaneness to experience. This is Quine clarifying what it means for sentences to vary 
in distance from the experiential boundary. See ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.43-4 
504 Philosophers often link Quine’s commitment to holism to his naturalism, although often 
they do so in very different ways. See, for example, Isaac, J. 2005. pp.211-12. Gibson, R. 
1988. p.24. Kemp, G. 2006. p.28. 2012. pp.57-8 
 
 
161 
naturalism within the empiricist tradition by outlining five milestones in which empiricism 
has improved. He writes: 
 
In the past two centuries there have been five points where empiricism has taken a turn 
for the better. The first is the shift from ideas to words. The second is the shift of 
semantic focus from terms to sentences. The third is the shift of semantic focus from 
sentences to systems of sentences. The fourth is, in Morton White’s phrase, 
methodological monism: abandonment of the analytic-synthetic dualism. The fifth is 
naturalism: abandonment of the goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science.505 
 
Most of these milestones bear directly on Quine’s outlook in ‘Two Dogmas’. There, Quine 
explains the limitations that forms of empiricism focussed on ideas have (e.g. those of the 
British empiricists) and stresses that a significant step forward is the move to focus, first, on 
words, and, second, on sentences. This brings him to the main target in his paper, i.e. 
verificationism.506 In other words, empiricism, as Quine was reacting to it in 1951, was at the 
second stage of this developmental picture. The third stage, “shift of semantic focus from 
sentences to systems of sentences”, is holism. In ‘Two Dogmas’, then, in presenting his 
holism against verificationism, Quine crosses an important boundary which brings him one 
milestone closer to naturalism. 
 
The next question to ask, of course, is how this third step (i.e. holism) relates to the fourth 
step (i.e. methodological monism). Their relation appears to be very close, for Quine writes: 
“[t]he fourth move, to methodological monism, follows closely on this holism.”507 Quine’s 
characterisation of methodological monism is very brief. He writes that from the perspective 
of methodological monism: “[t]he organizing role that was supposedly the role of analytic 
statements is now seen as shared by sentences generally, and the empirical content that was 
supposedly peculiar to synthetic sentences is now seen as diffused through the system.”508 
What leads to such an outlook is that one realises that the analytic/synthetic distinction is 
untenable via appreciating holism. Quine says this much when he writes that “[h]olism blurs 
the supposed contrast between the synthetic sentence, with its empirical content, and the 
 
505 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.67 
506 ‘Two Dogmas’, pp.37-42. See also ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.70 
507 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.71 
508 Ibid, p.72 
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analytic sentence, with its null content.”509 This shows just how close the third and fourth 
steps of Quine’s empiricist development are. That is, methodological monism is merely the 
result of taking seriously the holistic nature of empirical content. Having a sufficient 
appreciation of holism shows that the supposed duality between the analytic and the synthetic 
cannot be maintained, i.e. it shows us that our perspective should be one of methodological 
monism. As I explained in §2.2.2, this seems to characterise the state that Quine finds himself 
in during ‘Two Dogmas’, and so, by this time, naturalism appears to be close to Quine’s 
reach. 
 
Finally, we need to make sense of the gap between methodological monism and the fifth 
stage of empiricism’s development, i.e. naturalism. Quine writes that one of the two sources 
of naturalism is realising that reductionism isn’t going to work for theoretical sentences 
generally. He stresses that “[a] holistic or system-centred attitude should suffice to induce 
this despair.”510 Accordingly, it seems that, by ‘Two Dogmas’, this first source should be 
attained through Quine’s understanding of the consequences of holism for the prospects of 
reductionism. Quine lacks this appreciation in his earlier work and attains this perspective by 
‘Two Dogmas’, as established in §2.3. Thus, it looks like there was some obstacle in the way 
of the emergence of naturalism that is then cleared away by Quine’s argument in ‘Two 
Dogmas’. The gap between holism, methodological monism, and naturalism, starts to be 
crossed in ‘Two Dogmas’. 
 
However, this isn’t the whole story. We can see that a further obstacle remains if we focus on 
the second source of naturalism that Quine identifies. Quine writes that “[t]he other negative 
source of naturalism is unregenerate realism, the robust state of mind of the natural scientist 
who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science.”511 
Recall that in Chapter 1 I explained how this attitude typifies Quine’s naturalistic outlook, 
and, crucially, that this attitude is strictly lacking in Quine’s earlier work. The reason for this 
is that Quine is open to forms of inquiry, until at least 1951, that place value on theorising 
that is epistemologically prior to science. To be clear, while Quine might reject 
phenomenalistic reductionism in ‘Two Dogmas’, Quine has not ruled out phenomenalism 
wholesale. During this time, Quine thinks that something like sense-data can be viewed as 
 
509 Ibid. p.71 
510 Ibid. p.72 
511 ‘Ibid 
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more real than the posits that are found within science. Something, then, is stopping Quine 
from having access to the second source of naturalism in 1951.  
 
Now, the next important question to consider is the question of what leads Quine to 
acquire an attitude of “unregenerate realism”. What appears to lead Quine to this outlook 
is the same thing that leads him to the first source of naturalism, that is, taking holism 
seriously. As I explained above, taking holism seriously is what leads to methodological 
monism. Fully appreciating methodological monism has the consequence that our 
theorising becomes blurred together in vital ways. Methodological monism is 
characterised, as seen above, as “abandonment of the analytic-synthetic dualism”, and 
Quine writes that his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction involves a rejection of 
“the tracing of any demarcation, even a vague and approximate one, across the domain of 
sentences in general.”512 Crucially, this realisation constrains philosophical inquiry for 
Quine. As Verhaegh explains, an indirect effect of methodological monism is that it 
challenges the way in which the philosophy/science divide is often carved:  
 
…in blurring the boundary between matters of fact and matters of language, Quine 
indirectly challenged the supposed boundary between science (conceived of as the 
study of fact) and philosophy (conceived of as the study of meaning) that has 
dominated analytic philosophy for decades…513 
 
Indeed, Quine makes this clear when he claims that Auguste Comte was already a 
representative of naturalism. The reason for this, Quine explains, is that Comte “declared 
that “positive philosophy” does not differ in method from the special sciences.”514 So, 
abstracting from this particular case to speaking about our theorising more generally, 
taking methodological monism seriously has two vital consequences. Positively, it allows 
us to make sense of the idea that our theorising belongs to our overall scientific theory.515 
Negatively, it shows that we can’t make sense of the idea that there is some distinctly 
philosophical perspective on science, or, more particularly, on notions like reality and 
 
512 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.396 
513 Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.104 
514 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.72 
515 We see this sort of picture in ‘Two Dogmas’, when Quine introduces his holistic picture of 
inquiry as involving a wide conception of science. Geography, history, atomic physics, and 
pure mathematics are all included. p.42 
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evidence. That is, taking methodological monism seriously leads one to an outlook that 
appears to be, for all intents and purposes, naturalistic.  
 
This is a vital effect of methodological monism for Quine’s development because the first 
philosophical form of phenomenalism that Quine was open to in his earlier work required 
that there be a substantial demarcation within our theorising, i.e. between science and that 
which is epistemologically prior to science, or between claims about reality as made 
within science and claims about reality that transcend science. But, according to 
methodological monism, there are no sharp boundaries like this to be hoped for. That is, 
there are no boundaries from which the claims of philosophy, as distinct from science, 
could be built upon. Methodological monism, in appreciating how thoroughly empirical 
content is “diffused through the system” of science, has the effect of blurring the 
prominent demarcations that are drawn in philosophy from which the coherence of first 
philosophical inquiry relies. On such an outlook, there is no way to characterise something 
like sense-data as epistemologically prior to science.516 It’s true that Quine is wary of 
distinctions like this before the early 1950s, but Quine now has a principled reason to 
think that the distinction doesn’t hold weight, reached indirectly by taking holism 
seriously. 
 
Good evidence that this realisation comes quick to Quine is that, soon after ‘Two 
Dogmas’, Quine relates his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, i.e. 
methodological monism, to the development of his ontological view. Quine writes in 1951 
that it’s “[i]nstructive to see that the prob. of analytic & the prob. of the nature of 
ontological issues are one.”517 In particular, he relates his methodologically monistic 
perspective to the idea that scientific and metaphysical posits are on the same footing. As 
Quine puts it in ‘On Carnap’s Views on Ontology’: “[o]ntological questions…end up on a 
par with questions of natural science.”518 In 1952, as I explained in §1.4.2, we see Quine 
explain that sense-data and physical objects are both part of our ongoing scientific theory 
and, consequently, he rejects the idea that sense-data can be prior to science. 
 
516 Similarly, philosophers also often see Quine’s holism as undermining the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction. Philosophical truths, as a priori, cannot be separated from scientific, a 
posteriori, truths. See Haack, S. 1993. pp.338-39. Stroud, B. 1996. p.46. Lugg, A. 2012. 
p.234 
517 ‘Response to Bergmann’, p.186 
518 p.211 
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Putting all of this together, in 1951, Quine hasn’t quite got a sufficient grasp on his holistic 
picture of inquiry, and the methodological monism it leads to. After all, Quine is negative 
about the status of ‘Two Dogmas’ because he doesn’t think it provides an alternative 
conception of epistemology. On the face of it, this seems strange. What Quine has offered is 
very basic and metaphorical, but it is substantive enough to show that modern empiricists are 
chasing after a desire they need not have. However, it’s not strange when one appreciates that 
Quine is still grappling with the problem of epistemological priority at this time. That is, he 
has not rejected the idea that the phenomenalist’s conceptual scheme is epistemologically 
prior to science. A holistic version of empiricism is at odds with this constraint, and so Quine 
is, at least in some sense, torn between two paths. It’s not until approximately 1952 that 
Quine appreciates that sense-data are part of scientific positing too because the idea of them 
being epistemologically prior to science is illegitimate. And, it’s only then that Quine finally 
rejects phenomenalism outright. Hence, it’s only slightly later than ‘Two Dogmas’ that Quine 
confidently takes seriously the alternative conception of epistemology that he puts forward in 
the paper, and, crucially, this allows him to reach the second source of naturalism. 
 
Perhaps, then, this makes sense of the rather extreme nature of Quine’s negativity towards 
‘Two Dogmas’. Recall from §2.2.1 that Quine writes, typifying the attitude explained above: 
“I had not thought to look on my strictures over analyticity as the stuff of revolution. It was 
mere criticism, a negative point with no suggestion of a bright replacement.”519 ‘Two 
Dogmas’ presents an alternative conception of epistemology, albeit a bare one, that is used 
with enough conviction that Quine presents it as showing that two dogmas of empiricism are 
misplaced. In this way, it seems to provide more than “mere criticism”, however, the fact that 
Quine was also grappling with the tension in his outlook concerning both accepting the 
consequences of holism while not having rejected phenomenalism illustrates a reason that 
Quine might not have felt so sure of the position he’d advanced. Revolution may have been 
in the air in ‘Two Dogmas’, but Quine may not have been quite ready to overthrow 
phenomenalism.  
 
These reflections suggest that the spaces between holism, methodological monism, and 
naturalism are not so much gaps, but, rather, they are periods where Quine’s confidence 
 
519 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.393. 
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grows, and he thinks carefully through the consequences of the developments taking place 
within his outlook. Quine claims that between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object he was 
concerned with unpacking the metaphor of our theory of the world being like a web of 
belief.520 What we’ve seen suggests that Quine still needed a little bit more time to unpack 
this metaphor after ‘Two Dogmas’ in order to see that the consequences of this view 
undermine both the reductionist’s appeal to analyticity and, more generally, the coherence of 
the phenomenalist’s appeal to epistemological priority. By 1951, phenomenalism was a fairly 
entrenched thorn in Quine’s paw. However, it seems that, in the time that it took him to 
remove it, he had managed to walk the road to naturalism. 
 
In this chapter, I have undertaken an investigation into the development of Quine’s evolving 
views on analyticity in order to better understand their nature and significance, including 
their relation to the development of naturalism. I began, in §2.2.1, by motivating this project. 
To do this, I first provided reasons for thinking that Quine’s problems with analyticity in 
‘Two Dogmas’ are vital for the development of naturalism. I then highlighted two factors 
which cast doubt on the idea that Quine undergoes a significant change in his attitude in the 
paper. To aid my investigation, in §2.2.2, I isolated four crucial features the perspective 
Quine occupies in ‘Two Dogmas’. This investigation, carried out in §2.3, found that Quine’s 
views towards analyticity evolve in a complex but fairly natural way from optimistic 
beginnings to dismal pessimism. Crucially, I argued that Quine’s perspective in ‘Two 
Dogmas’ is distinctive in that it involves him presenting a holistic picture of inquiry in direct 
opposition to verificationism, and so, in turn, to the analytic/synthetic distinction. This 
showed that the idea that Quine had doubts about analyticity long before ‘Two Dogmas’ is 
only true in a carefully qualified way. I then ended the chapter, in §2.4, by offering some 
thoughts about why ‘Two Dogmas’ is significant for Quine’s development towards 
naturalism. 
 
  
 
520 ‘Replies’, p.180 
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Chapter 3 
Untangling Empiricism and Naturalism 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
So far, we’ve seen a number of important developments that Quine’s philosophy undergoes 
on his journey to naturalism. In Chapter 1, I argued that Quine is not always a naturalist 
because he’s tolerant of forms of theorising that are first philosophical until, approximately, 
1952. In Chapter 2, I argued that Quine’s attitude towards analyticity gets continually more 
critical, but that, crucially, Quine is only significantly close to an outlook that is naturalistic 
relatively late into the period of his early work. The fact that Quine is not always a naturalist 
combined with the fact that it takes him time to develop towards a position that is naturalistic 
undermines the idea that Quine’s naturalism is the systematic centre of gravity in his overall 
philosophy. To understand Quine’s overall philosophy, then, we need to understand Quine in 
a different and more complex light. In what remains of this thesis, I will lay the foundations 
for such an understanding by turning my attention to one of Quine’s most notable 
philosophical commitments, i.e. his commitment to empiricism.521  
 
As I explained in the Introduction, one area in which Quine’s influence is generally taken to 
be foundational is in epistemology. Naturalism appears to have taken root in contemporary 
epistemology and Quine, the preeminent naturalist, is often cited as the central influence on 
this movement. However, if the scope of Quine’s naturalism has been generally exaggerated, 
then in order to properly assess Quine’s influence on contemporary naturalistic epistemology, 
we need to be very careful about how we relate Quine’s views to these positions. That is, if 
Quine was not always a naturalist, then we need a careful understanding of how Quine’s 
naturalism and his empiricism relate to one another before we can assess Quine’s legacy in 
contemporary epistemology.  
 
 
521 Interestingly, attempts to understand Quine’s empiricism often focus on his distinctive 
naturalistic variant of empiricism and pay little attention to Quine’s empiricist views before 
naturalism. See, for example, Kemp, G. 2012. pp.24-7. Gibson, R. 1988. Especially Chapter 
2. Kemp, G. 2006. Chapter 4  
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As we’ve seen, Quine’s empiricism undergoes a significant reorientation in the early 1950s. 
Quine describes the period between ‘Two Dogmas’ and Word and Object as him becoming 
“more consciously and explicitly naturalistic”, and it’s during this period that we see Quine 
shift from considering phenomenalism as a viable (though not exclusively viable) 
epistemology and towards accepting an epistemology that focusses on our physical interface 
with the external world in strictly scientific and naturalistic terms.522 Now, one interesting 
feature of this transition is that Quine’s growing confidence in naturalism leads him to 
present his view in strong contrast to more traditional forms of empiricism, especially 
phenomenalism. This gives the impression that Quine’s move to a naturalistic form of 
empiricism involves a radical shift in his empiricist outlook. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this has 
also led to Quine’s naturalized epistemology being interpreted as involving such a shift. Roth, 
for example, writes: “Quine’s writings advocate a paradigm shift in epistemology — a 
change in methods, problems, and standards previously invoked in the subject.”523 
 
In this chapter, I will provide a thorough analysis of the subtle and complex relationship 
between the different forms of empiricism that Quine both considers and engages with 
throughout his career. Conducting such an analysis, I take it, will illuminate the 
distinctiveness of Quine’s naturalized epistemology in contrast to the traditional forms of 
empiricism that it is presented as reacting to, and it will do so in such a way that coheres with 
the findings of Chapters 1 and 2.  
 
To do this, I focus on important facets of both Quine’s naturalistic empiricism and the 
traditional empiricist views, and I investigate the way in which Quine’s naturalized 
epistemology evolves out of his engagement with these traditional forms of empiricism. §3.2 
begins by establishing a minimal but common thread which connects the various 
instantiations of empiricism that Quine engages with at numerous points throughout his work. 
In §3.3, I then consider what underlies Quine’s commitment to empiricism. I establish that 
Quine has a distinctive and principled reason for being an empiricist as a naturalist. I then 
explain that this route does not appear to be open to the more traditional empiricist. In 
particular, worries about circularity preclude such an empiricist from taking the naturalistic 
stance. I end the section by providing some speculative remarks concerning what, if anything, 
 
522 ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.398 
523 Roth, P. 1990. p.100 
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underlies the early Quine’s commitment to empiricism prior to the emergence of his 
naturalism.  
 
Following this, in §3.4, I establish that as a naturalist, Quine has no problem embracing the 
circularity in his view of the relationship between philosophy and science. This shows that 
epistemology, for the naturalist, is an inquiry that takes place within science. Accordingly, in 
§3.5, I identify the precise scientific location of naturalized epistemological inquiry, i.e. I 
argue that such inquiry takes place in the philosophical periphery of psychological theorising. 
Identification of this fact requires an understanding of the aspirations of naturalized 
epistemology. To this end, I compare the aims of the different forms of empiricism that 
Quine engages with, and I establish that this comparison unveils a further commonality 
between them, namely, that they are all concerned with investigating the relationship between 
science and its evidence. Importantly, however, I highlight that each form of empiricism 
approaches this relationship in a unique way. Finally, §3.6 considers and makes sense of the 
speculative nature of naturalized epistemology. I do so by, first, establishing the naturalist’s 
perspective on traditional scepticism (§3.6.1), and, second, identifying that the key 
motivation of the naturalized epistemologist’s project is to address a naturalistically 
legitimate sceptical worry (§3.6.2). The speculative nature of naturalized epistemology, then, 
is purposeful and warranted insofar as a speculative approach is sufficient in order to address 
the problem at the heart of naturalized epistemology. I then summarise the findings of these 
discussions in order to deliver a more nuanced understanding of Quine’s commitment to 
empiricism. 
 
 
3.2 Connecting Empiricisms 
 
Let me begin by addressing an important issue. That is, in focussing on the fact that 
Quine’s naturalistic empiricism emerges in response to traditional forms of empiricism, 
including the form of phenomenalism that he was open to in his early work, one might 
worry that this diverse range of positions is so disparate that the positions are 
fundamentally disconnected from one another. In other words, one might worry that in 
discussing this diverse group of theories, we’re not really talking about views that warrant 
treatment under the same heading, i.e. empiricism. Indeed, there is a more general worry 
here, namely, that it is mistaken to think that the history of empiricism marks a distinct 
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and traceable trend throughout the timeline of philosophical thought.524 When we look 
closely, empiricists often have significant differences between their views. In this way, 
empiricism is like naturalism. Quine even suggests this himself when he writes: “I would 
certainly consider myself an empiricist (that’s so broad as not to say much)”.525 So, while 
a commitment to empiricism by itself might not say much, the important question to ask at 
this stage of our inquiry is whether it says enough such that we can link together the forms 
of empiricism that we are concerned with. 
 
Fortuitously, Quine does think that there is a link. Namely, Quine thinks that traditional 
epistemologists were right about one vital thing, i.e. that all of our information about the 
world ultimately comes from sensory experience. Quine makes this clear when he writes 
that “[t]he crucial insight of empiricism is that any evidence for science has its end points 
in the senses.”526 This is a minimal but central commitment that is held across the range of 
empiricist theories that we are concerned with here. In this way, Quine characterises it as 
“the watchword of empiricism”, or the “empiricist manifesto”.527  
 
Now, not only are there many important differences between the forms of empiricism that 
concern us in this chapter, but there are also precise and important differences between the 
ways in which these forms of empiricism understand the above empiricist creed. In the 
following sections, I will explain these differences. But, in order to provide a framework 
for this discussion, it is vital to have established the above point since it shows that 
whatever differences there are between these forms of empiricism, they are still, in a 
minimal sense at least, forms of the same type of view. That is, they are all legitimate 
forms of empiricism as Quine understands the view.  
 
 
3.3 Validating Empiricism 
 
 
524 See Richardson, A. 1997. p.164 
525 ‘Philosophy’, p.36 
526 ‘On Mental Entities’, p.225. See also ‘Epistemology Naturalized’: “whatever evidence 
there is for science is sensory evidence”. p.75 
527 Pursuit of Truth, p.19. From Stimulus to Science, p.4. See also pp.4-6 
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Now that we have established what Quine takes the central commitment of empiricism to be, 
let us consider why the empiricist thinks that this claim should be accepted. In this section, I 
establish that Quine has a principled and distinctive argument for accepting empiricism as a 
naturalist. I then explain that the traditional non-naturalistic forms of empiricism seem unable 
to appeal to this argument. We will see that this difference both illuminates an interesting 
feature of Quine’s naturalized epistemology and prompts investigation into further distinctive 
aspects of the view. Furthermore, if Quine is not a naturalist in his early work, but still 
maintains a commitment to empiricism, then this raises the question of what, if anything, 
underlies his earlier acceptance of empiricism. I end this section by offering some thoughts 
about why Quine has a firm commitment to empiricism so early in his development. 
 
Let me explain Quine’s naturalistic validation of empiricism. Recall from §1.3 that for the 
naturalist there is no higher standard of truth than the standard met by the truths which 
emerge within our ongoing scientific theory. For example, there is no sense in which truth 
can be understood in a distinctly philosophical way, nor is there a way in which the claims 
of science could be supposed to aim to correspond to what is really the case beyond what 
science could tell us. Science evolves, and through this process we might change our 
minds about what is reckoned to be true, but there is no higher authority that the naturalist 
can appeal to in order to attain truth about the nature of the world. Truth, in this way, is 
immanent to science. 
 
Accordingly, for Quine as a naturalist, the truth of empiricism is also an immanent truth of 
our ongoing scientific theory. More precisely, it is by reflecting on our nature as physical 
objects within a scientific investigation of the world, including an investigation into the 
origins of our knowledge about the world, that we discover the empirical nature of the 
input that human organisms have. Quine stresses this point continually once his 
naturalistic view emerges. For example, he writes: 
 
Now how is it that we know that our knowledge must depend thus solely on 
surface irritation and internal conditions? Only because we know in a general 
way what the world is like, with its light rays, molecules, men, retinas and so 
on. It is thus our very understanding of the physical world, fragmentary 
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though that understanding be, that enables us to see how limited the evidence 
is on which that understanding is predicated.528 
 
In this way, Quine’s naturalistic outlook validates empiricism. That is, the naturalist 
always works within science, and science tells us that empiricism is true. The naturalist, 
therefore, accepts empiricism because it is a truth of science. In this way, Quine 
characterises the truth of empiricism as being “a prime specimen of naturalized 
epistemology”.529 
 
Moreover, because naturalism insists that we always work within science, we can make 
sense of why Quine’s naturalistic outlook does not appeal to other possible sources of 
information that might be seen to inform our theory of the world, such as telepathy or 
divine revelation. We see this when Quine writes: “there remains a fact — a fact of 
science itself — that science is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory 
stimulation to stimulation; there is no extrasensory perception.”530 This is an 
underappreciated normative aspect of Quine’s naturalized epistemology.531 That is, 
positively, naturalism validates empiricism, and negatively, it tells us not to trust sources 
like telepathy.532  
 
Having explained the nature of Quine’s naturalistic validation of empiricism, let’s now 
reflect on its strength. It’s true that accepting empiricism because it is a truth of our 
ongoing scientific theory will make this claim fallible. This is the case, Quine would 
concede, for any truth. We see this clearly when Quine writes: 
 
 
528 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.229. See also Word and Object, pp.2-4. ‘The 
Sensory Support of Science’, p.328, The Roots of Reference, pp.2-3 
529 Pursuit of Truth, p.19 
530 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.2 
531 The idea that Quine’s epistemology fails to be normative is a prominent objection in the 
literature. See Kim, J. 1988. Esp. p.389. For a reply to this worry from Quine, see ‘Reply to 
White’, pp.633-65 
532 For Quine, normativity generally survives in naturalized epistemology in relation to “the 
technology of scientizing.” That is, norms emerge within the process of scientific theorising 
and discovery. ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means’, pp.468-69. Pursuit of Truth, 
p.19 
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Even telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options, however moribund. It would 
take extraordinary evidence to enliven them, but, if that were to happen, then 
empiricism itself…would go by the board. For remember that that norm, and 
naturalized epistemology itself, are integral to science, and science is fallible and 
corrigible.533 
 
However, the fact that empiricism is fallible is not sufficient to undermine the idea that 
Quine’s acceptance of empiricism as a naturalist is principled. This is because the 
naturalist must work within our ongoing scientific theory, taking the claims it makes as 
seriously as is possible, and our ongoing scientific theory tells us that empiricism is true. 
Fallible or not, this approach is as principled as inquiry can get for the naturalist.  
 
Having established Quine’s naturalistic argument for empiricism, let’s now consider how 
this position compares to the traditional forms of empiricism that he is reacting to. 
Interestingly, Quine presents his realisation that the truth of empiricism is a discovery that 
is made within science, i.e. his naturalistic way of establishing that empiricism is true, as 
being in direct conflict with traditional forms of phenomenalistic empiricism. We can see 
evidence of this potential conflict when Quine writes: 
 
The champions of atomic sense data were seeking the unscientific raw materials from 
which natural science is made, but in doing so they were being guided, all unawares, by 
an old discovery that was the work of natural science itself… It is the discovery that all 
our information about the external world reaches us through the impact of external 
forces on our sensory surfaces.534 
 
Quine’s claim, then, is that the traditional epistemologist tried to appeal to things like sense-
data, where these are understood as the “unscientific raw materials” that natural science is 
made from or supported by, while, at the same time, failing to appreciate that the truth of 
empiricism is actually a truth that comes from within our ongoing scientific theory. To 
illustrate this point with an example, Quine stresses that traditional epistemologists often 
thought that what they were doing when they made claims about sense-data as an 
 
533 Pursuit of Truth, pp.20-1. See also for From Stimulus to Science, p.67. ‘The Sensory 
Support of Science’, p.328.  
534 ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.328. See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.29 
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epistemologically prior foundation for science was appealing to the results of introspection. 
Quine thinks that they were wrong about this. He writes: 
 
The old epistemologists may have thought that their atomistic attitude toward sense 
data was grounded in introspection, but it was not. It was grounded in their knowledge 
of the physical world.535 
 
Now, from what has been said so far, it seems like Quine is accusing the traditional 
epistemologist of not fully understanding their own view. That is, he is claiming that they do 
not appreciate that their claims are part of science and so not prior to science. Quine suggests 
this when he writes: “[t]he old epistemologist failed to recognize the strength of his 
position.”536 However, this does not get to the bottom of things. This is because Quine also 
thinks that traditional epistemologists would reject this way of viewing their claims for a 
principled reason. That is, they intentionally avoid putting epistemological matters in 
scientific terms and do so because they are trying to justify science on some independent and 
epistemologically prior basis. One cannot, on such a view, provide that justification from a 
perspective that is internal to science as such a justification would be viciously circular. We 
see this clearly when Quine writes: 
 
But he [Berkeley] and the other old epistemologists would have resisted this statement 
of the matter, because they saw their problem as one of challenging or substantiating 
our knowledge of the external world. Appeal to physical sense organs in the statement 
of the problem would have seemed circular.537 
 
According to Quine, it is for this reason that many traditional epistemologists do not view 
their claims about the empirical basis of science’s evidence (i.e. their claims about sense-
data, ideas, and so on) as coming from science. That is, they avoid putting things in these 
terms because it would be circular to provide a justification for science by using science. 
 
Now, Quine thinks that through engaging in this sort of project, the traditional epistemologist 
reveals themselves to be committed to empiricism, i.e. to the view that all of our information 
 
535 The Roots of Reference, p.2 
536 Ibid, p.3 
537 Ibid. See also ‘Posits and Reality’, p.254 
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about the world comes from sense experience. If this was not the case, Quine thinks, it would 
be unclear why the epistemological focus would be on something like sense-data. However, 
what motivates one to accept this position is not entirely clear since, as explained above, the 
motivation cannot involve appealing to a scientific story that explains our sensory input in 
scientific terms. Rather, the motivation for accepting empiricism is likely to be based on the 
idea that what we’re immediately aware of is experiential. This is a position reached through 
introspection, and hence all of our knowledge must ultimately be founded upon that 
immediate empirical basis. Whatever epistemological salience our subsequent scientific 
knowledge has, then, must be derived from the epistemological salience which belongs to 
that which is epistemologically prior to science, i.e. it must be derived from experience. A 
perspective like this is required by the traditional epistemologist because they are attempting 
the project of justifying science on the basis of experience.  
 
To take stock, what we’ve found is that while the traditional epistemologist who aims to 
justify science empirically may be committed to the empiricist creed, this creed itself can be 
understood in very different ways. That is, the specifics of that creed will vary depending on 
the nature of the form of empiricist theory that we’re dealing with. For Quine as a naturalist, 
this claim is cast in overtly scientific terms. That is, it will contain reference to scientific 
notions like the irritations or triggering of the physical sensory organs of human organisms. 
This fact is an internal truth of our ongoing scientific theory. However, the traditional 
epistemologist who is out to justify science does not understand the empiricist creed in these 
terms. Rather, such an empiricist understands our empirical input in terms that are supposed 
to be prior to and separate from science, e.g. in terms of “unscientific raw materials”. 
Accordingly, the empiricist creed amounts to something different for this form of traditional 
epistemologist compared to the naturalist, and, in particular, it amounts to something that 
cannot be an immanent truth of science on pain of circularity, and so comes before the 
science that it is meant to support. This shows that the naturalistic validation of empiricism is 
not available to this form of traditional epistemologist that Quine is reacting to. This is, as 
Quine stresses, an important contrast between a naturalized form of empiricism and the more 
traditional form of empiricism that he is engaging with.  
 
Now, in contrast to the traditional epistemologist whose aim is to justify science in terms of 
experience, Quine also considers an alternative traditional view which aims merely to 
understand the relationship between science and observation. Quine writes: “[i]f we are out 
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simply to understand the link between observation and science, we are well advised to use 
any available information, including that provided by the very science whose link with 
observation we are seeking to understand.”538 However, Quine does not think that many of 
the epistemologists that he’s engaging with, i.e. those who want to “understand the link 
between observation and science” rather than to justify science, would proceed in this way. 
That is, they would not conduct epistemology as a project that is internal to science. The 
reason for this is that there is an alternative motive for carrying out a more traditional 
phenomenalistic empiricist project. Namely, one might aim to reduce science into a 
phenomenalistic language (which includes logic and set theory). Such a project would not 
aim to justify science on the basis of experience, logic, and set theory, given that, if the 
reduction was successful, one would still have to address the further question of whether the 
latter group is itself justified.539  
 
To better understand the contrasts between these different forms of empiricism, it is helpful 
to think of these types of views in terms of a distinction that Quine introduces in 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’, that is, in terms of a distinction between epistemological 
projects that are conceptual and those that are doctrinal.540 Epistemological projects that 
attempt to justify science in terms of experience are doctrinal projects. Conceptual projects, 
on the other hand, aim to clarify scientific knowledge by examining its relation to experience. 
In doing so, the epistemologist might explain posits like physical objects in sensory terms. 
For example, such a view might outright identify physical objects with items constitutes from 
our experience, as Hume attempted to do, or it might try to reduce the sentences of scientific 
discourse to sentences in a phenomenalistic language, as Carnap attempted. Reductive 
projects like these are not viewed by Quine as attempting the doctrinal aim whereby one tries 
to justify science via experience. Rather, reductive projects are valuable for the light that they 
shine on the evidence that science has. Moreover, a strict form of reductionism, i.e. one 
which aims to translate science to a phenomenalistic language, would be valuable in light of 
possessing the ability to clarify our theory of the world by showing that it can be constructed 
from a phenomenalistic language involving sense-data, logic, and set theory. 
 
 
538 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. p.76 
539 Though, it would show science to be as legitimate as those things, since science can be 
reduced to them. 
540 See Ibid, pp.74-6 
 
 
177 
Now, to return to the issue of circularity, Quine also presents such a worry as being relevant 
to this second type of phenomenalism, i.e. to a form of phenomenalism which tries to reduce 
science to experience. Since someone undertaking this form of empiricist project does not 
attempt to justify science, the idea that they would resist characterising their view in scientific 
terms for fear of circularity has to be understood in a slightly different way. Let me explain. 
 
Recall that one form of phenomenalism that Quine was open to in his early work (i.e. before 
‘Two Dogmas’) aspired to reduce science to something like sense-data, where sense-data are 
viewed as being epistemologically prior to science. The idea is that sense-data are meant to 
be epistemologically purer than what is found within science and so are meant to belong to a 
more ultimate or immediate part of reality than the posits of science. In reducing science to 
its evidence, then, the phenomenalist requires that the evidence for science must not be on a 
par with the science that is being reduced to it. We see this when Quine writes: 
 
Epistemologists have wanted to posit a realm of sense data, situated somehow just me-
ward of the physical stimulus, for fear of circularity: to view the physical stimulation 
rather than the sense datum as the end point of scientific evidence would be to make 
physical science rest for its evidence on physical science.541 
 
The idea, then, is that, on this form of phenomenalistic view, the evidence for science itself 
cannot be viewed as a part of science, for then that evidence is not epistemologically prior to 
science after all. If this was the case, i.e. if sense-data were considered as being on a par with 
the posits of science, then the project could show that science can be reduced to science. This 
is a reduction that is plainly circular in its structure. Crucially, it would be circular in a 
problematic way because it would not achieve the epistemological aim that the reductionist is 
trying to reach, i.e. that of reducing science to that which is epistemologically prior to 
science.  
 
Here, then, we find an important contrast between the natures of the two forms of empiricism 
that are important to Quine at different points in his career. It might be the case that, on both 
the naturalistic view and the reductive phenomenalistic view, the evidence for science is 
ultimately sensory evidence. But, crucially, the “end point of scientific evidence” is 
 
541 ‘On Mental Entities’, p.225 
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understood in very different ways on these two views. For naturalism, scientific evidence is 
understood in terms of scientific notions, such as the stimulation of our physical sensory 
receptors. However, on the form of phenomenalism that Quine was open to in his earlier 
work, scientific evidence is supposed to terminate outside of science. That is, scientific 
evidence is supposed to terminate in that which is epistemologically prior to our ongoing 
scientific theory. So, on this form of phenomenalism, although empiricism is still 
characterised as the view that all of our information from the world comes from our sensory 
input (as it is with naturalism), that input itself is characterised in terms that are meant to be 
epistemologically prior to science. This is because things like sense-data are meant to be 
immediate or direct as well as conceptually primitive from an epistemological point of view. 
In this way, according to Quine, they belong to a more immediate and ultimate part of reality 
than the posits of science. This shows that the reductive phenomenalist’s characterisation of 
the empiricist’s creed cannot itself be a part of science, as this claim makes use of notions 
that are supposed to be epistemologically prior to science. This statement of empiricism, 
then, can’t be validated in the naturalistic fashion.  
 
This contrast, i.e. between the validation of empiricism for a naturalist and a reductive 
phenomenalist, is especially notable if we consider how the naturalistic variant of the 
empiricist creed relates to a strict form of reductionism. The naturalist holds that all of our 
information about the world comes from things like the triggering of our sensory receptors. It 
is this scientific fact that the naturalized epistemologist appeals to in order to validate the 
truth of empiricism. Yet the reductive phenomenalist seems unable to properly appeal to such 
a fact. This is because the reductive phenomenalist aims to translate sentences involving 
posits like physical receptors, i.e. sentences involving scientific posits, into phenomenalistic 
sentences, i.e. sentences concerning that which is epistemologically prior to such posits. That 
is (at least as Quine understands the view), the phenomenalist’s project aims to ultimately 
eliminate such posits by showing them to be merely a convenient apparatus that helps us 
facilitate our interactions with experience. The claim that is central to the naturalized 
empiricist, then, loses its lustre from the perspective of strict reductive phenomenalism. In 
aiming to reduce science to that which is epistemologically prior to science, the reductive 
phenomenalist has a more ultimate and transcendent goal than the naturalistic empiricist can 
hope to aspire to within the strict confines of scientific inquiry. 
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Finally, if the naturalistic validation for empiricism is not available to forms of reductive 
phenomenalism, and if Quine was open to a form of reductive phenomenalism in his early 
work, then one naturally wonders what underlies Quine’s firm commitment to empiricism 
throughout this period. After all, while Quine moves from being tolerant to views like 
reductive phenomenalism to endorsing a naturalistic empiricism, his commitment to the 
empiricist creed itself remains firm. Indeed, commitment to this creed is plausibly the closest 
thing to a life-long commitment of Quine’s that we can make sense of.542 
 
Now, the idea that Quine utilises his naturalistic validation of empiricism in his early work 
is suggested in the literature. For example, Lugg’s characterisation of Quine’s position in 
‘Two Dogmas’ is indicative of the idea that, within this work, Quine argues for 
empiricism naturalistically. Lugg writes: 
 
Though he [Quine] does not explicitly state that experience is the only sure guide to the 
truth about how things are, he was strongly of the opinion that experience is all we have 
to go on (and would have believed this substantive philosophical assumption requires 
no special defence beyond what can be learned from science itself).543 
 
Similarly, Isaac suggests that Quine has a naturalistic argument for empiricism at some 
point in his earlier work. Isaac explains, as I have above, that naturalism leads to Quine’s 
acceptance of empiricism since the truth of empiricism is a discovery that is made within 
science, and that it’s for this reason that Quine accepts it. But Isaac also claims that this 
naturalistic form of empiricism provides a basis for Quine to extrapolate: 
 
…his famous doctrines: meaning holism, radical translation, underdetermination of 
scientific theory, and ontological relativity. Each can be taken as an instance of the 
broader philosophical enterprise that Quine called “naturalized epistemology.” Such 
were the doctrines towards which Quine was moving as he made this way through 
college, graduate school, and the early stages of his academic career.544 
 
542 Although, Quine’s commitment to extensionalism also appears to be something like a life-
long commitment as well. Quine writes: “[e]xtensionalism is a policy I have clung to through 
thick, thin, and nearly seven decades of logicizing and philosophizing.” ‘Confessions of a 
Confirmed Extensionalist’, p.498 
543 Lugg, A. 2012. p.234 
544 Isaac, J. 2005. pp.211-12 
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It’s unclear how far back this “broader philosophical enterprise” is meant to extend, but 
Isaac’s reading at least suggests that Quine’s naturalistic empiricism is in operation in his 
earlier work, especially since, as I argued in Chapter 2, Quine’s holism plays an important 
role in leading Quine to a position that is naturalistic.  
 
In spite of this, however, Quine does not appear to explicitly provide an argument for 
empiricism in his early work. As we’ve seen multiple times in this thesis, Quine’s early 
epistemological views are often in flux, lack strong commitment, and, at times, are fairly 
naïve. In this way, it seems wrong to think that Quine has something as strong as his own 
positive, developed, and substantive empiricist theory at this time, and, instead, it seems 
plausible that he is merely open to views like phenomenalism. Appreciating that there is an 
absence of a developed theory of how evidence relates to science in Quine’s early work 
makes it less surprising that he doesn’t offer an argument in support of empiricism until he 
later arrives at such a theory, i.e. his naturalized epistemology. Indeed, as I mentioned in 
§1.4.1, it’s plausible that an important reason for Quine not having more definitive views in 
epistemology in his early work is that his focus was more directly on questions of ontology. 
Quine’s focus then shifts to epistemology in his later work where, as we’ve seen in some 
detail, his views blossom.545 Now, as I’ve argued above, the reductive phenomenalist appears 
unable to appeal to the naturalistic argument for empiricism. To whatever extent the early 
Quine sympathises with reductive phenomenalism, he is correspondingly unable to appeal to 
a naturalistic validation of empiricism.546 
 
On this topic, Quine sometimes stresses that the motivation for accepting a view like 
phenomenalistic reductionism is unclear. In Chapter 1, I explained that Quine thinks that 
epistemological priority is an obscure notion when compared with scientific notions like the 
triggering of our sensory receptors. One way in which Quine thinks that this obscurity is 
appreciable concerns what motivates the truth of empiricism within more traditional 
 
545 See, for example, ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, p.257 
546 Moreover, recall from §1.4.2 that in ‘Two Dogmas’ Quine appears to be open to an odd 
combination of holism and phenomenalism. Given that his consideration of such a view is 
fleeting, since his naturalistic empiricism emerges shortly after this time, and given the fact 
that Quine insists his view in ‘Two Dogmas’ was too sketchy to be worth debating 
(established in §2.2.1), I won’t consider this view in any detail in this chapter. 
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approaches to epistemology like phenomenalistic reductionism.547 As I’ve explained, the 
traditional epistemologist cannot appeal to the results of science to carry out their project 
without worrying about circularity. Accordingly, traditional epistemologists won’t appeal to 
scientific notions like nerve endings to explain the input that human organisms receive from 
the external world. This means that it’s simply unclear where the motivation for the truth of 
empiricism comes from on a more traditional outlook.  
 
Additionally, when discussing phenomenalistic reductionism, Quine suggests that it is 
something like introspection, rather than science, that supports their empiricist position, just 
like it did for the more traditional form of empiricism that tries to justify science via 
experience. For example, we see Quine characterise views like Positivism this way shortly 
after ‘Two Dogmas’. He writes: 
 
Falling in thus uncritically with the usage of old-fashioned epistemology and 
introspective psychology, let us consider, to begin with the process of language. It has 
been the fashion in recently philosophy, both that of some of the English analysts and 
that of some of the logical positivists, to think of the terms of science and ordinary 
language as having some sort of hidden or implicit definitions which carry each such 
term back finally to terms relating to immediate experience.548 
 
Indeed, Quine explains that sense-data are posited in an attempt “to segregate the 
immediate.”549 That is, they are posited in an attempt to home in on what subjectively is 
closest in the causal story that takes place when our sensory surfaces are affected by external 
objects. The phenomenalist, Quine claims, merely fails to appreciate that this shows that they 
are posited in a scientific fashion. Plausibly, then, these remarks can be seen as applying to 
some degree to the early Quine given his tolerance of this view. 
 
While Quine’s early views lack commitment to a substantive epistemological theory, we 
can provide some speculative remarks which attempt to cast some light over Quine’s firm 
commitment to empiricism in the early work. Now, it’s certainly telling that while Quine’s 
views fluctuate, they never do so in the direction of rationalism. Indeed, Quine frequently 
 
547 See ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.327 
548 ‘On Mental Entities’, p.221 
549 ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.327 
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writes about the diverse range of empiricist influence that his early developing views had. 
For example, Quine writes: 
 
…during my graduate studies at Cambridge, I read a lot by Hume, Locke, and 
Berkeley. But I don’t think that the influence [of empiricism] on me was distinctively 
American; it was rather one of international empiricism. It was in fact Whitehead, 
Rudolf Carnap, C.I. Lewis, and, among the Poles, Tarski, who influenced me a great 
deal.550 
 
This establishes that Quine had a strong foundation of empiricist influence from a very early 
stage. Empiricism appears to be part of the way that Quine conceived of the world from the 
start of his philosophical journey. For example, we find Quine accounting for mathematics in 
empirical terms in his college days. Quine gave a talk at Oberlin’s Mathematics Club about 
mathematical logic and wrote that, while logic is the “trunk supporting every branch” of 
mathematics, at root the “raw material is always experience.”551 Quine gives little detail 
about how mathematics relates to experience, but his remarks are suggestive of an underlying 
desire to be an empiricist and to not consider rationalist accounts from the very start, even 
when dealing with something like mathematical knowledge.552 
 
Moreover, Quine’s commitment to empiricism is often felt strongly in his early work through 
the constraints that he places on theorising. We saw this in detail in Chapter 2, where Quine 
is involved in an intricate investigation into the empirical adequacy of analyticity in which he 
argues that to get a more acceptable view of semantic notions, we need to take our 
commitment to empiricism more seriously. Quine’s engagement with analyticity isn’t merely 
negative, that is, Quine is striving to work out whether analyticity can fit within his own 
empirical outlook. This was notable, for example, in Quine’s emphasis on behavioural ways 
of getting clear on semantic notions, and in Quine’s emphasis on the fact that contemporary 
 
550 ‘Twentieth-Century Logic’, p.61. Similarly, Quine explains that an important early 
influence on him was pragmatism. Quine explains that pragmatism is too vague a label for 
Quine to identify himself with, but he specifies that an aspect of pragmatism that he does 
identify strongly with is empiricism. See Time of My Life, pp.37-8. ‘Replies to Professor 
Riska’s Eight Questions’, p.213 
551 Sourced in Isaac, J. 2005. p.215 
552 See also Sinclair, R. 2016. He notes that while Quine had little knowledge of 
epistemology when he started at Harvard, his college work had “a noticeable trace of 
empiricism”. p.82 
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empiricist approaches to notions like synonymy appear to be in “a state more typical of 
metaphysics generally than empiricism has any right to be.”553 This doesn’t provide Quine 
with a substantial empiricist doctrine about how experience and theory relate, but it does 
show ways in which Quine is adhering to a commitment to empiricism.  
 
Importantly, the motivation behind this push from Quine is scientific. That is, it is a push to 
be scientifically objective when it comes to philosophical notions like analyticity. Indeed, in 
much of Quine’s early work, he appears to be reacting to the unempirical state that 
philosophy is in, or to the fact that supposedly scientific philosophers are failing to meet the 
standards of empirical science. The scientific spirit that Quine often embodies in his early 
work, then, no doubt provides much of the motivation for him being attracted to the view. In 
other words, Quine accepts that scientific evidence is observational evidence, i.e. science’s 
evidence is empirical, and Quine often wants to be scientific about things.554 It is this, after 
all, that explains the value that Quine sees in focussing on linguistic behaviour rather than 
things like ideas. With this outlook, it’s no wonder that, when Quine turns his attention to 
epistemological projects, he’d be drawn to phenomenalistic reductionism. However, for the 
reasons given above, this early scientific motivation for empiricism should not be viewed as 
the same scientific motivation that the naturalized empiricism has for being an empiricist. 
 
To summarise, Quine may be right that the “crucial insight” for empiricism (i.e. the idea that 
science’s evidence comes from sensory experience) is a common thread shared by the 
naturalist and the more traditional forms of empiricism that naturalism reacts to. However, 
for the naturalist, this insight is recognised to come from within science, whereas, for the 
more traditional epistemologist, this insight has to be understood in ways that are not purely 
scientific. This means that the naturalistic validation of empiricism is not available to either 
the reductive phenomenalist nor the phenomenalist who attempts to justify science. 
Moreover, the reason that this validation is not available to either form of traditional 
empiricism is that both projects put significant weight on epistemological priority, despite 
having different motivations for their respective projects. Here, then, we find significant 
 
553 ‘Animadversions on the Notion of Meaning’, p.153 
554 Quine also takes science itself to be concerned with organising and predicting experience. 
This view of science is clear in ‘Two Dogmas’. Quine characterises part of what it means to 
be an empiricist as being someone who thinks “of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, 
ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience.” p.44 
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differences between the respective natures of the forms of empiricism that are important to 
Quine, as well as differences between the respective arguments for these positions.   
 
 
3.4 Embracing Circularity 
 
In the previous section, I established that traditional forms of empiricism have problems 
concerning the circularity involved in Quine’s naturalistic claim that empiricism itself is a 
truth of science. In this section, I explain the circular nature of naturalized epistemology to 
better understand the nature of the view and its relationship to the forms of empiricism that 
the naturalized epistemologist is reacting to. Namely, I demonstrate that Quine, as a 
naturalist, has no problem embracing the circularity inherent in his view.   
 
Quine explains this circular relationship between epistemology and science as one of 
reciprocal containment.555 That is, both epistemology and science are contained within each 
other, albeit in different ways. On the one hand, epistemology contains natural science in the 
sense that epistemology is focussed on accounting for how humans can acquire their 
scientific theory. Naturalized epistemology has this much in common with more traditional 
approaches to epistemology, though there’s no reductive project that is aimed at, nor is there 
an attempt to ground science on an independent experiential basis. Quine makes this clear 
when he writes: 
 
The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science; it would construct 
it somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained 
in natural science… But the old containment remains valid too, in its way. We are 
studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics 
from his data…556 
 
On the other hand, for the naturalist, epistemology is treated as a part of science. As Quine 
puts it, epistemology becomes “science self-applied…the scientific study of the scientific 
 
555 See ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.83 
556 Ibid 
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process.”557 Now, it is this side of the containment that Quine thinks the traditional 
epistemologist will deny, and hence we see a sharp contrast between naturalized 
epistemology and traditional epistemology. This is because it is this aspect of Quine’s 
naturalistic approach, i.e. the casting of empiricism in scientific terms, that leads to the 
worries about circularity that I discussed in §3.3.   
 
Now, the naturalized epistemologist does not aim to justify science on the basis of sense 
experience, nor do they aim to reduce science to experience. Quine views both of these 
traditional epistemological projects as requiring a perspective that is epistemologically prior 
to science, and such a perspective, as I explained in §1.4, is rejected by the naturalist as 
illegitimate. This means that Quine is able to embrace this circularity as a naturalist. That is, 
Quine is able to accept the circular nature of his naturalistic epistemological project without 
worrying about it being problematically circular since he rejects the idea that there is a 
perspective that is epistemologically prior to science.558 This perspective allows him to accept 
empiricism because it is a truth of science, and it allows him to carry out his epistemological 
project internally within science. 
 
Moreover, to illustrate the significance of this development, consider the way in which 
Quine describes the naturalized epistemologist as having newly found freedoms and 
responsibilities when compared to more traditional forms of epistemological theorising. 
Quine writes: 
 
Our dissociation from the old epistemologists has brought both freedom and 
responsibility. We gain access to the resources of natural science and we accept the 
methodological restraints of natural science. In our account of how science might be 
acquired we do not try to justify science by some prior and firmer philosophy, but 
neither are we to maintain less than scientific standards.559 
 
 
557 ‘Quine Speaks His Mind’, p.24. We can see Quine explaining this relationship fairly early 
into his naturalistic development. See ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.228-30 
558 Some philosophers have argued that Quine’s naturalism is viciously circular. See Siegel, 
H. 1995. pp.56-7 
559 The Roots of Reference, p.34 
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So, on the one hand, the naturalized epistemologist is liberated from the more traditional 
epistemologist in that they “gain access to the resources of natural science” since they accept 
that their epistemological inquiry must take place within science. In other words, in order to 
provide an understanding of how humans go from sensory input to scientific output, the 
naturalist is able to carry out this investigation while appealing to the results of science. On 
the other hand, in conducting this inquiry within science, the naturalized epistemologist’s 
inquiry is constrained by the standards of science. On both of these points, Quine’s 
naturalistic perspective is distinctive when compared with the more traditional forms of 
epistemology that he is detaching himself from. 
 
Quine often likens the naturalist’s lack of a problem with respect to circularity to the 
Neurathian metaphor. Recall that, in Chapter 1, we saw that this metaphor was a helpful 
illustration for shedding light on the nature of naturalism. Here, Quine also utilises it in order 
to illuminate the specific approach of the naturalized epistemologist. He writes: 
 
This interplay [between science and epistemology] is reminiscent again of the old threat 
of circularity, but it is all right now that we have stopped dreaming of deducing science 
from sense data. We are after an understanding of science as an institution or process in 
the world, and we do not intend that understanding to be any better than the science 
which is its object. This attitude is indeed one that Neurath was already urging in 
Vienna Circle days, with his parable of the mariner who has to rebuild his boat while 
staying afloat in it.560 
 
The naturalized epistemologist, then, is presented as someone who fully accepts that there 
is no level of understanding that they can provide which is “any better than the science” 
that they are concerned with. They are, like other scientists, workers engaged in the 
enterprise of keeping the ship of science sailing while always working on it from within. 
 
To summarise, I’ve established that a notable contrast between traditional forms of 
empiricism and Quine’s naturalistic empiricism is that, as a naturalist, Quine embraces the 
idea that epistemology has a circular structure. This picture is rejected by the more traditional 
epistemologist for the reasons outlined in §3.3. In embracing this circularity, Quine locates 
 
560 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.84. See also ‘On Mental Entities’, pp.223-25 
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epistemology within science. A natural question to ask, then, concerns where precisely Quine 
thinks that naturalized epistemology ends up within science. Moreover, we might wonder 
how this relocation of epistemology bears on the question of naturalized epistemology’s 
relationship to the more traditional forms of epistemology that Quine is reacting to. I will 
address this in the following section. 
 
 
3.5 The Location of Epistemology 
 
Let’s begin by locating Quine’s naturalized epistemology within the broad purview of 
scientific inquiry. Now, perhaps the main way in which Quine’s naturalized epistemology 
is viewed as being radically different from the more traditional approaches is through the 
idea that it is located specifically in psychology. In other words, Quine is viewed as 
shifting the subject of epistemology from philosophy to a scientific subject, namely, one 
that belongs narrowly (and problematically) within psychology. We see this view clearly, 
for example, in Kornblith’s interpretation of Quine. Kornblith claims that for Quine, 
“psychological questions hold all the content there is in epistemological questions. On this 
view psychology replaces epistemology in much the same way that chemistry has replaced 
alchemy”.561 
 
There is certainly plenty of evidence to be found in Quine’s remarks that provide support 
for this idea. For example, Quine writes that while his naturalization of epistemology 
doesn’t “repudiate epistemology”, it instead “assimilates it to empirical psychology.”562 
Elsewhere, Quine writes that naturalizing epistemology amounts to “a surrender of the 
epistemological burden to psychology”.563 Indeed, in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, the 
paper where Quine baptises his epistemology as naturalistic, he continually describes 
epistemology as finding itself in a different setting, and that setting is psychology. 
Similarly, he describes the naturalized epistemologist as ending up “as an empirical 
 
561 Kornblith, H. 1994. p.7. See also Kim, J. 1988. Creath, R. 1990b. p.21. Similarly, 
Murphey has emphasised that philosophers criticising Word and Object often claimed that “it 
was psychology rather than philosophy.” Murphey, M. 2012. P.126 
562 ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, p.72 
563 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.75 
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psychologist, scientifically investigating man’s acquisition of science.”564 Given remarks 
like these, it’s no wonder that this reading is common. 
 
Indeed, Quine certainly seems to have become more sensitive to the idea that psychology 
is relevant to his epistemological views as time progresses. For example, Quine spent a 
considerable amount of time discussing his work with linguists and psychologists while 
writing Word and Object.565 Moreover, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ was originally titled 
‘Epistemology Naturalized; or, the Case for Psychologism’, and hence it seems clear that 
Quine is aiming to stress the relevance of psychology for issues like meaning and 
justification within his naturalistic outlook. The fact that Quine does not think that it is 
problematically circular to view epistemology as a part of science, then, appears to be 
what makes this psychologistic view viable. That is, the epistemologist is finally allowed 
to appeal to science, psychology included.566 We see evidence for this when Quine writes: 
 
…a surrender of the epistemological burden to psychology is a move that was 
disallowed in earlier times as circular reasoning. If the epistemologist’s goal is 
validation of the grounds of empirical science, he defeats his purpose by using 
psychology or other empirical science in the validation.567  
 
Having provided evidence in favour of the idea that Quine intends naturalized 
epistemology to be included narrowly within psychology, let me explain why this idea 
must be understood in a very careful way. First, let me highlight the fact that Quine also 
presents the location of naturalized epistemology as being more scattered within science. 
In Pursuit of Truth, for example, Quine places naturalized epistemology more generally in 
science as “a chapter of theoretical science”.568 Additionally, Quine suggests a broader 
location for his view when he stresses that something notable about it in Word and Object 
 
564 The Roots of Reference, p.3. See also ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.230 
565 See Verhaegh, S. 2018. pp.148-49 
566 Indeed, a strong motivation for the separation of epistemology from science was a sort of 
anti-psychologism, that is, the view that psychological facts are not relevant for studying 
epistemological and semantic facts. According to this view, certain scientific facts, i.e. 
psychological ones, should be isolated from philosophy. That being said, a rejection of 
psychologism and avoiding the sort of circularity discussed in §3.3 are separate points. See 
Ibid. p.5 
567 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, pp.75-6. See also ‘Posits and Reality’, p.254 
568 Pursuit of Truth, p.19 
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is that “[o]ther logical semanticists put no such weight as I do upon natural linguistics and 
psychology”.569 Indeed, in a few places, Quine emphasises that naturalized epistemology 
is located in linguistics.570 More strongly still, Quine stresses that the question of how 
evidence relates to theory requires little investigation from fields like psychology. He 
writes: 
 
Within this baffling tangle of relations between our sensory stimulation and our 
scientific theory of the world, there is a segment that we can gratefully separate out and 
clarify without pursuing neurology, psychology, psycho-linguistics, genetics, or 
history. It is the part where theory is tested by prediction. It is the relation of evidential 
support, and its essentials can be schematized by means of little more than logical 
analysis.571 
 
So, we appear to have found ourselves at a crossroads. That is, in the pursuit of 
understanding the scientific location of naturalized epistemology, we are torn in two 
directions. On the one hand, Quine plainly claims that naturalized epistemology finds its 
home in psychology. Yet, on the other, Quine appears to stress that such an inquiry can be 
conducted independently of psychology. In order to make progress in the task of 
identifying the proper relation of naturalized epistemology to psychology, we need to 
consider the project that the naturalized epistemologist is concerned with in more detail. 
Doing so will also be beneficial for furthering our understanding of how the nature of 
naturalized epistemology relates to the natures of the other forms of epistemology that 
Quine is engaging with.  
 
Quine characterises the central question that the naturalized epistemologist is concerned 
with as follows: 
 
From impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective and cumulative creativity 
down the generations have projected our systematic theory of the external world. Our 
 
569 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.149 
570 See, for example, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, pp.89-90 
571 Pursuit of Truth, p.2 
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system is proving successful in predicting subsequent sensory input. How have we 
done it?572 
 
Here, we see that naturalized epistemology focusses on providing a scientific account of 
scientific knowledge. That is, it attempts to provide an account, from within science, of 
how human organisms are able to go from the stimulation that they receive to producing 
scientific theorising. Not only is this project to be conducted within science, the facts that 
it concerns are also facts that are established through the process of scientific discovery. 
Namely, it is a scientific fact that we receive input from the external world through 
“impacts on our sense organs”, and it is a scientific fact that we end up projecting “our 
systematic theory of the external world”, i.e. that we produce science as an output. To put 
it another way, not only is this project presented as taking place within science, it is also 
characterised purely in scientific terms. We see this clearly when Quine writes the 
following: 
 
We…find ourselves engaged in an internal question within the framework of natural 
science. There are these impacts of molecules and light rays upon our sensory surfaces, 
and there is all this output on our part of scientific discourse…we pose the problem of 
linking that input causally and logically to that output.573 
 
At each side of the relation, i.e. the input and the output, are natural scientific phenomena, 
and the naturalist’s task is to provide a causal and logical story about how we could go 
from the input to the output.  
 
This is the main task that the naturalized epistemologist is concerned with. But it’s worth 
pointing out that there are other tasks that are relevant to this perspective. For example, 
naturalized epistemology is also concerned with the heuristics of developing scientific 
hypotheses. This will include looking at how norms like conservatism figure in scientific 
theorising. Quine doesn’t say all that much in this direction.574 The reason for this, 
 
572 Ibid, p.1 
573 ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.328 
574 See Pursuit of Truth, p.20. From Stimulus to Science, pp.49-50. For something slightly 
more substantial, see The Web of Belief, §5. 
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plausibly, is that such processes cannot be schematized properly. As Quine explains: 
“[c]reating good hypotheses is an imaginative art, not a science. It is the art of science.”575 
 
Now that we have a better appreciation of the task that the naturalized epistemologist 
undertakes, let me relate this to the traditional forms of epistemology that Quine is 
reacting to in order to further illuminate the relationship between the forms of empiricism 
that concern us. Following this, I will make sense of the location of naturalized 
epistemology in relation to psychology.  
 
Quine acknowledges that the project of naturalized epistemology involves a fairly 
substantial departure from the form of traditional epistemology that attempts to support 
science by founding it on something more stable than science, e.g. on something certain 
like pure experience or ideas. Quine describes such an aim as “the Cartesian dream” (he 
intends this to also include rationalistic approaches to providing a justificatory foundation 
for science).576 In relation to this aim, Quine admits that naturalized epistemology might 
fairly be viewed as too different from the epistemological projects of old to be fruitfully 
called ‘epistemology’. After all, naturalized epistemology rejects the aim of the traditional 
purist as illegitimate. Quine writes: 
 
I call the pursuit naturalized epistemology, but I have no quarrel with traditionalists 
who protest my retention of the latter word. I agree with them that repudiation of the 
Cartesian dream is no minor deviation.577 
 
However, at the same time, Quine stresses that “it may be more useful to say…that 
epistemology still goes on, though in a new setting and a clarified status”.578 Quine says 
this because he thinks that the naturalized epistemologist remains focussed on “what has 
been central to traditional epistemology”.579 By this, Quine means that the naturalized 
epistemologist is focussed on “the relation of science to its sensory data.”580 Here, then, 
 
575 From Stimulus to Science, p.49 
576 Pursuit of Truth, p.19 
577 Ibid. Similarly, in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine writes: “Epistemology, or 
something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology…” p.82. My emphasis. 
578 Ibid, p.83 
579 Pursuit of Truth, p.19 
580 Ibid. See also ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.83 
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we find at least some commonality between the endeavour of naturalized epistemology 
and the endeavour of the doctrinal form of epistemology that Quine reacts to (in addition 
to their shared commitment to the empiricist creed, as explained in §3.2). In being 
focussed on the issue of scientific evidence, naturalized epistemology, like the 
epistemology of old, could still be characterised, roughly, as “concerned with the 
foundations of science”.581 However, for the reasons given above, one must understand 
this commonality carefully, since the naturalist denies that one can provide a foundation 
for science. The perspective required for providing such a foundation would need to be 
distinctly philosophical, that is, distinct from science. The naturalist, of course, denies that 
there is such a perspective.  
 
So, Quine, as a naturalist, is still concerned with investigating the sensory evidence of 
science. This much he also shares with the reductive form of phenomenalism. However, 
where his naturalistic view differs from this reductive view is that, as I argued in §1.4.2, it 
rejects the idea that we can separate this sensory evidence into its own autonomous 
domain and then attempt to reduce the statements of our scientific theory to statements in 
a phenomenalistic language. In doing so, Quine also rejects the stricter reductive 
phenomenalistic idea that the epistemologist can aspire to show how our scientific 
worldview is, ultimately, superfluous to that experiential domain. Quine makes this clear 
when he writes: 
 
There is every reason to inquire into the sensory or stimulatory background of ordinary 
talk of physical things. The mistake comes only in seeking an implicit sub-basement of 
conceptualization, or of language. Conceptualization on any considerable scale is 
inseparable from language, and our ordinary language of physical things is about as 
basic as language gets.582 
 
The naturalized epistemologist’s goal, like that of the reductive phenomenalist, may be to 
relate knowledge to its empirical evidence, and so to investigate the relationship between 
science and its evidence. However, in rejecting the coherence of an attempt to reduce 
 
581 Ibid, p.69 
582 Word and Object, p.3 
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science to something prior to science, the naturalized epistemologist is able to conduct 
their investigation within science and make use of its findings. 
 
To summarise so far, the naturalized epistemologist is still concerned with the relation of 
science to its evidence. This much they share with the traditional epistemologist, and 
hence it seems reasonable to view naturalized epistemology as still undertaking an 
epistemological project. However, the more specific we are about the concerns of these 
forms of epistemological theorising, the more apparent it becomes that their aims, and, 
consequently, the projects that they conduct to meet these aims, are very different. Now 
that we have a better understanding of the project that the naturalized epistemologist 
undertakes and the relationship that this project bears to traditional epistemology, let’s 
return to the question of how naturalized epistemology relates to psychology. Recall that 
the issue concerns the conflict between Quine’s insistence that naturalized epistemology 
takes place within psychology and his claim that we can conduct important aspects of the 
naturalized epistemologist’s project without considering psychology.  
 
Now, I contend that we can make sense of this tension, and so resolve the puzzle 
concerning the location of naturalized epistemology, by reflecting on the sort of project 
that the naturalized epistemologist aims to undertake. As I’ve explained, the naturalized 
epistemologist may be carrying out an epistemological challenge that is undertaken within 
science, but, at the same time, they are also undertaking the challenge which preoccupied 
the traditional epistemologist (at least in some minimal but fundamental sense). That is, 
they are still concerned with the issue of how science relates to its evidence. In this way, 
the naturalized epistemologist is occupied both with carrying out a scientific project and 
with addressing a distinctively philosophical challenge.  
 
To clarify, Quine’s naturalistic outlook denies that there is a perspective that is distinct 
from science which the philosopher can occupy, and from which they could address issues 
such as the question of how science relates to its evidence. But, at the same time, the 
naturalist accepts that within science there are distinctive issues which the philosopher is 
well-equipped for dealing with, and which an inquirer that we’re more likely to identify as 
a scientist (including a psychologist) is unlikely to have any direct interest in. Such issues 
will concern a very general and abstract level of understanding about the nature of the 
world. Crucially, the question of the relationship between scientific theorising and its 
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evidence, in concerning a very general and abstract aspect of the nature of reality, belongs 
at this level of inquiry.  
 
Now, to relate these points to psychology, it is true that the issue that the naturalized 
epistemologist is directly concerned with is distinctively philosophical, since it concerns 
things like the question of how science relates to its evidence, and the question as to what 
extent humans transcend that evidence when developing their theory of the world. These 
concerns are fairly general and abstract in their nature, especially when compared with the 
more typical questions that are dealt with within psychology. Now, it is these concerns 
that are the primary focus of naturalized epistemology, but such issues have to be 
approached as matters of psychology because of the nature of their subject matter, i.e. 
because they concern the psychological development of human organisms. It is human 
beings, after all, that go from stimulus to science. It is for this reason that it seems accurate 
to characterise the location of naturalized epistemology as being in the more philosophical 
domain of science, and, in particular, as being in the philosophical periphery of 
psychology.583 Appreciating that this is the proper location of naturalized epistemology 
makes sense of claims that Quine makes like the following: “[t]his [i.e. the question of 
how we go from stimulus to science] is a question of empirical psychology, but it may be 
pursued at one or more removes from the laboratory, one or another level of 
speculativity.”584 The naturalized epistemologist, then, attempts to provide, as Quine puts 
it, “a psychologically grounded theory of evidence”.585 That is, they attempt to provide a 
theory of evidence that belongs within the more psychological reaches of science, and, 
more particularly, within the more speculative and philosophical periphery of 
psychological theorising. 
 
Strictly, we should bear in mind the fact that, as I discussed in §1.3.3, Quine does not 
think that subject boundaries mark out substantially different fields of inquiry. This is no 
less the case when considering the location of naturalized epistemology. Quine writes that 
“the inquiry [i.e. naturalized epistemology] proceeds in disregard of disciplinary 
 
583 See also Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.149 
584 The Roots of Reference, p.3. See also Quine’s claim in ‘The Sensory Support of Science’: 
“It smacks of psychology, yes; but it embraces the logic of science too, the whole problem of 
scientific evidence, the relation of observation to theory.” p.328 
585 ‘Posits and Reality’, p.252 
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boundaries but with respect for the disciplines themselves and appetite for their input.”586 
Viewing naturalized epistemology as being located in psychology, then, can also be 
viewed as a pragmatic decision that is made because of the similarity that its problems 
have with other problems that are dealt with in this field. The fact that naturalized 
epistemology deals with an especially general topic, though, makes the potential relevance 
of the input from other fields of science likely.  
 
Having established the proper relation of naturalized epistemology to psychology, let me 
highlight the sharp contrast between this location and the location of a form of empiricism 
that Quine was open to in his earlier work, i.e. phenomenalistic reductionism. We see 
strong evidence of this in 1946, when Quine stresses the separation of the tasks of 
epistemology and psychology. Recall the following note of Quine’s that was discussed in 
Chapter 1: 
 
Clarification of the notion of epistemological priority is needed to know what the task 
of epistemology (as distinct e.g. of psychology) is; for, epistemological priority is the 
direction in which epistemological reduction of knowledge to more fundamental or 
immediate knowledge seeks to progress.587 
 
From this perspective, then, the very task of epistemology is being presented in ways that 
make it distinctly philosophical, i.e. as separate from the rest of science, psychology 
(explicitly) included. As the note makes clear, Quine’s openness to epistemological 
priority is what leads to this tolerance of this position. This is because that which is 
epistemologically prior is epistemologically prior to science, and hence epistemological 
theorising is carried out from a perspective independent and autonomous from science. 
The idea of such a project would be to reduce our scientific knowledge into knowledge 
that is epistemologically prior to it. This thereby attempts to provide us with an outlook on 
the nature of reality that is more fundamental than the outlook that is found in science. We 
saw this in §1.4.1 in the way that experience is characterised in Quine’s early view. 
Namely, something like sense-data was viewed as real in some special sense when 
compared to the other things that we think of as real. In this way, experience is not merely 
 
586 From Stimulus to Science, p.16 
587 Sourced in Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.96 
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a posit within our scientific theory. Accordingly, such epistemological theorising occurs 
autonomously outside of the experimental method that governs our overall scientific 
theory. Indeed, as I’ve explained above, this means that such epistemological theorising 
cannot be carried out from within our ongoing scientific theory because, if it was, the 
reduction simply wouldn’t work. More precisely, it would not allow one to think that our 
scientific apparatus is merely a convenient adjunct to the pure experience that we receive. 
There is a principled reason, then, against viewing this project as part of our ongoing 
scientific theory. 
 
The legitimacy of this perspective, of course, is ruled out by naturalism. Quine illustrates 
this point by relating it to the Neurathian metaphor. He writes: 
 
Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild it 
plank by plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the 
same boat. If we improve our understanding of ordinary talk of physical things, it will 
not be by reducing that talk to a more familiar idiom; there is none. It will be by 
clarifying the connections, causal or otherwise, between ordinary talk of physical things 
and various further matters which in turn we grasp with help of ordinary talk of 
physical things.588 
 
Here, then, we can appreciate the sharp contrast between the location of the naturalized 
epistemologist’s theorising and the location of the reductive phenomenalist’s theorising. 
That is, while both view epistemology as a distinctively philosophical subject, it is only 
the naturalist that attempts to keep this philosophical inquiry within the boundaries of 
science. The reductive phenomenalist, in contrast to the naturalist, conducts 
epistemological inquiry in a distinctly philosophical locale.589  
 
So, in this section, we’ve seen that the specific location of naturalized epistemology is best 
identified within the philosophical periphery of psychological theorising, and that this is in 
 
588 Word and Object, p.3 
589 Moreover, the science of psychology is not going to be of help to a strict reductive 
phenomenalist because it is not a psychological fact about human beings that they acquire 
the apparatus of physical objects through first acquiring the apparatus of the 
phenomenalist language, set theory, and logic and then, via definition, acquire the 
language of science. See ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.76 
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contrast to the distinctly philosophical location of both phenomenalistic reductionism and 
the form of empiricism which strives to justify science on the basis of experience. Let me 
end by offering some explanatory reasons as to why Quine’s presentation of the fact that 
naturalized epistemology is included within psychology can be misleading. Recall that the 
beginning of this section introduced a host of evidence for the idea that, for Quine, 
naturalized epistemology is a matter of brute psychological theorising, rather than being 
located at the philosophical periphery of psychological theorising that I’ve argued for 
above. Foley claims that part of Quine’s reason for introducing his view in the way that he 
does is that he is fond of “shocking aphorisms” which end up presenting his position in an 
unclear way.590 This seems to explain part of the problem, as Quine occasionally explains 
the contrast between his view and the more traditional epistemological views that he’s 
reacting to in misleading and hyperbolic terms. The fact that Quine is presenting his 
naturalistic view in contrast to traditional forms of empiricism through the fact that the 
naturalist accepts that epistemology takes place within science may have caused him to 
emphasise this contrast too strongly. 
 
Moreover, it’s important to note that, in the paper where Quine presents his idea that 
epistemological inquiry takes place narrowly within psychology most strongly (i.e. 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’), he is also at pains to make the distinctiveness of his own 
view apparent. This is the paper in which Quine first explicitly describes his view as 
naturalistic, and he is especially conscious of presenting the distinctiveness of his own 
view after the problems he had in communicating his perspective without a label like 
‘naturalism’ in Word and Object, as I explained in §1.2. In attempting to push the contrast 
between his naturalistic view and the views of traditional epistemologists, Quine presents 
the contrast between these views more strongly there than he does in most of his other 
works. 
 
In his other works, Quine highlights commonalities between the inquiries involved in 
naturalized epistemology and traditional epistemological projects, like Carnap’s use of 
rational reconstruction, and he describes his own approach as “a naturalistic analogue or 
counterpart of the traditional epistemologist’s phenomenalistic foundation in sense 
 
590 Foley, R. 1994. pp.249-50 
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data”.591 But, in ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine writes as if he’s aiming to provide 
something very different from a rational reconstruction. Quine claims that from the 
perspective of naturalism, it is “[b]etter to discover how science is in fact developed and 
learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to similar effect.”592 Quine even suggests 
that while something like a rational reconstruction could be carried out within naturalized 
epistemology, one would only do this for pragmatic reasons to help hint at the “actual 
psychological processes” involved in how humans go from stimulus to science.593 In this 
way, Quine presents his naturalistic view as if it is aiming to answer the question of how 
we actually go from sensory input to scientific output. Now, this is a question that belongs 
more to the experimental and rigorous part of psychology rather than to psychology’s 
philosophical periphery. Quine’s focus in naturalized epistemology, however, is on the 
slightly weaker question of how we could go from such input to our scientific output. In 
relation to this question, a more speculative and philosophical approach to providing an 
answer is appropriate. Let me end this chapter, then, by explaining this important aspect of 
naturalized epistemology. 
 
 
3.6 The Speculative Nature of Naturalized Epistemology 
 
I’ve established that naturalized epistemology belongs within the philosophical periphery 
of psychology. This locates philosophy within the broad domain of science. Now, as I 
explained above, this perspective is liberating in the sense that it allows one to appeal to 
the results of science in order to understand how theory relates to evidence, but it is also 
restrictive in the sense that one has to abide by scientific standards when conducting 
epistemology. However, as I mentioned in the previous section, naturalized epistemology 
has a notably speculative appearance. In this section, I argue that to make better sense of 
the nature of the naturalized epistemologist’s inquiry, we have to understand its 
speculative nature. Understanding its speculative nature, I contend, will help us better 
understand the distinctive nature of naturalized epistemology and, moreover, will 
 
591 ‘Naturalism; Or, Living within One’s Means’, p.464. See also From Stimulus to Science, 
Chapters 1-2. ‘Two Dogmas in Retrospect’, p.399 
592 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.78 
593 Ibid. p.83 
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contribute towards a more nuanced appreciation of the relationship between the forms of 
empiricism Quine engages with throughout his career.  
 
Now, philosophers have claimed to find problems with Quine’s naturalized epistemology 
because of its speculative appearance. The general worry is that Quine’s view is too 
speculative and so the naturalistic edge that Quine’s work putatively exemplifies is dulled. 
For example, Fogelin has stressed that, because of the speculative nature of Quine’s 
project, his view is often too theoretical and distanced from empirical checkpoints to 
qualify as scientific.594 In epistemology specifically, Fogelin stresses that it’s unclear as to 
why Quine should formulate the epistemological challenge first before carrying out the 
empirical work. In other words, Quine, in the spirit of Dewey and Pierce, should see the 
relevant epistemological questions themselves as emerging during ongoing empirical 
research. Such an approach would appear to be a more scientific option. Now, if an 
interpretation like this is correct, it might weaken the contrast between Quine’s naturalistic 
approach to epistemology and the more traditional forms of epistemology that he is 
reacting to. This is because it would make the character of naturalized epistemology much 
more philosophical rather than scientific.  
 
Indeed, Quine’s naturalistic work often involves descriptions of his view as being 
speculative. For example, Quine sums up his general approach as follows: “[i]n Word and 
Object and The Roots of Reference I have speculated on how we learn individuative terms, 
predication, and various further essentials of our language.”595 Additionally, Quine 
describes his explanation of how we introduce talk of objects into language as 
“speculative psychology”.596 In one of his earliest discussions of naturalized epistemology, 
after noting that the question of the roots of referential language properly belongs to 
psychology, Quine claims that “[a]ctually we can proceed to answer this twofold question 
plausibly enough, in a general sort of way, without any very elaborate psychologizing.”597 
 
594 Fogelin, R.J. 2004. See esp. pp.43-4. See also Foley, R. 1994. pp.253-56. Fogelin admits 
that Quine sometimes gives a “Peircean response” where he dismisses philosophical issues in 
the context of empirical inquiry. As I explain below, this is a response that Quine gives to 
classical examples of sceptical hypotheses. 
595 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.5. See Pursuit of Truth, pp.34-5 
596 ‘Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis’, p.74 
597 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.230-31 
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Later in the same paper, he describes his claims as “speculations”.598 Moreover, in The 
Roots of Reference, plausibly Quine’s most extended and detailed work on epistemology, 
Quine’s descriptions of his view as speculative are abundant. There, Quine describes his 
view as speculative three times in one paragraph.599 He also describes it as “psychogenetic 
speculations”, “suppositious psychogenesis” and a “caricature”.600 Crucially, these are not 
fine-grained claims about the nature of specific parts of Quine’s view being speculative, 
rather, they are general claims about the nature of his approach to epistemology being 
speculative.  
 
What perhaps makes this situation worse is that admission that Quine’s view is speculative 
is also often accompanied by a further admission, that is, that the claims that he makes 
aren’t true of the precise details about what happens when humans acquire cognitive 
language. For example, Quine describes his speculations as “inaccurate”; as providing a 
“construction of a fictitious learning process”; as “crude”; and as “imaginary”.601 
Moreover, Quine’s views are also presented as being inadequate in important ways. For 
example, we see this when he writes: “[t]rue, there are scarcely the beginnings here of a 
full theory of evidence and scientific method; much more to that purpose can be gleaned 
from works by others.”602 
 
To take stock, while the naturalized epistemologist embraces the fact that epistemology is 
located in science, there is an abundance of evidence which shows that they intend their 
naturalistic approach to epistemology to be deeply speculative, and even distanced from 
the literal truth. That Quine’s naturalistic approach to epistemology has this deeply 
speculative aura, then, is a fact that needs to be explained.  
 
 
3.6.1 Naturalism and Scepticism 
 
 
598 Ibid. p.234 
599 The Roots of Reference, p.81 
600 Ibid. p.92, p.105 
601 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, pp.267-68. The Roots of Reference, p.121, p.123 
602 ‘Replies’, p.180 
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Now, to properly understand why Quine is content with providing a speculative approach, 
we first need to understand the naturalist’s treatment of scepticism. Quine’s naturalistic 
perspective on traditional scepticism is difficult to grasp in light of two different ways in 
which the naturalist can interpret, and consequently respond to, traditional sceptical 
worries.603 More precisely, Verhaegh stresses that Quine’s attitude towards scepticism is 
liable to confuse readers in light of the fact that Quine talks about scepticism as being 
incoherent at certain times, and coherent at others. For example, we see this when Quine, 
on the very same page, claims that radical scepticism “is not itself incoherent” and that 
within his naturalistic worldview “the transcendental question of the reality of the external 
world” disappears.604 
 
Let’s begin by looking at why Quine thinks that traditional scepticism, interpreted in a 
certain way, ends up being incoherent. Quine often presents traditional scepticism as if it 
is a form of first philosophical theorising. Recall from Chapter 1 that one way in which 
theorising can be first philosophical is if it aspires to provide a perspective on the nature of 
reality that transcends our ongoing scientific claims about it. Now, at times, Quine 
interprets traditional sceptical worries as attempting to aspire to such a perspective. For 
example, in one paper, Quine dismisses a transcendental notion of reality that science 
aspires to mirror as being first philosophical, and so as illegitimate. Quine then relates this 
idea to scepticism, writing: “[r]adical skepticism stems from the sort of confusion I have 
alluded to”.605 That is, a sceptical challenge could be interpreted as taking the form of an 
attempt to invoke standards or evidence concerning reality that are supposed to be external 
to science which can then be used to undermine our knowledge of the world. Obviously, 
such a sceptical approach has no credence from the perspective of the naturalist since they 
insist that there are no standards or evidence that transcend those found within science. 
Quine makes this clear when he writes: 
 
 
603 Quine’s naturalistic treatment of scepticism is also the source of many complaints. 
Namely, that scepticism is meant to challenge science, but Quine, in assuming science to 
answer these challenges, does something viciously circular to avoid scepticism. See 
Hookway, C. 1988. p.56. Stroud, B. 1984. Ch. 6 
604 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.21. See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.31 f28. His 
response, like mine, is to stress that one can interpret traditional scepticism as a scientifically 
immanent challenge, which Quine views as coherent but not motivated, and a transcendental 
or first philosophical challenge, which is rejected as illegitimate. 
605 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.22 
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We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is 
evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses; for, to do so is simply to 
dissociate the terms ‘reality’ and ‘evidence’ from the very applications which originally 
did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us.606 
 
For these reasons, the naturalist rejects traditional scepticism, interpreted as first 
philosophical, as being illegitimate. In this way, the naturalist’s perspective is, as Quine 
puts it, that “[w]hat evaporates is the transcendental question of the reality of the external 
world—the question of whether or in how far our science measures up to the Ding an 
sich.”607 
 
Now, alternatively, Quine could interpret traditional scepticism in another way. That is, he 
could view the doubts that the sceptic puts forward as doubts that take place immanently 
within science. Quine sometimes writes of this as being the only sense that he can make of 
transcendental worries about the reality of the external world. For example, Quine writes: 
 
Transcendental argument, or what purports to be first philosophy, tends generally to 
take on rather this status of immanent epistemology insofar as I succeed in making 
sense of it.608 
 
The traditionalist will reject this reading of the sceptical challenge since they are aiming to 
challenge science from some independent perspective, but Quine insists that, in rejecting 
the coherence of such a perspective, the naturalist is “enlightened in recognizing that the 
sceptical challenge springs from science itself”.609 That is, the naturalist recognizes that 
“sceptical doubts are scientific doubts.”610 
 
To demonstrate this point, Quine considers the sort of evidence that the sceptic could 
appeal to. For example, if one wanted to show that the information provided by experience 
 
606 ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, pp.229-30. See also Word and Object, p.3 
607 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.22. See also ‘Structure and Nature’: “what reality 
is really like…is self-stultifying”. p.405 
608 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.22 
609 The Roots of Reference, p.3 
610 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, p.258 
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is unreliable, one might cite an optical illusion. This claim has to be understood as coming 
from within our ongoing scientific theory. Quine writes: 
 
Ancient skepticism, in its more primitive way, likewise challenged science from within. 
The skeptics cited familiar illusions to show the fallibility of the senses; but this 
concept of illusion itself rested on natural science, since the quality of illusion consisted 
simply in deviation from external scientific reality.611 
 
That is, the type of phenomenon that a sceptic would cite in support of scepticism, e.g. an 
illusion where a stick appears bent when placed in water, requires that we make sense of a 
distinction between reality and illusion. Quine then stresses that such a distinction only 
makes sense within the context of our ongoing scientific theory. That is, illusions can only 
be seen to be illusions “relative to a prior acceptance of genuine bodies with which to 
contrast them.”612 The naturalist, of course, insists that our “acceptance of genuine bodies” 
involves an acceptance that such things are paradigmatically real. In this way, “common 
sense about bodies is thus needed as a springboard for scepticism.”613 Without this 
anchoring, we can’t make sense of a distinction between reality and illusion, since 
illusions are meant to provide evidence of something that veers away from that which is 
taken as real within science. Moreover, the sceptic needs to appeal to things like the 
regularities of nature that sceptical phenomena are meant to go against, e.g. that sticks 
don’t normally bend when placed in water. Such phenomena are also part of our scientific 
theory of the world. 
 
With scepticism understood as an internal challenge to science, Quine insists that the 
sceptic has little scientific motivation for the plausibility of their challenge. That is, the 
challenge makes sense, but it’s not a threat to science. Sceptical hypotheses like sticks 
appearing bent when placed in water or the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, understood 
immanently, simply aren’t empirically motivated given that they don’t arise as concerns 
within scientific inquiry. In one place, for example, Quine describes the sceptic “merely as 
overreacting” to the idea that they have evidence which undermines science.614 
 
611 The Roots of Reference, pp.2-3 
612 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, p.257 
613 Ibid, p.258 
614 ‘Things and Their Place in Theories’, p.22 
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So, traditional scepticism does not find itself in good standing in relation to the outlook of 
naturalized epistemology. Either the sceptic attempts to provide a first philosophical 
challenge to science, a view that the naturalist rejects as illegitimate, or, they concede that 
their challenge takes place within science, a position that the naturalist dismisses as 
unmotivated. Interestingly, though, this reveals that the naturalist does not rule out the 
position of scepticism completely. Quine suggests this when he writes the following: 
 
…the term ‘reality’, the term ‘real’, is a scientific term on a par with ‘table’, ‘chair’, 
‘electron’, ‘neutrino’, ‘class’…all these are part of our scientific apparatus, our 
terminology, so that the only sense I can make of scepticism is that somehow our 
theory is wrong…615 
 
Quine notes that the worry that “somehow our theory is wrong” is, in itself, a reasonable one 
to have, however, his point is that the more weight that we place on doubts like these, the less 
plausible our doubt becomes. 
 
 
3.6.2 Speculation and Naturalized Epistemology 
 
Now that we have an understanding of the naturalized epistemologist’s multifaceted 
attitude towards scepticism, let’s return to the issue that prompted this detour, i.e. that of 
making sense of the speculative nature of the naturalist’s epistemological inquiry. In this 
section, I make sense of this aspect of Quine’s view by establishing that the project that 
the naturalized epistemologist undertakes can be viewed as addressing a naturalistically 
legitimate sceptical worry.  
 
Recall that the naturalized epistemologist’s project is to provide a scientific account of the 
relationship between science and its evidence. That is, the naturalist aims to provides an 
account of how human organisms are able to go from the input that they receive to having 
a scientific theory about the nature of the universe. As I explained in §3.5, such a project 
 
615 ‘Exchange Between Donald Davidson and W.V. Quine Following Davidson’s Lecture’, 
p.152. See Verhaegh, S. 2018. p.31 
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belongs approximately within psychology, since it concerns the psychological 
development of human beings. More precisely, because the project is general and abstract 
in its nature, it belongs within the philosophical periphery of psychology.  
 
With this in in mind, consider the following way in which Quine presents his project: 
 
Science itself teaches that there is no clairvoyance; that the only information that can 
reach our sensory surfaces from external objects must be limited to two-dimensional 
optical projections and various impacts of air waves on the eardrums and some gaseous 
reactions in the nasal passages and a few kindred odds and ends. How, the challenge 
proceeds, could one hope to find out about the external world from such meagre traces? 
In short, if our science were true, how could we know it?616 
 
Here, then, Quine presents a “challenge”. That is, science tells us that we have certain 
input which then eventually leads us to produce scientific theorising as an output, and the 
naturalized epistemologist is concerned with working out how this can be the case. This is 
a challenge because natural science, as it stands, does not have an answer to this problem. 
 
Crucially, Quine does not present this as a challenge that one should attempt only for the 
light that it will shed on the nature of the relationship between science and its evidence. 
That is, he also stresses that addressing this problem is important in overcoming a 
challenge to science. We see this when, right before explaining the project that the 
naturalized epistemologist undertakes, he writes that “the epistemologist is confronting a 
challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science.”617  
 
To better understand this point, consider the way in which Quine explains the relationship 
between epistemology and scepticism generally. Quine thinks that doubt is the vital 
motivation in epistemology. We see this clearly when he writes: 
 
Doubt has oft been said to be the mother of philosophy. This has a true ring for those of 
us who look upon philosophy primarily as the theory of knowledge. For the theory of 
 
616 Roots of Reference, p.2. See also Pursuit of Truth, p.1 
617 Roots of Reference, p.2. Emphasis added. See also ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. p.76. 
pp.83-4 
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knowledge has its origin in doubt, in scepticism. Doubt is what prompts us to try to 
develop a theory of knowledge.618 
 
Doubt is what motivates epistemologists to search for something firmer than science. That 
is, they realise that scientific knowledge is fallible, and so they try to find something more 
secure than science. As I’ve explained, Quine rejects the coherence of this aspiration and 
insists that such doubts must spring from within science. However, it is exactly this point 
that Quine is making when he insists that the naturalist is dealing with a challenge to 
science. Expanding the quote given above, we see that he writes: 
 
This fear of circularity is a case of needless logical timidity, even granted the project of 
substantiating our knowledge of the external world. The crucial logical point is that the 
epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within 
natural science.619 
 
This shows that Quine thinks that there is a further important commonality between the 
project of naturalized epistemology and the traditional doctrinal approach to epistemology; 
a commonality beyond their more general concern with the issue of how science relates to 
its evidence. We see further evidence for this when Quine characterises naturalized 
epistemology in the following way: 
 
A far cry, this, from old epistemology. Yet it is no gratuitous change of subject matter, 
but an enlightened persistence rather in the original epistemological problem. It is 
enlightened in recognizing that in coping with it we are free to use scientific 
knowledge.620  
 
Now, in emphasising that epistemology is focussed on “the original epistemological 
problem”, Quine is emphasising that he is focussed on the problem of overcoming doubt. 
That is, the naturalized epistemologist is focussed on addressing a sceptical issue. All of 
these points, of course, have to be understood immanently within science. That is, Quine is 
 
618 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’. p.257. See also ‘Lectures on Hume’s Philosophy’, 
pp.50-59 
619 Roots of Reference, p.2. Emphasis added. 
620 The Roots of Reference, p.3 
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not attempting to address a transcendental sceptical worry, nor is he attempting to justify 
science by providing a science-independent foundation for it. But Quine is stressing that 
the naturalist is still concerned with “the project of substantiating our knowledge of the 
external world”. We see this focus when he writes: 
 
The epistemologist thus emerges as a defender or protector. He no longer dreams of a 
first philosophy, firmer than science, on which science can be based; he is out to defend 
science from within, against its self-doubts.621 
 
In order to appreciate why there are scientific doubts which motivate the project that 
naturalized epistemology is concerned with, it is vital to appreciate the asymmetry 
between the input and the output that are relevant to this project. In Quine’s 
characterisation of this challenge, he stresses that at either side of the relation between 
science and its evidence we have drastically different phenomena. The output, i.e. science, 
is impressive and “torrential”.622 That is, it is a force to be reckoned with. At the other 
side, Quine stresses that the input seems impoverished. For example, he writes about “our 
meagre contacts with [the world]; the “mere impacts of rays and particles on our 
surfaces”; “how limited the evidence is”; the “meagre traces” that experience provides us 
with.623 Here, then, we have a problem that is especially challenging because of the picture 
of the input that science provides us with. This asymmetric picture shows that human 
beings have a long way to go from the input that they receive from the world to having a 
scientific theory. As Quine stresses: “[i]t was science itself…that demonstrated the 
limitedness of the evidence for science.”624 In this way, the scientific doubt that the 
naturalized epistemologist is protecting us from is a type of poverty of the stimulus 
problem. That is, given the quality of the input that science tells us that we have, there is a 
genuine challenge to account for how this input is sufficient to lead us to a scientific 
theory of the world.  
 
 
621 Ibid 
622 ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, p.83 
623 From Stimulus to Science, p.16, ‘The Scope and Language of Science’, p.229, Roots of 
Reference, p.2. Emphasis added to all. 
624 Ibid, p.3 
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Moreover, with the project of naturalized epistemology understood in this way, we can 
appreciate Quine’s view of what a legitimate sceptical challenge to naturalized epistemology 
would be. This would be the worry that the challenge that the naturalist addresses cannot be 
overcome. We see this when Quine writes the following in response to his acknowledgement 
that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts: 
 
I am not accusing the sceptic of begging the question. He is quite within his rights in 
assuming science in order to refute science; this, if carried out, would be a 
straightforward argument by reduction ad absurdum. I am only making the point that 
sceptical doubts are scientific doubts.625 
 
This refutation of science, coming from within science, would show that we can’t arrive at 
our theory of the world merely from the input that such a theory tells us we receive.626 In 
other words, the stimulus is too impoverished. 
 
To clarify, viewing naturalized epistemology as focussed on addressing this sceptical worry 
should not undermine the idea that naturalized epistemology is also focussed on addressing 
the issue of how science relates to its evidence. Indeed, carrying out the project of naturalized 
epistemology addresses both of these issues. We see clear evidence of this when Quine 
emphasises that: 
 
His [i.e. the naturalist’s] project becomes one of major scientific and philosophical 
interest, moreover, even apart from protective motives — even apart from any thought 
of a skeptical challenge. For we can grant fully the truth of natural science and still 
raise the question, within natural science, how it is that man works up his command of 
that science from the limited impingements that are available to his sensory surfaces.627  
 
The philosophical interest that Quine is referring to here is both the light that such an 
investigation would shine on the relationship between theory and evidence, and the extent 
 
625 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, p.258 
626 Indeed, Van Fraassen appears to offer such a challenge. Namely, he claims that Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology fails because empiricism is inadequate to account for science. In 
other words, that the stimulus is too impoverished. Van Fraassen, B. 1995. For a reply, see 
Roth, P. 1999. p.103 f27 
627 The Roots of Reference, p.3 
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to which it would show that humans go beyond that evidence. So, the central motive of the 
naturalized epistemologist may be to deal with the internal doubts that science has, but 
there are additional valuable motives for carrying out this project. To properly enjoy the 
gains associated with these latter motives, the epistemologist merely has to put any doubt 
to one side.  
 
Now that I’ve explained the way in which naturalized epistemology can be viewed as 
addressing a naturalistically motivated sceptical challenge, let me finally use this finding 
to explain the speculative nature of Quine’s approach to tackling this problem. Quine’s 
speculative response is explainable by the very nature of the challenge that it is 
addressing. The challenge is to show, consistent with science and from within science, that 
what science tells us about our input from the world is sufficient to lead to our possession 
of science.628 In other words, Quine is concerned with the question of how we could go 
from stimulus to science. That story, rather than the stricter story of how we actually go 
from stimulus to science, is sufficient to dissolve the sceptical worry, i.e. it is sufficient to 
solve the challenge at the heart of naturalized epistemology. This establishes that a 
speculative approach to this issue is entirely appropriate. A stricter scientific account of 
how humans actually psychologically develop from receiving stimulation to developing a 
scientific theory would also dissolve this worry, but such an account is not necessary.  
 
In addressing this challenge, Quine is engaged in a project that is similar in important 
respects to the sort of rational reconstruction that Carnap attempted in the Aufbau. That is, 
all that the naturalized epistemologist has to do is provide an account of how human 
organisms could go from stimulus to science. We see this when Quine presents his view in 
the following terms: 
 
His [the naturalized epistemologist’s] problem is that of finding ways, in keeping with 
natural science, whereby the human animal can have projected this same science from 
the sensory information that could reach him according to this science.629 
 
 
628 See also Kemp, G. 2012. p.28 
629 The Roots of Reference, p.2 
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In this way, the answer that Quine provides to this challenge does not, strictly, need to be 
true to the fine-grained details of what goes on when human beings acquire cognitive 
language. Such a level of specificity and depth is simply not required to meet the 
challenge, welcomed though it would be. In this way, Quine’s approach is plainly 
speculative, but it is speculative for a good reason, i.e. because that is exactly the sort of 
approach the naturalized epistemologist should conduct, given the nature of their project. 
This makes sense of Quine’s claim that “[s]peculation is allowable if recognized for what 
it is and conducted with a view to the possible access of evidence at some future stage.”630 
 
In this claim, we also see that Quine, unsurprisingly, sees the position that he puts forward 
as being sensitive to empirical evidence as well as suggestive of providing direction for 
further research. Quine accepts that his epistemological views are fallible (and, indeed, 
that they are likely to need correction, given that they are speculative) and, so, if it was the 
case that other claims within science conflict with his epistemological views, then they are 
open to be corrected. We see evidence for this in numerous places. For example, Quine 
writes: 
 
Such speculations [on the development of cognitive language] would gain, certainly, 
from experimental investigation of the child’s actual learning of language. 
Experimental findings already available in the literature could perhaps be used to 
sustain or correct these conjectures at points, and further empirical investigation could 
be devised.631 
 
And also: 
 
There is substantial literature on the child’s mental and linguistic development, much of 
it from Jean Piaget’s group in Geneva around 1960 and much of it later. The data 
recorded in these sources could perhaps be mined and reworked to account for the steps 
of development that are concerning us here. Such an inquiry would no doubt suggest 
further empirical studies directed at our present concerns.632 
 
 
630 The Roots of Reference, p.34 
631 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, pp.267-68 
632 From Stimulus to Science, p.38 
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Moreover, in viewing epistemology as an internal affair of science, Quine does not think 
that his speculations originate from some source of pure philosophical insight, or from 
some other location that is disconnected from ongoing science. His views may be 
speculative, but they arise from reflecting on what science tells us is the case, i.e. they are 
put forward as claims that build upon scientific knowledge. We see this when Quine 
writes: “I have no experiments or excavations to report, but there has been room for 
insights by just raising new questions against existing knowledge.”633 This, Quine thinks, 
is just a common trait of an investigation that is scientific. He writes: “[it] is a matter, as 
always in science, of tackling one problem with the help of our answers to others.”634  
 
So, the naturalized epistemologist makes claims that are purposefully speculative, but, at 
the same time, these claims are not meant to be detached from ongoing science. Now, 
recall that the challenge that the naturalized epistemologist is facing is distinctively 
philosophical, that is, in concerning the question of how theory and evidence relate, it 
belongs to a notably general and abstract part of our scientific theorising. It is this more 
philosophical aspect of the project that explains why the naturalized epistemologist begins 
by considering claims that impinge on many fields of science, and then speculates about 
how these pieces could fit together. This has to occur before one can really identify what 
experimental tests would be needed in order to provide a more refined perspective on what 
happens when we go from stimulus to science. Quine makes this clear when he 
characterises the approach of the naturalized epistemologist in the following terms: 
 
…a speculative approach…seems required to begin with, in order to isolate just the 
factual questions that bear on our purposes. For our objective here is still philosophical 
– a better understanding of the relations between evidence and scientific theory. 
Moreover, the way to this objective requires consideration of linguistics and logic along 
with psychology. This is why the speculative phase has to precede, for the most part, 
the formulation of relevant questions to be posed to the experimental psychologist.635 
 
The general and abstract nature of the challenge that the naturalized epistemologist is 
addressing also makes sense of the imprecise nature of Quine’s claims. In addressing this 
 
633 ‘The Growth of Mind and Language’, p.182 
634 From Stimulus to Science p.16 
635 ‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’, pp.267-68 
 
 
212 
issue, Quine is only required to provide an account that is true in a general sense, rather 
than providing an account that aims at being true to the precise details of what goes on 
when we acquire cognitive language. Quine makes this clear when he writes: 
 
In any event the present speculations, however inaccurate, are presumably true to the 
general nature of language acquisition. And already they help us to understand how the 
logical links are forged that connect theoretical sentences with the reports of 
observation.636 
 
That is, Quine’s claims only need to be true to such an extent that they can afford us a 
picture, consistent with and internal to science, of how humans could go from stimulus to 
science. Nothing more precise than this is required. As Quine puts it, what he is offering is 
merely “a vague picture of how it has to be.”637 
 
Moreover, similar thoughts can explain why the naturalized epistemologist provides 
merely a caricature of how science relates to its evidence. The picture that Quine provides 
concerns, as he puts it, “the central logical structure of empirical evidence”, or the 
question “of how our knowledge of the external world is possible.”638 Quine stresses that 
the “essentials” of this relation “can be schematized by means of little more than logical 
analysis.”639 In addressing this question, Quine explains the relation of the more 
theoretical reaches of science to naturalistic notions like observation categoricals, which 
he then relates to observation sentences, and, ultimately, to our sensory interface with the 
external world. Such a picture leaves a lot of the minute details of the process of scientific 
theorising unaccounted for. For example, it says little about how science is sensitive to its 
evidence, or how science is testable, when the part of our theory that we are concerned 
with is tested in highly indirect ways. However, given the nature of the project that Quine 
is undertaking, he is not required to burden himself with providing such precise details.  
 
Indeed, this philosophical perspective is appreciable in many of the important notions that 
Quine makes use of within naturalized epistemology. Such notions, though crucial to 
 
636 Ibid 
637 The Roots of Reference, p.84 
638 Ibid, p.2 
639 Pursuit of Truth. p.2 
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Quine’s project, are at a considerable distance from the more fine-grained scientific details 
concerning what goes on when human beings acquire cognitive language. Observation 
sentences, the cornerstone of Quine’s picture of how science relates to its evidence, are a 
good example of this. Quine writes: 
 
Among the myriad manifestations of these largely unfathomed processes [that take 
place when we acquire scientific theories], one outcome is a neat correlation between 
certain ranges of sensory stimulation and certain sentences. Exploiting these 
correlations, we can happily leave all the bewildering intervening processes to the 
neurologists, interested though we are bound to be in what they find out about them.640 
 
That is, observation sentences are vital since they allow the naturalized epistemologist to 
put the more particular scientific details to the side while pursuing the epistemologically 
important ones, i.e. those relevant to the epistemological challenge that the naturalized 
epistemologist is dealing with.   
 
In summary, then, this section has argued that understanding the speculative nature of 
naturalized epistemology requires appreciating that the central motivation for conducting 
the project that it undertakes is to address a naturalistically legitimate form of scepticism. 
Attaining this perspective allows us to explain why Quine gives an account that is 
speculative and not directly concerned with the fine-grained truths about the psychological 
development of human organisms. This perspective is speculative, but it is, I have argued, 
speculative in a purposeful way such that it does not threaten Quine’s naturalistic integrity. 
 
Finally, let me briefly summarise the findings of this chapter. Here, my aim has been to 
provide a detailed analysis of the subtle and complex relationship between Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology and the traditional forms of empiricism that he engages with. I 
have established that there are minimal but fundamental similarities between these forms 
of empiricism. Namely, as I established in §3.2, these views share a minimal commitment 
to the basic creed of empiricism, and, as I argued in §3.5, they are also focussed on the 
relation of science to its evidence. For these reasons, it seems plausible to view them as 
forms of the same view, i.e. as forms of empiricism, and as forms of empiricism that 
 
640 ‘The Sensory Support of Science’, p.339 
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undertake an epistemological project. However, close examination of these similarities in 
§3.3-§3.6 revealed that there are also crucial differences between the empiricist theories 
that are important to Quine. The naturalized epistemologist does not attempt to provide an 
empirical foundation for science, as the doctrinal epistemologist tries to, nor do they 
attempt to reduce science to sensory experience, as the reductive phenomenalist aspires to. 
Rather, the naturalized epistemologist stays anchored to science, with their inquiry being 
located within the philosophical periphery of psychology. They attempt to provide a 
scientific account of our scientific knowledge, embracing the circularity inherent in their 
view.  
 
The upshot of this discussion is twofold. First, I take it that we now have a better 
contextualised understanding of naturalized epistemology with respect to the alternative 
empiricist views that Quine responds to. Second, appreciating the complex differences 
between naturalistic and traditional forms of empiricism makes it clear that, although 
Quine’s commitment to empiricism appears to be sustained throughout his work, applying 
the generic label of ‘empiricism’ to Quine’s overall philosophy is liable to suggest much 
too simplistic a picture of his development. Throughout the timeline of Quine’s 
philosophical development, his commitment to empiricism may be unwavering, but this 
can only be true in a very minimal sense given these differences between traditional and 
naturalistic approaches to empiricism. That is, given that Quine is not a naturalist in his 
early work, and is at least tolerant of a more traditional approach at this time, it is clear 
that the way in which Quine engages with empiricism changes throughout his 
development, and this ought to be reflected in the way in which we understand Quine’s 
place within the landscape of empiricism.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, we began with a worry about how we ought to understand the nature and 
development of Quine’s naturalism. That is, we saw that Quine’s naturalism, while 
commonly taken to be the systematic core of his philosophical views, can be difficult to 
elucidate. Here, I have endeavoured to clarify Quine’s commitment to naturalism, and 
consequently utilise this analysis in order to provide a holistic and nuanced interpretation of 
various important aspects of Quine’s work, including a variety of his key philosophical 
commitments and the development of his thought throughout his career. The fact that Quine 
is not committed to naturalism until shortly after ‘Two Dogmas’ reveals that Quine’s 
philosophical worldview cannot be felicitously understood as revolving around a stable 
commitment to naturalism. Instead, we must recognize that Quine’s early openness to first 
philosophical theorising and subsequent shift to naturalism influences the way in which we 
should understand vital aspects of his thought, such as the development of his attitude 
towards analyticity, and his longstanding commitment to empiricism. These findings, I 
propose, motivate and lay the foundations of a more nuanced and cautious understanding of 
Quine.   
 
In Chapter 1, I established that Quine was not always a naturalist. To do this, §1.2 motivated 
the idea that Quine’s naturalism is commonly thought to extend far into his early work. §1.3 
then provided a thorough characterisation of Quine’s naturalism. This showed naturalism to 
be a restrictive and nuanced perspective on philosophical inquiry which requires the 
philosopher to always be working within science. I then argued, in §1.4, that Quine’s early 
work is not naturalistic by demonstrating that Quine was open to a form of first philosophical 
theorising until at least 1951. I concluded the chapter by investigating Quine’s later argument 
against phenomenalism which found evidence for the idea that the emergence of Quine’s 
naturalism takes place soon after ‘Two Dogmas’.  
 
In Chapter 2, I carefully analysed the development of Quine’s evolving views on analyticity 
in order to better understand their nature and significance, including their relation to the 
development of naturalism. In §2.2.1, I started by motivating my investigation. To this end, I 
provided reasons for thinking that Quine’s problems with analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ are 
vital for the development of naturalism. I then provided two considerations which undermine 
the idea that Quine’s outlook undergoes an important development in that paper. Namely, the 
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fact that Quine’s doubts about analyticity are often understood to have existed for a long time 
before ‘Two Dogmas’, and, the fact that Quine displays an unfavourable attitude towards the 
paper because he thinks it’s substance is negative. I explained that these considerations, then, 
also undermine the idea that the paper could be important for Quine’s development towards 
naturalism. To aide my investigation, in §2.2.2, I identified four vital features Quine’s 
perspective in ‘Two Dogmas’. My investigation, carried out in §2.3, found that Quine’s 
views on analyticity develop in a complicated but fairly natural way from optimistic 
beginnings to dismal pessimism. Crucially, I maintained that Quine’s perspective in ‘Two 
Dogmas’ represents a substantial step forward in his development because in the paper he 
first presents a holistic picture of inquiry against verificationism, and so, in turn, against the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. This showed that the idea that Quine had doubts about 
analyticity long before ‘Two Dogmas’ is misleading unless it’s understood in a carefully 
qualified way. I then ended the chapter, in §2.4, by offering some thoughts about why ‘Two 
Dogmas’ is important for the development of naturalism. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 3, I endeavoured to elucidate Quine’s naturalistic empiricism. To this 
end, I conducted a detailed inquiry into the relationship between naturalistic and 
traditional forms of empiricism. I argued that these views share two vital features. 
Namely, as I demonstrated in §3.2, they are committed to the basic creed of empiricism, 
and, as I established in §3.5, they are focussed on the question of how science relates to its 
evidence. In these ways, these views all seem to be forms of empiricism that are occupied 
with an epistemological project. However, I argued that these similarities are fairly 
minimal, and that close examination (provided in §3.3-§3.6) reveals that there are also 
important differences between these views. Of particular note is the fact that Quine, as a 
naturalist, does not attempt to reduce science to its sensory evidence, nor does he attempt 
to conduct epistemological inquiry from a perspective that is independent of our ongoing 
scientific theory. On both of these points, Quine’s naturalistic view contrasts with the 
traditional forms of empiricism that it is presented against. Instead, the naturalized 
epistemologist conducts epistemology from within science, located at the philosophical 
periphery of psychological theorising. I contend that these findings prompt a more 
nuanced understanding of Quine’s empiricism.  
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